A truck of the Mexican company Olympics bearing Mexican and U.S. flags approaches the border crossing into the U.S., in Laredo (Courtesy Reuters).
It is worth reading the Woodrow Wilson Center Mexico Institute’s new study by Christopher Wilson, entitled “Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico.” The report is packed with examples and statistical evidence of the deepening integration between the United States and Mexico since 1993 (the signing of NAFTA), and concisely explains why this relationship is so important and beneficial for the United States.
In terms of trade, for nearly half of U.S. states, Mexico is the number one or number two export destination. For border states such as Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, up to a third of all exports head to our southern neighbor. But it isn’t just a border issue – export industries in states as far flung as New Hampshire, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Missouri all depend on Mexican industries and consumers. And these are some of the most dynamic trading relations we have. Twenty U.S. states increased exports to Mexico by more than 10 percent each year over the last fifteen years. Investment also flourished. Mexican FDI in the United States, though starting at a low base, increased tenfold over the past two decades.
The report shows that trade with Mexico is particularly beneficial to the United States because these goods incorporate many parts and products produced in the United States. In fact, even though fully counted as imports in official trade data, an estimated 40 percent of the value of Mexican products is actually “made in the USA.” Only Canada comes close to this ratio (25 percent). In stark contrast, only 4 percent of the value of Chinese imports is made on U.S. soil. This means that products coming from Mexico support homegrown industry and labor. In fact, 6 million American jobs – or 1 out of every 24 – depend on Mexican trade. The study breaks down employment by state – showing for instance that some 200,000 Georgians, 120,000 Indianans, and 100,000 Coloradans owe their jobs to Mexico. Other studies show that export oriented jobs pay more than others, further benefiting U.S. workers. And what is good for Mexico is good for the United States — Mexico’s strong 2011 economic growth should create 150,000 new U.S. jobs.
The report interestingly points out how the United States is now competing with China and others to supply parts and materials used in Mexican production. Here, worryingly, the United States is falling behind – losing market share to its Asian rivals. Part of the problem is the border. Overwhelmed infrastructure, and long and unpredictable wait times at crossings limit competitiveness, costing taxpayers billions in lost revenue and jobs.
There are some signs that these issues are at least appreciated. In 2010 three new border crossings opened, easing congestion along the dense 2,000 mile border, and under its “21st Century Border” project, the Obama administration is working to make commercial and other crossings more efficient and secure. But a conceptual shift is still needed. U.S. politicians, business owners, workers, and the general public need to understand that the path to improving U.S. global competitiveness –defending American industry in the process – runs through, rather than around Mexico (and Canada). Regional integration is vital for U.S. economic recovery and growth going forward.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
U.S Air Force worker, helps unload tons of relief aid at Armenia's airport, Colombia (Str Old/Courtesy Reuters).
Last week WOLA released the report “A Cautionary Tale: Plan Colombia’s Lessons for U.S. Policy Toward Mexico and Beyond.” The study is a useful reminder of the real differences between Colombia and Mexico. Unlike Colombia, where security forces fought to assert control over territory left to criminal groups, Mexico has had a strong state presence throughout the country for decades. Whereas violence in Colombia was concentrated in rural areas, in Mexico the highest rates of crime are in population centers and along drug trafficking routes.Their analysis also puts the Colombian experience into historical perspective. The real fight against drug cartels, as opposed to guerrillas and paramilitaries, happened in the 1990s – before Plan Colombia was even on the table. Successes here depended on police work by specialized vetted units, as well as a strong public prosecutor’s office – not sending the military into the streets or hills.
There are a number of good recommendations about how the United States and Mexico can apply these lessons to their joint policy on the drug war going forward. A few stand out.
For Mexico (and other countries dealing with organized crime):
• Don’t rely on the military, as it lacks the investigative capacity and the right training to provide public safety to civilians.
• Measure what matters. Rather than process (e.g. how many arrests or drug kingpins captures) the government should focus on tangible results, such as how many cases are successfully prosecuted, or how much violence and other crimes decline.
For the United States:
• Take on challenges at home – guns, money, and demand. Since the United States is asking other countries to implement politically difficult policies, policymakers at home should try it themselves – particularly because all these issues feed into the escalating violence Mexico (and other countries) face.
• Make human rights a top priority, not an afterthought. Do more than just require police and military forces to take classes in human rights, and withhold bilateral security cooperation if standards are not met.
• Let USAID take the lead in managing security assistance, not the Department of Defense or even State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, as these are likely to overlook the crucial socioeconomic side of the security problem.
For all involved: protect local populations first. In addition to safeguarding, these governments need to invest in people – protecting them through law enforcement, courts, and social policies, and creating economic alternatives to a life of crime for those that today remain on the margins.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Photographs of missing people are on display at a square in Queretaro (Courtesy Reuters).
Last Wednesday, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released its report “Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture and Disappearances in Mexico’s ‘War on Drugs’.” The report is incredibly thorough – based on two years of research in the states of Baja California, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Nuevo León and Tabasco, and incorporating information from over 200 interviews. It charges Mexican security forces with routinely violating citizens’ most basic rights during President Felipe Calderón’s six years in office, and further argues that these horrific tactics are not incidental, but endemic to the government’s drug war strategy.
Some of the most worrisome statistics and findings include:
· Formal human rights abuse complaints increased seven-fold, from 691 during the 2003-2006 period, to 4,803 from 2007-2010
· Of some 3,700 military investigations into human rights abuses in the past four years, just 15 – less than one half of one percent — resulted in convictions
· Formal complaints of “degrading treatment” – read torture — at the hands of security forces more than tripled since 2006
Based on witness testimonies and material evidence in specific cases HRW investigated they find:
· Law enforcement – including the Army, Navy, Federal Police as well as local and federal judicial investigative police — participated in over 170 specific cases of torture – including beating, asphyxiating, water boarding, electrically shocking and sexually torturing detainees
· Others facilitate this torture – medical examiners fail to document signs of physical abuse on detainees, and judges admit confessions and other evidence acquired through torture, even when the victim protests
· Law enforcement played a part in 39 “forced disappearances” and 24 extrajudicial killings of civilians
After a meeting with HRW representatives Calderón agreed to investigate the findings, though he did say that the “main threat to the human rights of Mexicans is from criminals”.
Why have human rights violations expanded so drastically? One explanation lies in the use of the military. Armed forces are trained to kill the enemy on the battlefield, not police neighborhoods to ensure basic public safety. With some 50,000 soldiers now on the front-lines of the drug war, this disconnect can lead to abuses of the rule of law.
Another reason is the profound weakness of Mexico’s judicial system. Most crimes – likely 80 plus percent — are never even reported. Of the few complaints filed, the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) investigates only one in every five; even fewer go to trial. In the end, only one to two of every hundred crimes end in a conviction. Once prosecutors do move forward with a case however, the chances of acquittal are slim, as roughly 9 in 10 of all suspects brought to court end up in jail. This has less to do with the stellar cases built around airtight evidence, and more to do with the underlying system, which is stacked against defendants – resulting in few safeguards and a de facto presumption of guilt.
Finally, Mexico doesn’t even have the laws needed in some cases to prosecute bad behavior. For instance, only eight of Mexico’s thirty-two states have laws against forced disappearances and only sixteen have formally criminalized torture. What it does have is opportunities to limit citizen rights – such as the arraigo procedure, which lets prosecutors lock up individuals for up to 80 days if they’re allegedly involved in organized crime, and vaguely defined “flagrancia” rules that dictate when police officers can make arrests without a warrant.
The spike in human rights complaints is worrisome on many levels. First and foremost, it reflects the government’s utter failure to protect thousands of citizens from itself. But more strategically, the abuses described in the report run counter to the state’s long-term aims. In order to “win” the war on organized crime, Mexico’s government must have society’s support. Egregious human rights violations will just push away the one force the narcos can’t match. To end drug related violence, Mexico must construct a truly democratic rule of law, in which the means to and the ends are one and the same. To do so, the government must track and punish human rights abuses and abusers as fervently as it does those on its Most Wanted lists.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Bundles of confiscated drug money worth two million euros ($2.7 million) are displayed at a police headquarters in Madrid January 18, 2011. (Andrea Comas/Courtesy Reuters).
On Tuesday, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released a new report on global money laundering, “Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime.” The upshot? It is really hard to estimate. But, the report does provide some tangibles. Surveying numerous studies, it calculates that illicit global proceeds amount to over $2 trillion dollars every year (roughly 3.6 percent of global GDP), with some $1.6 trillion of this laundered. Within these staggering figures, roughly $870 billion of these revenues relate to drug trafficking and organized crime, and close to $580 billion of those illicit funds are laundered through financial institutions. The study drills down and looks specifically at the global cocaine market, estimated at some $85 billion. Most of this, again, is laundered.
The report provides some hints as to how this happens. Of the $85 billion cocaine market, most (estimated at $61 billion) stays in the retail markets – the United States and Europe primarily. Producers – mostly Andean farmers – receive in total $1 billion, or just over 1 percent of the gross profits. This leaves, by their estimates, roughly $23 billion for those processing and moving the drugs from the fields to the domestic wholesalers. Shipping cocaine from producing regions to transit locations generates at least $8 billion in profits.
When it comes to laundering this money, at least half occurs locally, and most of the rest in nearby countries. In South America, the report estimates that some $13 billion dollars of laundered cocaine money likely flows into and through local banks and local businesses, and roughly $7 billion is probably cleaned nearby, often in the Caribbean. The report also touches on the profound (and mostly negative) impacts of these flows on local economies, including corruption, real estate price distortions, large income disparities, and weaker growth (since criminals aren’t usually looking for long term productive investments in local economies).
The report ends on a fairly pessimistic tone. Drawing on a separate, heavily cited 2009 report from the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Drug Intelligence Center, the UNODC estimates that Mexican and Colombia’s drug-related money laundering may amount to between $18 and $39 billion each year. The authors argue that, unlike taking down kingpins (who are easily replaced), seizing illicit funds has much more severe and long lasting impacts on illicit trade. But, then the report goes on to show that our global ability to find and stop these financial flows is abysmal – estimated at far less than 1 percent – not much different than the fees brokers charge to clients to buy and sell stocks, and less than hedge funds take to manage your (legal) money. With the cost of doing business – at least in terms of money laundering – remaining low, the UN office points out the vital need for international law enforcement to truly step up and follow the money.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
– Latin Americans are second only to North Americans in terms of social networking — for those that access the Internet, 8 in 10 use social media.
– While broadband access is limited but increasing (expected to surpass 30% by 2014) some 36% of Latin Americans Internet access of some form. And, 90 percent of Latin Americans have cell phones – so the potential to expand is large.
– Facebook claims 100 million Latin American users, led by Brazil, and then Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and Venezuela.
– Some governments – most notably Colombia – are investing millions to expand Internet use, seeing it as an important driver of economic growth.
Overall it is an interesting and fairly positive technological look at the region. While Latin America falls behind Asia in terms of access to the Internet, the region’s citizens are more socially connected – at least as measured by Facebook, Twitter, and the like. These connections have had and can have broader political and economic impacts than just catching up with family and friends. Social networking has already played big roles in Colombia, with a Facebook-led series of marches against the FARC in 2008 that spread throughout the country (and as far as New York and Chicago), and in Mexico, where twitter updates on drug violence give people vital information the local press and governments are no longer able or willing to provide. Some even see the arrival of social media to Latin America as a great democratizer – helping open up governments (like in the Arab Spring) and media monopolies.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea finally passed, after four plus years of delay. My colleague Ted Alden talks about the consequences for the U.S. job market and for the Obama administration’s trade and investment strategy.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Police pay became a hot topic of discussion over the past two weeks with the release of a Mexican government report breaking down police salary by state. The disparities are stark — with police officers in Tamaulipas earning monthly salary of just $268, while their counterparts in Aguascalientes bring home about $1,342 a month.
Still, the graph below of police salary vs. homicide rate by state suggests that police pay does matter. While we see a lot of variation at the low and the middle end of the scale, high salaries and low violence are strongly correlated. The top nine payers– including states that are in drug traffickers’ line of fire (e.g. Baja California) – have relatively few murders per capita. While not the only and last word, this should encourage lagging state governments to rethink their spending priorities.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
At least 27 people were found dead in the Guatemalan village near the border with Mexico last May. Police look at a message written with a victim's blood, which reads: ‘What’s up, Otto Salguero, you bastard? We are going to find you and behead you, too. Sincerely, Z200.’ (Courtesy Reuters).
In the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s recent hearing, “Has Merida Evolved? Part One: The Evolution of Drug Cartels and the Threat to Mexico’s Governance,” Committee Chairman Connie Mack (R-Fla), among others, expressed his support for a U.S. counterinsurgency program (COIN) to fight Mexican drug traffickers. Calling the cartels “a well-funded criminal insurgency raging along our southern border,” Mack said the only way to win the drug war is through an “all U.S. agency” COIN approach, which would require greater U.S. military involvement.
I’d tend to agree instead with this article by Patrick Corocan, which says that sending U.S. troops into Mexico will not provide a long-term solution to the country’s security challenges, first because the nature of narco-violence is distinct from that of an insurgency (so a COIN response to it would be inappropriate) and because of the “practical difficulties” involved in such an approach (including a popular backlash to it in Mexico).
This week the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control released its report, “Responding to Violence in Central America,” which draws attention to the rapid escalation of violence in the region – most of it tied to the ramped up activity of organized crime, as detailed by the Woodrow Wilson Center study I discussed last week. The report offers a number of policy recommendations to deal with the problem, the most critical (and innovative) of which include placing more emphasis on extraditions of drug traffickers to the United States, improving witness protection programs and expanding cooperation between U.S. law enforcement and regional counterparts. It also notes that while U.S. security assistance for Central America has grown over the past three years, it is likely to stagnate – or even decline – in the future, making it even more critical for countries in the region to seek other sources of security funding by reaching out to other donors and to the domestic private sector.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Governors (L-R) Jose Guadalupe Osuna Millan of Baja, Humberto Moreira Valdes of Coahuila, Texas Governor Rick Perry, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Jose Natividad Gonzalez Paras of Nuevo Leon, Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano and Eduardo Bours Castelo of Sonora pose as characters from the movie "Terminator" at the 26th Border Governors Conference (Courtesy Reuters).
This week the Mexican state of Baja California will host the two-day Border Governor’s Conference. Started nearly two decades ago, the annual meeting brings together governors from all four U.S. and six Mexican border states to discuss the issues directly affecting their states and citizens. At its height in the early 2000s, the governors and their ministers met not just with each other but also with representatives from Commerce, Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and other departments and agencies to influence border-centered debates in both Washington, DC and Mexico City.
But in recent years the conference has fallen on hard times, a victim of polarizing politics. The 2009 session hinted at the divides, as the governors of Arizona, California and Texas failed to make it to Monterrey due to “scheduling conflicts.” It hit its nadir in 2010 in the wake of Arizona SB 1070. The Mexican governors wrote a letter calling the law “discriminatory [and] racist” and announced their plan to boycott the meeting if hosted, as planned, by Arizona Governor Jan Brewer in Phoenix. Brewer cancelled the conference in retaliation. In the end, Governor Richardson of New Mexico held the meeting, but no other U.S. governors attended, leaving the future of this consultative mechanism in limbo.
The conference also has suffered from a sprawling agenda and size. With its initial successes the agenda items grew, as did the number of participants. In recent years there have been some 25 working groups on topics ranging from wildlife to science and technology. The influx of hundreds of staffers and activists has made the process much more cumbersome, and reduced the intimacy and spirit of cooperation that guided the conference in the past. Reduced in large part to the signing of agreements and photo opportunities, many governors (particularly from the United States), began skipping the event.
As the United States and Mexico search for common ground and mutual solutions to pressing problems, it is time to revitalize this mechanism. It should refocus on practical problems facing the border states and their residents. Rather than covering the gamut, the agenda should be streamlined to emphasize a few vital issues. It must enable leaders to actually meet and discuss the serious challenges facing their states and constituencies, re-energizing the consultative element of the event. Most pressing today is security, where policy so far has been guided from the center, even though the effects are concentrated on the border.
Once refocused, the border governors need to organize better to influence their respective governments, shaping policies that in turn shape the border. One potential model is the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), which brings together state legislators, governors, civil society and businesses to lobby the federal government and strengthen U.S.-Canada border security and the region’s economic competitiveness. Another is scaling up the San Diego Association of Governments’s (SANDAG) annual binational conference, which brings together local leaders in California and Baja California to address just one broad agenda item at each meeting – such as the economic impact of wait times at shared border crossings.
As Arizona Governor, Janet Napolitano repeatedly said that one of her closest day-to-day working relationships was with Sonora Governor Eduardo Bours. This reality – that cross-border issues and events strongly affect border state residents’ daily lives — hasn’t changed. Revitalizing the Border Governor’s Conference is one means to address these shared challenges, and reincorporate regional problem-solving strategies into larger U.S.-Mexico debates.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
As important as the total numbers is their breakdown. Here, the Mexican government provides some estimates, sorting the murders according to whether they were acts of aggression, executions or occurred as a result of a confrontation. Walter McKay at WM Consulting has built a useful tool by scouring local newspapers in many (but not yet all) Mexican states. This map depicts the murders according to whether the victim was a civilian, politician (or other high profile individual), or law enforcement official, and also shows the sites of car bombs and mass graves. McKay puts the number of deaths as a result of the drug war at some 47,000, significantly higher than the government estimate. As the policy debates continue, these various sources of information will be vital to informing steps forward.
This week the Woodrow Wilson Center released its report, “Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle”, which has many well researched and written chapters on the accelerated rise of criminal structures over the past three decades in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. To bolster weak rule of law institutions vulnerable to the influence of organized crime in the region, it argues, the U.S. will need to contribute more funds to the region’s security initiatives – even as individual countries play a greater part by collecting more taxes. Though overall the picture is disheartening, this useful study lays out the complex factors underlying the violence in Central America today.
It also shows that while all Central American nations struggle with crime and violence, the real security challenges are in the Northern Triangle – where the magnitude and type of organized criminal operations are unparalleled. This finding questions the traditional blanket regional approach taken by the United States (through CARSI), or the way other Latin American or European countries develop multilateral security initiatives within Central America.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Latin America’s Economic Outlook There has been much debate in Mexico about the number of drug-related killings since the start of drug war in 2006. The Mexican government provides an official database that puts this figure at some 35,000. Others, such as Reforma, provide an estimate near the official number — but more current — now totalling some 37,000.
As [...]
Changes in Mexican Migration There has been much debate in Mexico about the number of drug-related killings since the start of drug war in 2006. The Mexican government provides an official database that puts this figure at some 35,000. Others, such as Reforma, provide an estimate near the official number — but more current — now totalling some 37,000.
As [...]
