Source: Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe Anual 2010 (Santiago de Chile, December 2010).
Steven Levitsky’s recent article in the Journal of Democracy explains why Humala won the Peruvian elections last summer. He points to a mix of campaign particulars — most importantly the divisions within the center-right – Humala’s effective shift from the left to the center, and most fundamentally, state weakness (which tends to push voters toward anti-establishment candidates). The Peruvian state has always been weak – as Hillel Soifer’s work has shown.
This weakness means Humala faces a huge challenge — and not just from the Lima-based political and economic establishment that voted against him. As the graph above shows, Peruvians in generally have little faith in their government, their parties, their political institutions in general. This hints at Humala’s bigger problem. He has few tools – especially outside of the country’s larger urban centers – to do much to drastically improve Peruvians’ standard of living. Even if economic growth continues and can pay for it, delivering social programs, better schools, and safer streets will require building a stronger state (almost from scratch) – quite a tall order.
Still, Humala is off to a decent start – he appointed a “market-friendly” cabinet that pleased even Alan Garcia, then raised the minimum wage without upsetting the economic elite too much, and most recently passed a prior consultation law many years in the making. Whether he can build and strengthen the Peruvian state will define his presidency. If he can’t, it will lead to Levitsky’s most likely scenario – a mediocre government.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Members of Venezuela's militia and supporters of Venezuela's President Chavez attend a ceremony in Caracas (Jorge Silva/Courtesy Reuters).
Today, chances are Hugo Chávez will face off against Henrique Capriles Radonski in the 2012 October presidential elections. The 39-year-old former mayor of Caracas’s Baruta Municipality (2000-2008) and current Miranda state Governor is leading the opposition candidates, and polling just 2 percentage points below Chávez. He is a lawyer who entered politics at the age of 26 to become the youngest member of the Chamber of Deputies until it was dissolved in 1999.
Capriles appeals to the non-Chavista Left. Following in Lula’s Brazilian footsteps, he has poured money into education and social programs, drawing strong support among the lower classes as well as from a growing contingent of independent voters put off by the Chávez-centered polarization of Venezuelan politics. Comfortable among slum dwellers and businessmen alike – and unafraid to don Chávez’s signature Veneuelan flag jacket– the young candidate has won hearts and minds with his intensity and obvious passion. He has also attracted Chávez’s ire. In 2004, he was arrested for “trespassing, intimidation and ‘violating international principles’” for his involvement in a protest outside the Cuban embassy in the wake of the 2002 attempted coup. The charges were eventually thrown out and two months after leaving prison he was reelected to his post as mayor with 80 percent of the vote.
Yet while a rising star, he faces three major challenges. The first is the divisions within Venezuela’s anti-Chávez opposition. There are other worthy competitors — Leopoldo López, the former Mayor of Chacao Municipality and Pablo Pérez, another young and dynamic governor of the state of Zulia. While one of these — probably Pérez — may give him a run for the nomination, the real test will be whether the opposition can remain united. In the past, their divisions have weakened them perhaps as much as any moves Chávez has made.
The opposition’s track record has gotten a lot better. In the 2008 regional elections they were able to come together, winning governorships in 5 of Venezuela’s 22 states (including the two most populous, Miranda and Zulia). The 2010 Congressional run was their best showing yet. By uniting behind candidates chosen either by consensus or in local primaries, they managed to win the popular vote (52%) — though only 40% of the legislature due to gerrymandering. Signs look good for this coming year, as last month the three major opposition parties signed a pact promising to support the winner in February’s primary.
A second challenge is Chávez’s electoral machinations. While the ballot box itself has not yet been in question, the Chávez administration has repeatedly tilted the electoral playing field — arresting prominent opposition leaders, silencing independent media outlets, and undercutting autonomous institutions such as the National Electoral Council (CNE). The meddling for 2012 has already started, beginning with moving up the election date from December to October 2012. This is likely just the first of many measures to take the wind out of opposition sails.
The third, less analyzed challenge is Chávez’s health. At first brush his potential inability to run for reelection should boost the opposition’s chances. But it could make it all the much harder. Left without a popular candidate, hard-line Chavistas might pull the plug on elections all together. Hugo’s brother Adán has already suggested as much, saying recently, “It would be inexcusable to limit ourselves [PSUV] to only the electoral and not see other forms of struggle, including the armed struggle.” Instead of opening up Venezuela’s political system, Chávez’s absence might put an end to Venezuela’s democratic trappings altogether.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Workers harvest soybeans at a farm in Tangara da Serra, Brazil (Paulo Whitaker/Courtesy Reuters).
A recent article by Mariano Turzi argues that soy is the most recent of Latin America’s commodity booms, creating many of the same challenges that metals, minerals, and oil brought in the past. Whether economic booms and busts, populist leaders, or fights between more powerful (e.g. Brazil) and weaker (e.g. Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia) nations in the supply chain, Turzi worries about the fallout for the Southern Cone and its future.
Mexico Evalúa recently released the first study I have seen evaluating the outcomes of Mexico’s New Security Model. The results are mixed, at best. Some of the most fundamental measures differentiating the new security model from its predecessors – such as tracking law enforcement officers and their arms in a national database – have not become universal, and in fact have actually declined in recent years. The huge government outlays – now six times the amounts at the start of Calderon’s term – remain at times unspent and in others poorly accounted for. Accountability in general remains perhaps the biggest challenge. Mexico Evalúa finds it hard to judge these programs from the outside, as few metrics are provided. The military maintains even less oversight than the other security agencies they analyze. But reports such as these are at least a start toward pushing for more openness, evaluation, and in the end, better outcomes.
Finally, the Justice Department’s National Drug Intelligence Center’s annual report shows cocaine prices increased by a third and purity decreased by more than two thirds from 2007 to 2010. This seems to have led to a decline in cocaine use – down by almost a quarter — confirming the findings of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration report included in last week’s reads. Less positive, methamphetamine production (north and south of the border) seems to have reached an all time high, driving prices down, while purity has continued its steady climb.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
A general view of Sao Paulo, the biggest Latin American city (Paolo Whitaker/Courtesy Reuters).
A new piece by Eduardo Guerrero in Nexos looks at the growing problem of extortion in Mexico. Differentiating it from drug trafficking, he finds it more brutal and violence, and argues it is on the rise for three reasons: fragmentation of cartels, displacement of crime rings (and their response to expand into new territories), and finally rampant impunity for such acts.
Drug abuse in the United States is on the uptick overall, though use of “harder drugs” seems to be down, according to a recent study by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Marijuana use has increased some 20 percent over the last four years, particularly among young people. Today more than one in five Americans aged 18-25 get high on a regular basis. On the other hand, rates of methamphetamine and cocaine abuse have been steadily declining since 2006.
The World Economic Forum released its Global Competitiveness report this week, which measures competitiveness based on twelve benchmarks that include “basic requirements”, such as institutions, “efficiency enhancers” such as market size, and “innovation and sophistication factors”, such as innovation. Among Latin American countries, Mexico had the biggest boost in the rankings, moving up 8 spots from 66th to 58th, and improving on 10 of the 12 categories (its only drop was in macroeconomic environment). Brazil also made gains, up 5 places to 53rd overall (due largely to the size of its internal market and its sophisticated business environment), and Chile remains at the top of the region and the 31st most competitive nation worldwide. Central American countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua registered steep declines in their ratings, due to weakening institutions and rising insecurity, while Argentina and Venezuela remained generally unchanged, but near the bottom of the list at 84th and 124thoverall, respectively.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Argentine President Fernandez waves to supporters after hearing the first results of the nationwide primary election in Buenos Aires (Enrique Maracarian/Courtesy Reuters).
The Pew Research Center released the results of a wide-ranging public opinion poll based on interviews with some 800 Mexicans (the study is part of their larger Global Attitudes Project). It finds strong continued support for military – 83 percent favor their role in the drug war – and for U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, with nearly 3 in 4 Mexicans supporting U.S. training and weapons for national security forces. Calderón, despite an economic recession and ever more bloody drug war, still enjoys the confidence of a majority of Mexicans, with 57% saying they view his political influence in a positive light. While these numbers look bad vis-à-vis past Mexican presidents entering their last term in office, other Western Hemisphere leaders (Barack Obama and Sebastian Piñera, for example) would be quite pleased with such levels of support.
A recent survey of the Guatemalan judiciary, on the other hand, paints rule of law institutions in a much more more troubling light. The Plaza Pública study shows that overall Guatemalans see judges as corrupt, controlled (by vested economic interests and other political elites), and inefficient.
This Cefeidas Group report provides an update on the Argentine elections, where Cristina Fernández de Kirchner looks even more likely to win a second term in the October 23rd election, due in part to the weakness of the opposition.
On a different note, Rolling Stone has an in-depth and well written article about La Barbie, a native Texan who rose to become the top drug kingpin in Acapulco. The behind the scenes narrative of his rise and fall shows why going after kingpins will not, on its own, make Mexico safer.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents usher Fabio Ochoa, Colombian drug kingpin, to an awaiting vehicle following his extradition from Colombia to Florida, September 8, 2001(Courtesy Reuters).
One of the heralded lessons of Colombia’s fight against drug cartels is that fragmentation reduces violence. The vertical command structures of the famed Medellín and Cali cartels were legendary. Their pseudo-celebrity leaders lived extravagantly, socialized widely, and often died violently. They spent billions to buy off politicians, judges, and business leaders, and they spent more to assassinate adversaries they couldn’t buy, chasing their targets not just all over Colombia but the world. The country became, for a time, the most violent place on earth, the nationwide homicide rate topping 80 per 100,000 in 1991.
But a couple of decades later, the drastic levels of violence have fallen, the motorcycle assassins disappeared, the car bombs ended. The conventional story goes something like this: the killing first of Pablo Escobar and then the arrest and conviction of the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers fragmented the cartels and their command structures. From the ruins of the once centralized cartels sprang smaller – and less vicious – criminal organizations. While cocaine production and distribution (which hasn’t changed much) continued, violence fell.
A U.S. law enforcement official once told me that their antidrug strategy in Mexico was first to go after the wolves (the highest level cartel leaders), then go after the snakes (the next level down), and then clean up the remaining rats. The odd animal analogy aside, this strategy seems straight out of Colombia’s playbook.
Mexico has, in fact, done this fairly successfully. Of the 37 thugs on its Most Wanted list, 21 are either behind bars or six feet underground. Where once U.S. and Mexican officials cited four main criminal organizations, today the number has at least doubled, complemented by the rise of many smaller operations and local gangs. But as the Mexican cartels multiplied, violence escalated to all time highs.
Why the difference? Obviously Mexico and Colombia have different histories, and different security problems, so the reasons for divergent outcomes are multiple and complex. Perhaps one issue — seemingly forgotten in the transfer of “lessons learned” —is the direct targeting of the Colombian government by its cartels. In the early 1990s, at the peak of the violence, one of the biggest points of contention was Colombia’s extradition law. The drug cartels wrote open letters offering to stop the car bombs and assassinations, to retire from the drug business, to even pay off the national debt if extradition to the United States was taken off the table. Denied, the cartels tried to lay down their own version of the law on the nation. Fighting back, Colombian law enforcement slowly gained the advantage, and as these groups fragmented, violence declined.
In Mexico, by contrast, the cartels are not openly and directly confronting the state. Sure, they threaten, co-opt and even increasingly kill local and state police and elected representatives. But their open letters –narcomantas hung over important intersections– are primarily directed to their drug trafficking rivals, or to local political alignments. They don’t often explicitly challenge the national government, much less launch violent “campaigns” against it. Even the most high-profile recent killings – for instance DEA officer Jaime Zapata in San Luis Potosi, the brother of former Chihuahua Attorney General Mario Gonzalez or PRI gubernatorial candidate in Tamaulipas Rodolfo Torre Cantú— the assassinations don’t seem to have come from the top. If the violence isn’t ordered from on high (as it was in Colombia), then taking out the top echelons of the cartels won’t end it. Furthermore, if most of the bloodshed is between the criminals themselves, going after the heads will just escalate the cycle, as more and more mid-level criminals fight it out for control of the remaining business (catching innocent civilians and law enforcement officials in their wake).
This suggests Mexico should rethink its kingpin strategy — or at least complement it with other approaches. There are many other models out there to consider – the “broken windows” approach (perhaps the other extreme, as it focuses instead on smaller quality of life crimes before building up to the big organized crime rings); community policing models, used to good effect in U.S. cities such as Boston, Los Angeles, New Haven, and elsewhere; or a territorial approach, which integrates neighborhood level policing with other public services, and is already being used in the historic center of Mexico City. These methods may work to raise the social, in addition to the material costs of violence for the criminals.
As Mexico debates the right policy mix in the coming year under Calderón and beyond next July’s presidential elections, the big missing question is how to get Mexican society– the one weapon the cartels can’t match – involved. So far, citizens have been relegated to the status of “clients” or victims. Opening up the security policy to analysis and debate is an important first step.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
U.S. President Barack Obama and Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff toast during lunch in Brasilia (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters).
Today the Council on Foreign Relations is releasing its independent Task Force report, “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations”. I sat in as an observer for the Task Force, ably led by co-chairs Samuel W. Bodman — former Secretary of Energy under George W. Bush — and James D. Wolfensohn — chairman of Citigroup’s international advisory board and former president of the World Bank Group — and directed by my CFR colleague, Julia Sweig. The project’s 30 participants hail from diverse backgrounds, some old Brazil hands and others with functional and/or wide-ranging expertise. Needless to say, the four meetings that took place over the course of a year yielded a stimulating and fruitful dialogue. Although there were some differences of opinion among Task Force members (some of which are noted in the additional comments and dissents section of the report), everyone agreed to Brazil’s rising importance.
We addressed a wide range of issues, including Brazil’s economic health, its energy agenda, its role as a dominant regional power and its relationship with the U.S. government. The report’s core recommendations focus on deepening cooperation between Brazil and the United States so that both can more effectively advance their common interests (and better manage areas where we might come into conflict). In particular, the Task Force points to Chinese monetary policy, climate change mitigation, the expansion of the biofuels industry and regional counternarcotics policy as issue areas that provide opportunities for bilateral cooperation. It calls for Washington to better appreciate Brasilia’s increasing potential as a global strategic ally. As a sign of goodwill, the Task Force recommends a particular concrete step: fully endorsing Brazil as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.
The report’s most basic takeaway is that Brazil is the newest pillar in a multipolar world and must be treated as such. Slotted to become the world’s fifth largest economy within the next decade, it grew at a stunning pace of 7.5% in 2010 (whether this is sustainable remains a big question mark), and is expected to expand 4.5% this year. Unemployment and inequality — perennial concerns for the nation—have fallen. Still, Brazil’s economic outlook is not entirely rosy. In the short to medium term, rising exchange rates and inflation threaten Brazil’s growth. Decrepit infrastructure and an overwhelmed public education system threaten its longer term competitiveness. Whether Brazil can take on these myriad obstacles effectively remains to be seen.
Whatever its economic future may hold, the Task Force report is worth a full read, as it provides important insights and ideas on how both Brazil and the U.S. can manage the challenges that lie ahead, and the U.S.-Brazil relationship, for the better of both nations.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Venezuelan President Chavez looks on as his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva speaks during their meeting at Miraflores Palace in Caracas in July, 2010 (Jorge Silva/Courtesy Reuters).
Jorge Dominguez’s recent testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere gives an overview of Latin America’s progress toward democratic consolidation in recent history, and the role the international community has played in this slow, but steady, march.
Time and America’s Quarterly have two good pieces on Mexico’s state level elections last weekend. While both rightly focus on the PRI’s strength coming out of the election, it didn’t win everywhere. The party lost nine municipalities it previously held in the state of Hidalgo, due in large part to successful alliances between the PAN and PRD. Meanwhile, the PRD mayor of Mexico City urges that these ties must become stronger to give his party and its allies a fighting chance in the 2012 presidential elections.
A recent New York Times article looks at the current state of illegal immigration from Mexico to the U.S., highlighting how changing dynamics within both countries dissuade Mexicans from crossing the border illegally. This discussion addresses issues I raised in the past, namely changing demographics and new economic realities, including the rise of the middle class in Mexico and the region more broadly.
Lastly, for readers worried about Brazil’s overheating, this Economist graph won’t calm your fears.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Coca leaf farmer John Basilio harvests coca leaves in Tingo Maria, Peru (Mariana Bazo/Courtesy Reuters).
As Peruvian President Elect Ollanta Humala prepares to take office at the end of the month, the worries focus on his economic policies. Will he be another Chavez, nationalizing industries, or a Lula, balancing market friendly macroeconomic policies with broader social programs? The fears have led to a rollercoaster month in the stock market, which sank a record-breaking 12.5 percent the day after Humala’s election, only to bounce back one day later. Rumors of Humala’s plans for the mining industry, private pension funds, and even the free trade agreement with Peru and Colombia abound.
Receiving less attention is how Humala will manage security issues— and particularly narco-trafficking. According to this year’s United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report, Peru is now virtually tied with Colombia as the largest supplier of cocaine in the world. And with skyrocketing cultivation come the more nefarious elements of organized crime. Evidence suggests Mexican cartels are working with local criminal groups and some say moving into Peru themselves, spurring a precipitous rise in drug-related violence in recent years.
Throughout the campaign Humala promised voters a tough on crime, or ‘mano dura,’ approach. He talked about centralizing anti-drug strategies into one agency — a High Commission on Drugs. More controversially, he supported a role for local militias in the fight against narco-traffickers. Recently he met with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos to talk about bilateral counternarcotics cooperation.
On the other hand, the former lieutenant colonel maintains a close political relationship with Peru’s community of coca growers, and his Nationalist Party incorporates prominent leaders of the so-called ‘cocalero’ movement within its ranks. Humala has repeatedly pledged to respect the rights of peasant cultivators of coca leaf, and has opposed forced coca eradication. During the campaign he moderated his original platform, which eschewed a drug policy “subordinated to external interests”, and called for greater collaboration between the U.S. and Peru on security issues. But, Humala’s party recently announced its desire to appoint a representative of the coca grower’s movement to the National Commission for the Development of Life without Drugs (Devida) – the government’s principal anti-drug agency — in an effort to, as one official put it, establish an “open dialogue” with this community.
Humala owes his election to Peru’s rural poor, and it is this constituency that stands to lose the most (at least in the short to medium term) from a hard-line counternarcotics program. Most of Peru’s coca farmers are entirely dependent on the crop as their only source of sustainable income, even as they remain poor. For example, in the Ene-Apurimac valley (responsible for nearly a third of Peru’s coca cultivation), roughly 80% of the population is poor and half live in conditions of extreme poverty.
Though successful anti-poverty and anti-drug campaigns are not mutually exclusive, achieving both sets of aims will be no easy feat for Peru’s incoming president. As Wall Street waits to see how the recent elections will affect Peru’s economic trajectory, domestic and international communities should also be looking toward Humala’s initial security programs, and how he will balance the fight against drugs with his long-standing commitment to improving the lot of Peru’s poor.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
With the formation of ALBA, Unasur, IIRSA, and many others, Latin American nations are pushing towards a new era of economic, political, and social integration. But how innovative are these efforts really? Will they differ from the failed attempts of the past? I recently wrote the following article for World Politics Review on the promise and perils of the region’s integration.
The Promise and Perils of South American Integration
Shannon O’Neil
January 12, 2009
World Politics Review
In the 21st century so far, regional integration has been one of the most notable elements of South American foreign relations. Picking up speed in recent years, the continent’s heads of state have enthusiastically met in numerous summits, promising increased political, economic, social, and development cooperation. Across the spectrum, governments are expanding current integration frameworks and entering into new agreements. Expectations are no less grand. As Brazil’s President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva recently stated, “South America, united, will move the board game of power in the world, not for its own benefit, but for everyone’s.” Read the entire article here.
