A man holds a symbol of the Patriot Party during a political rally in Solola (Jorge Lopez/Courtesy Reuters).
Front-runner Otto Pérez Molina won 36% of the vote in first round of Guatemala’s presidential elections on Sunday, and will face off against second place finisher Manuel Baldizón in the second round in November. Though winning the runoff election will not be easy for either candidate (both have to build coalitions to clinch a second-round victory); far trickier will be facing Guatemala’s long list of challenges, topped by insecurity.
Guatemala’s murder rate has more than doubled in the last twenty years, reaching a high in 2009 when nearly 6,500 people were killed – 17 a day — more than in the war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the past four years the government of Álvaro Colom has been unable to quell the violence or bring its perpetrators to justice. During the campaign the leading presidential candidates advocated a mano dura, or iron fist security policy, with Pérez Molina as its most forceful proponent (his Patriot Party has a clenched fist as its emblem). He even proposed bringing back the notorious military task forces used against guerrillas in the 1980s and 1990s, this time to take on drug traffickers.
It is unlikely this strategy will work. Guatemala’s military today doesn’t have the capacity to ramp up its public safety functions. As a part of the 1996 peace agreements (ending 36 years of civil war) the military agreed to downsize. The current force stands at 17,000 troops (roughly 60 percent less than 1990 levels). Earlier this year, when the government called a state of siege in the northern province of Alta Verapaz taken hostage by traffickers, the military could only send 600 soldiers in to patrol the area – less than one tenth the size of the Mexican military force sent to fight the La Familia cartel in Michoacán in 2006. After the operation, President Colom himself admitted that the military could not match the drug traffickers’ vast resources, noting “just the weapons seized in Alta Verapaz are more than those of some army brigades.”
But the issue is not just one of capacity. Even if the government found the resources to beef up the military, it shouldn’t be the force to take over the fight against organized crime. If deploying the armed forces in Mexico’s drug war is considered controversial, in Guatemala it is decidedly more complicated. The Guatemalan army enjoys considerably less citizen trust than their Mexican counterparts due to their long and ignominious involvement in the country’s brutal civil conflict. The U.N. truth commission report (whose findings Pérez Molina questions) deemed the war a genocide, and blamed the army for 93 percent of the massacres of innocent civilians that occurred. Breaking the peace accords’ promise to keep the military out of citizen security would be a step backward to a past many would rather not revisit.
Growing evidence too suggests the military itself may well have ties to organized crime. Reports from the UN peacekeeping mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), and a number of NGOs show that long standing military ties with the criminal groups that today work with Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers. The Kaibiles, an elite special operations force, trained some of the Mexican soldiers that would later become the Zetas, and many former Kaibiles now work full time for the cartels.
If the army is not the right choice for improving security, the only alternative is the National Civil Police (PNC). Unfortunately, the PNC faces many of these same challenges: a lack of manpower, resources, and public trust. Furthermore, the U.S. and the Guatemalan government have tried a number of times, and on the whole failed to reinvent the PNC in the past.
Still, trying again is the least bad alternative. And there are a few hopeful signs from the past year. With new wiretapping, plea bargaining and seized assets laws in place (in no small part due to the work of CICIG), the police have arrested some high-ranking drug traffickers and suspects in high-profile murders. With human rights leader Helen Mack at the helm of a new police reform initiative, some observers are more optimistic about the chances of finally building a professionalized Guatemalan police force.
As the U.S. and other countries in the region look to begin working with the new administration, security assistance – including Mérida funds — should focus on strengthening the national police (and court systems). Despite the PNC’s past failures, and Guatemala’s weak institutions in general, the issue of security is simply too important to let fall by the wayside, or worse, into the wrong hands.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
A general view of Sao Paulo, the biggest Latin American city (Paolo Whitaker/Courtesy Reuters).
A new piece by Eduardo Guerrero in Nexos looks at the growing problem of extortion in Mexico. Differentiating it from drug trafficking, he finds it more brutal and violence, and argues it is on the rise for three reasons: fragmentation of cartels, displacement of crime rings (and their response to expand into new territories), and finally rampant impunity for such acts.
Drug abuse in the United States is on the uptick overall, though use of “harder drugs” seems to be down, according to a recent study by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Marijuana use has increased some 20 percent over the last four years, particularly among young people. Today more than one in five Americans aged 18-25 get high on a regular basis. On the other hand, rates of methamphetamine and cocaine abuse have been steadily declining since 2006.
The World Economic Forum released its Global Competitiveness report this week, which measures competitiveness based on twelve benchmarks that include “basic requirements”, such as institutions, “efficiency enhancers” such as market size, and “innovation and sophistication factors”, such as innovation. Among Latin American countries, Mexico had the biggest boost in the rankings, moving up 8 spots from 66th to 58th, and improving on 10 of the 12 categories (its only drop was in macroeconomic environment). Brazil also made gains, up 5 places to 53rd overall (due largely to the size of its internal market and its sophisticated business environment), and Chile remains at the top of the region and the 31st most competitive nation worldwide. Central American countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua registered steep declines in their ratings, due to weakening institutions and rising insecurity, while Argentina and Venezuela remained generally unchanged, but near the bottom of the list at 84th and 124thoverall, respectively.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Passengers on a bus pass a vehicle painted with a slogan during an anti-drugs campaign to mark International Anti-Drug Day in Jakarta (Dadang Tri/Courtesy Reuters).
The “drug war” strategy of the last four decades revolves primarily around supply side measures. Whether eradication, interdiction, or arrests, it fixates on stopping the seemingly endless flow of drugs and cash across U.S. borders. But there is obviously another side to the equation – U.S. demand. The United States is the largest consumer of drugs across the globe (though there are signs that the cocaine and marijuana markets in Europe and the developing world are catching up) with 1 in every 7 Americans having tried an illegal substance. Marijuana accounts for the vast majority of that consumption, followed by prescription drugs and cocaine.
Three basic strategies underlie the traditional approach to dealing with drug abuse at home: prevention, treatment and enforcement. Prevention programs seek to stop substance abuse by educating primarily schoolchildren on the dangers of narcotics. Even with their memorable slogans (such as Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaign or Drug Abuse Resistance Education’s “D.A.R.E. to resist drugs and violence”) the results have been disappointing. A number of studies show these efforts – costing millions of dollars – may slightly slow marijuana experimentation among teens.
Treatment programs, particularly when focused on rehab for heavy drug users, are by far the most cost effective U.S. policy. For every million dollars spent, these programs reduce lifetime cocaine consumption by 100 grams.This may not seem like a lot, but it is more than three times as effective as preventive programs and punitive measures. Investing in treatment also yields impressive returns in terms of public safety, as every dollar spent on substance abuse rehabilitation reduces the costs of associated crime by an estimated seven dollars. Still, soaring dropout rates – even within mandatory programs — question the long-term benefits of formal treatment for the relatively few drug addicts who choose to participate.
A final major element of demand side in the United States has been enforcement, namely incarceration of those selling and using drugs. From 1972-2002, the number of drug offenders behind bars increased twelve-fold (accounting for about half of the total growth of the federal prison population). This has hit African American communities the hardest, as 1 in every 3 black males goes to prison at some point in his life (1 in 15 black adults are currently behind bars). This is at least in part because the punishments for crack are harsher than those for powder cocaine, leading to longer sentences for black vs. white offenders. This style of stepped up enforcement doesn’t seem to have changed the fundamental drug markets, at least not for the better. Cocaine and heroin prices have hit all-time lows, indicating greater availability, while purity has increased by more than half in recent years. Methamphetamine rose from near obscurity in the early nineties to become the drug of choice for roughly 1.5 million Americans today.
Latin American officials such as presidents Felipe Calderon of Mexico and Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia are increasingly calling on the United States to do more to reduce consumption, and a recent report co-authored by former President of Brazil Fernando Henrique Cardoso urged a “paradigm shift” in global drug policy to treat “drug addiction as a health issue, reducing drug demand through educational initiatives and legally regulating rather than criminalizing cannabis.” So what should the U.S. government do?
Some experts favor legalizing narcotics, putting an end to drug war once and for all. These advocates maintain that making drugs commercially available will replace illicit markets with formal ones, and thus eliminate the violence of the illegal drug trade. Researchers have found that legalizing marijuana would not necessarily lead to a rise in substance abuse (since those that want to get high today can, at least in many states, do it quite easily), and could slash one fifth of Mexican cartels’ profits. Ending the prohibition on harder drugs may not have the same effect, as legalization could prompt more consumption of cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine (because current enforcement against these drugs is more effective than for marijuana). To appreciate the potential costs of a surge in use, one need only to look at the double-edged consequences of ending the prohibition against alcohol. While the likes of Al Capone are history, Americans today are four times more likely to abuse alcohol than all illicit drugs combined. Alcohol-abusers are also more prone to break the law, as more than half of the current prison population committed their crimes drunk.
Other experts (especially those at RAND corp.) suggest we focus our anti-drug resources on enforcement that prioritizes harm reduction. The idea here is not to lock people up indiscriminately, but to go after the most violent drug traffickers and retail dealers. While this may not alter the availability and price of drugs (current policies haven’t done this either), it would they suggest reduce the effects on the larger community and population – whether here in the United States or in places such as Mexico.
For the past three decades Washington has spent the bulk (an average of two thirds) of anti-drug resources on supply side solutions. Even as the U.S. drug control budget expanded by more than 50 percent in recent years, expenditures for demand side policies remained stagnant, growing less than one percent per year over the past decade. Realizing that there is no easy solution on either side of the border, it is time to rethink these strategies, keeping in mind the brief successes and unfortunate failures of the last four decades.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Argentine President Fernandez waves to supporters after hearing the first results of the nationwide primary election in Buenos Aires (Enrique Maracarian/Courtesy Reuters).
The Pew Research Center released the results of a wide-ranging public opinion poll based on interviews with some 800 Mexicans (the study is part of their larger Global Attitudes Project). It finds strong continued support for military – 83 percent favor their role in the drug war – and for U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, with nearly 3 in 4 Mexicans supporting U.S. training and weapons for national security forces. Calderón, despite an economic recession and ever more bloody drug war, still enjoys the confidence of a majority of Mexicans, with 57% saying they view his political influence in a positive light. While these numbers look bad vis-à-vis past Mexican presidents entering their last term in office, other Western Hemisphere leaders (Barack Obama and Sebastian Piñera, for example) would be quite pleased with such levels of support.
A recent survey of the Guatemalan judiciary, on the other hand, paints rule of law institutions in a much more more troubling light. The Plaza Pública study shows that overall Guatemalans see judges as corrupt, controlled (by vested economic interests and other political elites), and inefficient.
This Cefeidas Group report provides an update on the Argentine elections, where Cristina Fernández de Kirchner looks even more likely to win a second term in the October 23rd election, due in part to the weakness of the opposition.
On a different note, Rolling Stone has an in-depth and well written article about La Barbie, a native Texan who rose to become the top drug kingpin in Acapulco. The behind the scenes narrative of his rise and fall shows why going after kingpins will not, on its own, make Mexico safer.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
A customs officer is handed a passport by a motorist at the San Ysidro border crossing (Fred Greaves/Courtesy Reuters).
The U.S. debates over Mexico’s drug war increasingly focus on spillover violence. Border state governors Rick Perry and Jan Brewer insist that Mexican cartels are hitting their states hard, portraying the border as a lawless “war zone” in which the drug cartels and illegal Mexicans incite “terror and mayhem” on a daily basis. In stark contrast, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner Alan Bersin and Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano contend that the border has never been safer.
The statistics bear out the latter position. A recent study based on FBI figures shows that violent crime in cities within 50 miles of the border is consistently lower than state and national averages. The robbery rate in the Texas border region, for example, remained at least 30 percent lower than the state average for every year in the past decade. The data also show that the number of kidnapping cases in border areas dropped by more than half since 2009. This doesn’t mean that bad things don’t happen – they do. But they happen less frequently along the border, on average, than in other parts of the United States. Despite local politicians’ concerns and rhetoric, the border is more secure than in the past, and in fact safer than the rest of the country.
But the downward trend in border violence does not mean that the Mexican drug war hasn’t had spillover effects on the United States. Among the most troubling is corruption. Local newspapers recount the stories of public officials engaged in foul play; from the South Texas county Sheriff Conrado Cantú, who took bribes from drug traffickers, to Columbus, New Mexico Mayor Eddie Espinoza, charged with operating a gun smuggling ring in connection with Mexican cartels. Available data also show a rise in corruption within the ranks of the border patrol. Since the reopening of the Homeland Security Bureau’s internal affairs unit in 2003 – in and of itself a reflection of the increased risk of corruption within the agency – cases of corruption against law enforcement officials on the border have more than doubled. Tales of CBP agents turning a blind eye to, and sometimes actively aiding drug traffickers smuggling narcotics, arms and migrants across the border abound.
The increase in corruption reflects the lure of drug money and the CBP’s institutional weaknesses. Doubling the border patrol’s numbers in less than a decade made it more vulnerable to corruption, diluting the once highly disciplined force with less experienced and committed newcomers. The border patrol administers lie detector tests to only 10 percent of applicants, more than half of which fail — raising serious concerns about the capability, and even intentions, of many of its new hires.
Other spillover effects are positive for the United States – namely increasing economic activity. Seemingly every day new restaurants, stores, and private schools are opening in border towns, serving clients that once traveled further south. Many attribute Texas’ strong real estate market to the influx of Mexican citizens eager for greater peace and stability. In the spring of 2008, when foreclosures hit record highs across the United States, real estate agents in El Paso reported steady sales of houses and apartments worth more than $100,000. The President of the Greater El Paso Association of Realtors, Dan Olivas, attributed the stability of the El Paso market to “a substantial number of people from Juarez coming over to buy properties for security reasons, for fear of kidnappings, extortion, and cartel violence.” This El Paso trend has continued, and spread more broadly.
Not only do Mexicans buy homes, but many are bringing their businesses north. Immigration consultants say inquiries from Mexicans for EB-5 investor visas – which cost $500,000, and require that applicants’ create at least 10 jobs in the U.S. within two years – have doubled in recent years. Mexico has quickly risen the ranks to become one of the top recipients of these visas.
Mexico’s drug war is indeed affecting the United States – but mostly in ways that politicians overlook, misunderstand, or (more cynically) choose not to recognize. The current policy prescriptions – a higher and longer border wall, more boots on the ground and predator drones overhead – won’t slow seeping corruption, nor bolster the beneficial economic ties. Unfortunately, the wrong diagnosis means also the wrong policy prescriptions, hurting both countries in the process.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents usher Fabio Ochoa, Colombian drug kingpin, to an awaiting vehicle following his extradition from Colombia to Florida, September 8, 2001(Courtesy Reuters).
One of the heralded lessons of Colombia’s fight against drug cartels is that fragmentation reduces violence. The vertical command structures of the famed Medellín and Cali cartels were legendary. Their pseudo-celebrity leaders lived extravagantly, socialized widely, and often died violently. They spent billions to buy off politicians, judges, and business leaders, and they spent more to assassinate adversaries they couldn’t buy, chasing their targets not just all over Colombia but the world. The country became, for a time, the most violent place on earth, the nationwide homicide rate topping 80 per 100,000 in 1991.
But a couple of decades later, the drastic levels of violence have fallen, the motorcycle assassins disappeared, the car bombs ended. The conventional story goes something like this: the killing first of Pablo Escobar and then the arrest and conviction of the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers fragmented the cartels and their command structures. From the ruins of the once centralized cartels sprang smaller – and less vicious – criminal organizations. While cocaine production and distribution (which hasn’t changed much) continued, violence fell.
A U.S. law enforcement official once told me that their antidrug strategy in Mexico was first to go after the wolves (the highest level cartel leaders), then go after the snakes (the next level down), and then clean up the remaining rats. The odd animal analogy aside, this strategy seems straight out of Colombia’s playbook.
Mexico has, in fact, done this fairly successfully. Of the 37 thugs on its Most Wanted list, 21 are either behind bars or six feet underground. Where once U.S. and Mexican officials cited four main criminal organizations, today the number has at least doubled, complemented by the rise of many smaller operations and local gangs. But as the Mexican cartels multiplied, violence escalated to all time highs.
Why the difference? Obviously Mexico and Colombia have different histories, and different security problems, so the reasons for divergent outcomes are multiple and complex. Perhaps one issue — seemingly forgotten in the transfer of “lessons learned” —is the direct targeting of the Colombian government by its cartels. In the early 1990s, at the peak of the violence, one of the biggest points of contention was Colombia’s extradition law. The drug cartels wrote open letters offering to stop the car bombs and assassinations, to retire from the drug business, to even pay off the national debt if extradition to the United States was taken off the table. Denied, the cartels tried to lay down their own version of the law on the nation. Fighting back, Colombian law enforcement slowly gained the advantage, and as these groups fragmented, violence declined.
In Mexico, by contrast, the cartels are not openly and directly confronting the state. Sure, they threaten, co-opt and even increasingly kill local and state police and elected representatives. But their open letters –narcomantas hung over important intersections– are primarily directed to their drug trafficking rivals, or to local political alignments. They don’t often explicitly challenge the national government, much less launch violent “campaigns” against it. Even the most high-profile recent killings – for instance DEA officer Jaime Zapata in San Luis Potosi, the brother of former Chihuahua Attorney General Mario Gonzalez or PRI gubernatorial candidate in Tamaulipas Rodolfo Torre Cantú— the assassinations don’t seem to have come from the top. If the violence isn’t ordered from on high (as it was in Colombia), then taking out the top echelons of the cartels won’t end it. Furthermore, if most of the bloodshed is between the criminals themselves, going after the heads will just escalate the cycle, as more and more mid-level criminals fight it out for control of the remaining business (catching innocent civilians and law enforcement officials in their wake).
This suggests Mexico should rethink its kingpin strategy — or at least complement it with other approaches. There are many other models out there to consider – the “broken windows” approach (perhaps the other extreme, as it focuses instead on smaller quality of life crimes before building up to the big organized crime rings); community policing models, used to good effect in U.S. cities such as Boston, Los Angeles, New Haven, and elsewhere; or a territorial approach, which integrates neighborhood level policing with other public services, and is already being used in the historic center of Mexico City. These methods may work to raise the social, in addition to the material costs of violence for the criminals.
As Mexico debates the right policy mix in the coming year under Calderón and beyond next July’s presidential elections, the big missing question is how to get Mexican society– the one weapon the cartels can’t match – involved. So far, citizens have been relegated to the status of “clients” or victims. Opening up the security policy to analysis and debate is an important first step.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Miner Gomez celebrates as he arrives on the surface as the ninth to be rescued in Chile (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters).
Today is the one year anniversary of the collapse that buried 33 Chilean miners deep underground for more than two months. Their rescue inspired a jolt of nationalistic pride in Chile, and not a little media fanfare, but now many of the survivors find themselves worse off than before the ordeal. Despite, and in some cases because of their fame (sure to increase with the production of a movie based on their tale), almost half of the 33 are unemployed, and some are back working underground to make ends meet.
Sebastián Piñera’s high hasn’t lasted either – recent polls show his ratings slipped to 31 percent last month, a far cry from his 63 percent approval rate in October 2010. Even the Economist is down on Piñera at this point, criticizing the billionaire for creating ties between government and the private sector that are often too close for comfort.
Dilma Rousseff recently unveiled the “Bigger Brazil Plan”, or “Plano Brasil Maior”, a program designed to make Brazil more competitive and stimulate investment in the face of an increasingly overvalued real and the influx of inexpensive goods from abroad. Some question whether the bill will have any positive effect in the long-run, arguing that the $16 billion in tax cuts for manufacturers will be offset by higher sales taxes, needed to finance recent government spending sprees.
For those that haven’t seen it, this Los Angeles Times four-part series on the Sinaloa cartel is an illuminating profile of the more average citizens involved, the way the business works, and one particular DEA attempt to take down a cartel.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Suspects wait at the Supreme Court in Guatemala City (Jorge Lopez/Courtesy Reuters).
The conventional Guatemalan security story is one of a country riddled with violence, where law enforcement institutions are in shambles and corruption reaches the highest levels of government. Its homicide rate triples that of Mexico, and its notoriously weak rule of law system lets more than 99 percent of criminals walk free. The growing presence of Mexican and Colombian cartels, pushed out of their home countries due to intensive antidrug campaigns, has only made matters worse. As the Zetas in particular move into the northern provinces, observers sound alarm bells about Guatemala’s possible descent into a “narco-state”.
Still, it may be too early to give up on Guatemala. Since the capture of top drug-smuggler Juan Alberto Ortiz-López, alias ‘el Chamalé’, in late March of this year, Guatemalan officials have arrested a number of local gang leaders, some with close ties to the Zetas. Within days of folk singer Facundo Cabral’s murder this month, the authorities announced the arrest of three suspects, presenting a slideshow with a play-by-play rundown of the events. The swift response became a point of pride for Guatemalans accustomed to sluggish, if any, justice.
The UN International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) can take much of the credit for these improvements. Set up in 2007, the commission has been an enormous boost to law enforcement’s (still limited) capacity; assisting in high-profile investigations and promoting important reforms, notably witness protection and plea bargaining laws. It works in conjunction with domestic security agencies, employing a “learning by doing” model that teaches investigative methods to Guatemalan prosecutors on the job. Not least of all, CICIG played an instrumental role in the appointment of current Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz, who has had a markedly positive impact on the public prosecutor’s office.
But Paz y Paz and her fellow reformers face an uphill battle. Guatemalans are among the most mistrustful of judicial institutions across Latin America, and the most skeptical of democracy overall. Winning the public’s trust in the justice system requires sustained improvements, not just sporadic high-profile successes. The lack of funding for security poses another major challenge – last year the government cut the public prosecutor’s budget by a quarter. More generally, Guatemala’s tax revenue is the lowest in the region at around 10 percent of GDP (its Central American neighbors are not much better, with this part of the region ranking below the rest of the continent and even Sub-Saharan Africa in tax collection).
The upcoming elections may also stall progress. The presidential frontrunner, Otto Pérez-Molina, is a retired army general with a questionable human rights record and a preference for iron fist, hard-line security policies. While he has promised to respect political appointees’ mandates, many fear that if elected he would replace Paz y Paz and even block the continuation of CICIG’s work beyond its current 2013 deadline. While outsourcing justice is not a long-term solution, banishing the UN commission before it has completed its investigations and trials will handicap efforts to strengthen the rule of law.
For a place that many have already labeled a failed state, the recent advances in security are a ray of hope. A committed Attorney General and external commission have shown that it is possible to make inroads combating organized crime and Guatemala’s pervasive culture of impunity. But to sustain and further these small islands of progress, other branches of government and citizens more generally will have to do their part. The very wealthy will have to pay higher taxes to underpin public security (a point stressed by Hillary Clinton during last month’s Central American security conference). The next president may have to forgo partisan calculations and bolster the justice system, starting with keeping the effective Paz y Paz as chief prosecutor. These are by no means easy steps to take. They require personal sacrifices and the setting aside of self interest for the public good of a stronger state. But if Guatemalans truly want a more stable and secure future, they will have to start making these tough choices. Instead of writing Guatemala off as a lost cause, we should applaud the work of a few courageous reformers and encourage the rest of the country to follow their lead.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Peru's new President Ollanta Humala is sworn in to office in Congress in Lima (Mariana Bazo/Courtesy Reuters).
As President Ollanta Humala assumes office today, it looks as if he has chosen to emulate Lula rather than Chávez. His cabinet is full of moderates, and some even see it as leaning center-right. While growth is expected to continue at about 6 percent, the new administration will face many challenges, in particular security and the increasing presence of transnational crime, as well as high levels of inequality.
This week the Obama administration released a new directive on combating transnational organized crime (TOC). Among its 56 “priority actions” are new and deepened efforts to stop the money laundering and flows supporting these crime networks. New tools include barring TOC members entry into the U.S., freezing assets and other financial sanctions. The document also expands the role of the Justice Department and FBI in investigating transnational crime more generally. Still, many of the nearly five dozen items seem little more than aspirations– such as the commitment to “stop the illicit flow from the United States of weapons.” But generally, this revamped strategy and more focused game plan is welcome.
Finally William Rempel’s new book, At the Devil’s Table, showcases the role one individual can play in the fight against drug cartels. This gripping read chronicles the life of Jorge Salcedo, a Colombian engineer that rose to be head of security for Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, a godfather of the Cali cartel during its heyday. The tale tells the true story of Salcedo’s introduction to crime, his rise within one of the most powerful drug cartels in the world, and the actions he ultimately took to help bring it down. It shows the power of one courageous individual, but also the challenges of going it alone in the belly of the criminal underworld. While the Cali cartel is now gone, others have willingly taken its place, and Colombian coca and cocaine continue unimpeded.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Mexico's President Calderon and Secretary of Public Security Luna attend an award presentation to federal police in Mexico City (Daniel Aguilar/Courtesy Reuters).
Mexico’s recent state level elections informally hail the beginning of the presidential election season. The PRI triumph positions Enrique Peña Nieto, the outgoing State of Mexico governor, as the PRI’s candidate, and the one which everyone must beat.
As the politicking begins, so too does the legacy shaping. And here for the current administration no issue is more important than security. Perhaps the hallmark of the Calderón administration has been the creation of the Federal Police. Genaro Garcia Luna, the Secretary of Public Security (SSP) and head of this new force has just released a new book, Para Entender: El Nuevo Modelo de Seguridad to explain Mexico’s “New Security Model.” It is worth a read in order to understand what the government is officially trying to do – then one can judge how far it has progressed down that path.
Mexico’s new model comprises three essential parts. The first is technology – led by the much heralded Plataforma México, a comprehensive national crime database. Its goal is to make information easily accessible, searchable, and actionable for law enforcement across the nation. The second is people, working to make “Mexico’s finest” live up to the moniker. This involves creating a truly professional force through new ways of recruiting, vetting, training, and career planning. It has also meant changing the Constitution to give the federal police more powers than they previously had, including the ability to investigate crimes. The third arm is the prison system, seen more often as both a revolving door for powerful criminals and a training ground for those just starting out. The model envisions expanding and upgrading the current overcrowded and run-down facilities and professionalizing the staff.
The book gives a strong vision of the reasons, goals, and processes behind the administration’s police reforms, which they hope will truly transform Mexico’s security situation. This work now needs to be complemented by analyses of how much progress has been made so far in making this aspiration a reality. Some of the preliminary figures out there are promising: the number of federal police officers has risen from nearly 6,500 when Calderón took office to the current 35,000. More than 7,000 – or roughly 20% —are college educated, practically unheard of under previous national level forces.
But other numbers are more worrisome. The crime reports submitted (called Informes Policiales Homologados, or IPHs) to Plataforma México are uneven and overall sobering. Sources show that many municipalities and states submit less than one report a month. Plataforma México – no matter how sophisticated the technology — is only as good as its inputs. Recruitment too has been a problem, particularly the search for more skilled and educated, to the point of leaving positions unfilled.
Also left relatively untouched in Luna’s book is his agency’s relationship with the Attorney General’s office, the PGR. During the creation of this new model, the fights between the PGR and SSP were legendary, and undoubtedly some hard feelings remain. But for Mexico to reduce violence and crime, the links and cooperation between these two branches is vital. How evidence is collected and handed off, how federal police do, should, and will work with prosecutors remains unclear – even in the book’s visionary schematic.
Calderón’s legacy will depend on the security situation not just when he steps down at the end of 2012, but over the next generation. If the new Federal Police strengthens and the vision expands to include state and local forces; if the judicial reforms are implemented, transforming Mexico’s system of justice; and if these two law enforcement branches learn to work together, then it will look very good indeed. But these are still big ifs. The legislative battles and international agreements are perhaps the easiest part of Mexico’s institutional transformation. The hardest slog will be in the bureaucratic trenches, trying to change the on-the-ground ways of doing things. It is this challenge that the next President – and Mexico more generally– still faces.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
