CFR’s Task Force on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy

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Container ship sails beneath Golden Gate Bridge en route to port in California (Robert Galbraith/Courtesy Reuters).

Container ship sails beneath Golden Gate Bridge en route to port in California (Robert Galbraith/Courtesy Reuters).

Today the Council on Foreign Relations is releasing its independent Task Force report, “U.S. Trade and Investment Policy.” Led by Andrew H. Card — former White House Chief of Staff under George W. Bush – and Thomas A. Daschle – former U.S. Senator and Senate Majority Leader – and directed by my CFR colleagues Edward Alden and Matthew Slaughter, the 22 members took on the increasingly thorny issue of the future of  U.S. trade policy.

One of the most interesting discussions within the report is of multinational corporations. While representing less than 1 percent of all companies, they provide nearly a quarter of all private sector jobs, nearly 40 percent of all U.S. capital investment, and conduct the vast majority of research and development. These are the engines of today and tomorrow’s economy – and as such the United States needs to become much more competitive in attracting these corporations to its shores.

Another important discussion involves the increasing skepticism among the U.S. public toward trade’s benefits. The group rightly points out this has occurred not because of the general public’s lack of understanding or “ignorance”, but because of the experience of the average American worker. Over the last ten years –the time frame within which trade became a much harder sell — nearly all American workers saw their real earnings fall. U.S. based export oriented jobs – which in general pay more than domestically oriented ones – haven’t grown, even as the world economy exploded. Inequality too has grown during this time frame. And while the report rightly points out that trade was not the only, or perhaps even the deciding factor behind these shifts, it did play a role. As such, any new policy must take into account and work to enhance the widespread benefits of trade for America’s citizens.

Too often participants in policy debates come out as for or against trade, without defining for what end. Here, the Task Force usefully defines the main goals of U.S. trade and investment policies as “improving American living standards and advancing America’s broader interests.” To better meet this end it provides several concrete recommendations, including prioritizing service sector opening in ongoing trade negotiations, reforming the tax code and removing protectionist regulations on international mergers and acquisitions in order to encourage foreign investment in the United States, streamlining the WTO and creating stronger international trade enforcement mechanisms, and expanding adjustment assistance programs to provide a broader safety net for American workers.

As is often the case in trade oriented debates, Task Force members weren’t able to reach a unanimous consensus on what a better trade policy would look like, and how to get there. It is worth looking at the additional dissenting views section to get a sense of the varied perspectives on the report’s conclusions.  Still, everyone did agree to the Task Force’s basic takeaway – that the administration and Congress must revise America’s trade strategy or risk losing out on the enormous potential gains of deeper global engagement.  The report is well worth a read, offering insights on how the United States can emerge from the recession and financial crisis a stronger and more capable leader in the international economy.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Reads of the Week: Extortion vs. Drug-Trafficking in Mexico, New Reports on U.S. Drug Use and Competitiveness in Latin America

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A general view of Sao Paulo, the biggest Latin American city (Paolo Whitaker/Courtesy Reuters).

A new piece by Eduardo Guerrero in Nexos looks at the growing problem of extortion in Mexico. Differentiating it from drug trafficking, he finds it more brutal and violence, and  argues it is on the rise for three reasons: fragmentation of cartels, displacement of crime rings (and their response to expand into new territories), and finally rampant impunity for such acts.

Drug abuse in the United States is on the uptick overall, though use of “harder drugs” seems to be down, according to a recent study by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Marijuana use has increased some 20 percent over the last four years, particularly among young people. Today more than one in five Americans aged 18-25 get high on a regular basis. On the other hand, rates of methamphetamine and cocaine abuse have been steadily declining since 2006.

The World Economic Forum released its Global Competitiveness report this week, which measures competitiveness based on twelve benchmarks that include “basic requirements”, such as institutions, “efficiency enhancers” such as market size, and “innovation and sophistication factors”, such as innovation. Among Latin American countries, Mexico had the biggest boost in the rankings, moving up 8 spots from 66th to 58th, and improving on 10 of the 12 categories (its only drop was in macroeconomic environment). Brazil also made gains, up 5 places to 53rd overall (due largely to the size of its internal market and its sophisticated business environment), and Chile remains at the top of the region and the 31st most competitive nation worldwide. Central American countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua registered steep declines in their ratings, due to weakening institutions and rising insecurity, while Argentina and Venezuela remained generally unchanged, but near the bottom of the list at 84th and 124thoverall, respectively.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Reads of the Week: Chile’s Miners, Brazil’s Industrial Policy, and Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel

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Miner Gomez celebrates as he arrives on the surface as the ninth to be rescued in Chile (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters).

Miner Gomez celebrates as he arrives on the surface as the ninth to be rescued in Chile (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters).

Today is the one year anniversary of the collapse that buried 33 Chilean miners deep underground for more than two months. Their rescue inspired a jolt of nationalistic pride in Chile, and not a little media fanfare, but now many of the survivors find themselves worse off than before the ordeal. Despite, and in some cases because of their fame (sure to increase with the production of a movie based on their tale), almost half of the 33 are unemployed, and some are back working underground to make ends meet.

Sebastián Piñera’s high hasn’t lasted either – recent polls show his ratings slipped to 31 percent last month, a far cry from his 63 percent approval rate in October 2010. Even the Economist is down on Piñera at this point, criticizing the billionaire for creating ties between government and the private sector that are often too close for comfort.

Dilma Rousseff recently unveiled the “Bigger Brazil Plan”, or “Plano Brasil Maior”, a program designed to make Brazil more competitive and stimulate investment in the face of an increasingly overvalued real and the influx of inexpensive goods from abroad. Some question whether the bill will have any positive effect in the long-run, arguing that the $16 billion in tax cuts for manufacturers will be offset by higher sales taxes, needed to finance recent government spending sprees.

For those that haven’t seen it, this Los Angeles Times four-part series on the Sinaloa cartel is an illuminating profile of the more average citizens involved, the way the business works, and one particular DEA attempt to take down a cartel.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.


Reads of the Week: Latin America’s Democracies, Mexican Migration, and More

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Venezuelan President Chavez looks on as his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva speaks during their meeting at Miraflores Palace in Caracas in July, 2010 (Jorge Silva/Courtesy Reuters).

Venezuelan President Chavez looks on as his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva speaks during their meeting at Miraflores Palace in Caracas in July, 2010 (Jorge Silva/Courtesy Reuters).

Jorge Dominguez’s recent testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere gives an overview of Latin America’s progress toward democratic consolidation in recent history, and the role the international community has played in this slow, but steady, march.

Time and America’s Quarterly have two good pieces on Mexico’s state level elections last weekend. While both rightly focus on the PRI’s strength coming out of the election, it didn’t win everywhere. The party lost nine municipalities it previously held in the state of Hidalgo, due in large part to successful alliances between the PAN and PRD. Meanwhile, the PRD mayor of Mexico City urges that these ties must become stronger to give his party and its allies a fighting chance in the 2012 presidential elections.

A recent New York Times article looks at the current state of  illegal immigration from Mexico to the U.S., highlighting how changing dynamics within both countries dissuade Mexicans from crossing the border illegally. This discussion addresses issues I raised in the past, namely changing demographics and new economic realities, including the rise of the middle class in Mexico and the region more broadly.

Lastly, for readers worried about Brazil’s overheating, this Economist graph won’t calm your fears.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Why Can’t Brazil Grow as Fast as China?

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A resident rides a tricycle past the head of a bullet train outside an exhibition for the Seventh World Congress on High Speed Rail in Beijing (Jason Lee/Courtesy Reuters).

A resident rides a tricycle past the head of a bullet train outside an exhibition for the Seventh World Congress on High Speed Rail in Beijing (Jason Lee/Courtesy Reuters).

China’s recurring 10 percent annual average growth rate has won it predominantly accolades (and not a little envy); making it the global economic powerhouse it is today. But as Brazil nears these numbers – growing 7.5 percent in 2010 — it is the naysayers and doubters that have come to the fore. Even the government has labored to reassure investors and the public that it is working hard to “slow down” growth: Finance Minister Guido Mantega assured last week that “[Brazil] will grow moderately” due to proactive measures to raise interests rates and cut public spending.

Why the stark contrast?

One reason is the source of economic growth. China’s has been primarily investment led. From 2000-2008 China invested an average of 41 percent of GDP, a ratio more than double that of Brazil (and other countries such as the United States). In 2009, in the depths of the worldwide global downturn, investment soared to almost 50 percent of GDP, much dedicated to infrastructure. Thousands of factories, millions of miles of road, new ports, high speed railway lines, and airports have sprung up over the past decade. The country is now populated by entirely new cities and manufacturing centers that then drive growth.

Brazil, by comparison, invests less than 19 percent of GDP a year. Infrastructure is notoriously bad – which some economists estimate will curtail future growth by nearly 1 percent a year. Instead, consumption fuels Brazil’s recent rise. In 2009 a whopping 84 percent of GDP was consumption – compared to 17 percent in the United States and just 13 percent in China. Brazil now ranks at the top of the list of the world’s best shoppers led by booming credit, the expansion of foreign and domestic retailers, and the now 100 million strong middle class. The current over reliance on consumption leads economists and policymakers alike to worry about overheating.

Furthermore, China’s transformative growth has been mostly self-funded. It leads the world in internal domestic savings, which has risen steadily since the turn of the 21st century and in 2007 topped 54 percent of GDP, dwarfing the 23 percent average rate of OECD countries. Brazil’s internal savings rate, meanwhile, is only 15 percent, making it more reliant on foreign investment (both long term FDI and more worryingly shorter term portfolio or “hot money” flows) to fund needed investment. Even with these inflows, the savings available don’t approximate those China wields, limiting the potential pace of growth.

But another real and important reason for the discrepancy is that Brazil is already a much more developed economy. Brazil’s per capita income is more than double China’s – $8,230 vs. $3,650 in 2009. Its mortality rates, education rates and urban development rates all top China’s. The basic health improvements, spread of education, and urbanization behind much of China’s growth occurred in Brazil from 1967-1979, when it too grew at rates of almost 9 percent a year. 

This current growth differential between China and Brazil isn’t a permanent status quo.  China’s per capita income has now already risen, and much of the “easy” productivity gains are behind it. Some China observers point to the growing speculative real estate bubble, the rapid aging of its population, and a less than open government as further obstacles to sustainable high growth. Brazil, in turn, has many advantages – a sizable and diversified economy, low government debt and healthy banks. But going forward, for Brazil to grow quickly (and sustainably) it must increase its productivity (and not rely on just high commodity prices and consumption). This will depend on more investment, better education, and other structural reforms. If these changes happen, then the skeptics should fade, and a true second “Brazilian miracle” will be possible.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations

How Mexico Can Win Drug War, Colombia’s Way

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A girl stands in front of a mural as she waits for Spain's King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia for the inauguration of a public library in a suburb of Medellin (Jose Gomez/Courtesy Reuters).

A girl stands in front of a mural as she waits for Spain's King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia for the inauguration of a public library in a suburb of Medellin (Jose Gomez/Courtesy Reuters).

I wrote this op-ed for Bloomberg Views on the lessons for Mexico from Colombia’s wealth tax.

In 2002, strife-torn Colombia took a bold step that paved the way for vastly improved public safety. Now Mexico is struggling to subdue drug wars that have killed almost 40,000 people during President Felipe Calderon’s tenure. It’s time to try the Colombian remedy.

Part of Colombia’s success can be traced to Plan Colombia, the multibillion-dollar U.S. assistance package. That plan concentrated on beefing up military capacity, professionalizing the police and reforming Colombia’s judicial system. The desperately needed money and strategy helped pull Colombia back from the brink of chaos.

Just as important — and much less heralded — is a transformation within Colombia. The country’s privileged rallied together, not just to demand better security but also to shoulder responsibility. In 2002, newly inaugurated President Alvaro Uribe and Colombia’s elites negotiated a wealth tax. In the decade since, the tax has raised nearly a billion dollars annually for security. It also changed the nature of the fight, throwing the establishment’s weight behind the government in the battle for public safety. More than foreign security aid, this is what Mexico needs today: an investment by Mexico’s elites in the safety and well-being of all its citizens.

Click here for the full story.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Rethinking the Scorecard: Brazil vs Mexico

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Fans outside Johannesburg's Soccer City stadium before Mexico and Brazil World Cup game (Siphiwe Sibeko / Courtesy Reuters).

Fans outside Johannesburg's Soccer City stadium before Mexico and Brazil World Cup game (Siphiwe Sibeko / Courtesy Reuters).

The conventional U.S. wisdom today is that Mexico is a problem, and Brazil is an opportunity. The reality is that while Mexico faces serious challenges, the United States shouldn’t count it out. And, while Brazil does present real promise, there are serious issues it has yet to take on.

Economically, these two countries are not as drastically different as current analyses suggest. Yes, Brazil has had six years of consistent high growth. In large part, these were the dividends from macroeconomic reforms begun in the mid-1990s under President Cardoso and reinforced and deepened by President Lula (in fact, the pick up in growth coincided with the start of Lula’s second term, when domestic money finally believed  his centrist promises).

By comparison, Mexico embarked on a similar reform process ten years earlier and earned its macroeconomic dividend in the 1990s, when Brazil was still struggling to rein in hyperinflation. Looking at per capita growth rates over the last twenty years (not just the last 7 or 8), Mexico and Brazil actually look fairly similar (with annual average per capita growth of 2.25% and 2.5% respectively).

While both countries have now solidified a range of necessary macro reforms, they face somewhat similar long term  challenges. Both desperately need to invest in  infrastructure, in education, and to find ways to reduce stark inequalities. Both too are now thriving democracies – a plus on so many levels, but not for pushing through big comprehensive reforms.

There are of course big differences – but those don’t necessarily cut just in Brazil’s favor. Brazil is a bigger market, has ever increasing oil finds, and is a complement to China’s rise – all positive. But it is also a more bloated state, stands in a much worse place vis-à-vis inequality and infrastructure, and faces worrisome inflationary and exchange rate pressures that threaten to undermine its recent gains.

Mexico is already a more export and manufacturing-led economy. And while Obama (and others) made much of  the potential of US-Brazil trade during his March visit, the reality is that the United States already depends on Mexico as its second largest export market – earning some $163 bn last year compared to $35 bn with Brazil.

Mexico is also a much more friendly business environment. According the World Bank’s Doing Business index, Mexico ranks 35th globally – and the highest in Latin America — while Brazil is a woeful 127th (out of a total of 183 countries). On the downside, Mexico lacks widespread credit (which is much more available in Brazil), suffers from too many monopolies and oligopolies, and so far competes with (rather than complements) China’s rise.

The upshot is that there is no clear “winner” in terms of future potential or peril. So what drives the misguided conventional wisdom? A recent paper by Roberto Newell, founder of the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (IMCO), provides a partial answer.  Analyzing the Mexico coverage in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal since the late 1980s, he shows the increasingly negative tone and focus of the main U.S. papers of record. While political and economic news dominated both papers in the 1990s (in large part due to NAFTA), in recent years crime and the border have taken over the new cycle. Economic and political news – much of it good – rarely merit a mention, much less a sustained focus.

Without doing a similar in depth study, anecdotal readings of Brazil in the U.S. media shows the reverse – an almost ebullient focus  on economics and politics, with relatively few stories on crime (even though Brazil’s 25 per 100,000 inhabitants murder rate far exceeds Mexico’s 14).

This negative shift isn’t because that is the only news coming out of Mexico. Yes Mexico’s security situation is grave, but it isn’t Mexico’s only story. As the brief comparison above shows, there are many economic and political strengths (and weaknesses) in both countries. Newell lays out many more of Mexico’s advantages and advances vis-à-vis the much touted BRICs, which include Brazil.

This skewed coverage hits both countries – though Mexico the hardest. For Brazil, it encourages the “hot money” flowing in, further aggravating the underlying economic weaknesses. For Mexico, the resoundingly negative take may, somewhat paradoxically, make it harder to address the security challenge. To see through necessary changes, Mexicans need some sense of optimism and can-do spirit, as well as a sense of what can be lost – and that is so much of what Mexico has gained.

Mexico’s Corrosive Corruption

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Mexico City traffic police inspect driving documents (Daniel Aguilar / Courtesy Reuters).

Mexico City traffic police inspect driving documents (Daniel Aguilar / Courtesy Reuters).

Nearing Mexico City’s airport on my way to Oaxaca with my husband and brother-in-law a few years back, we had an all too familiar experience. Amid the crawling traffic were eight or ten police officers, systematically pulling over every third or fourth car. Unlucky in the lottery, we duly stopped, half in the road, half up a curb. Our offense was not using our blinker to signal a lane change, even though we hadn’t, of course, changed lanes. After the requisite license showing, some hemming and hawing about having to go to the station to sort things out, and a few long silences, we asked what our ticket would cost, and if we could pay it here. Now more animated, the officer pulled out his black notebook and quoted a price based on a multiple of the minimum wage. After finally working the amount down to roughly $40, we put the pesos into his small notebook and were on our way. Just a hundred yards on, at the next light waiting to make our turn, another policeman approached our car, knocking on the driver’s window. My husband, exasperated at this point, rolled it down a couple of inches and yelled “Ya pagamos!” (We already paid). To which the officer, ever polite, replied “Gracias – buen viaje!” and headed off to talk to the next driver in line.

A recent study by Transparency International shows that it wasn’t just our Texas plates that led to this ritual. In the capital, as well as the states of Mexico, Tamaulipas and Querétaro those stopped by the traffic police pay bribes over 80 percent of the time. While these represent the worst, the national average is just under 70 percent (in only four states is it less than  half of the time).

(Courtesy The Economist / Transparency International)

(Courtesy The Economist / Transparency International)

Surveying 15,000 homes across Mexico, the report measures 35 different types of bribery and corruption, from those facing street vendors (23 percent of those surveyed paid a bribe), to people recovering stolen vehicles (25 percent), buying building permits (13 percent), requesting trash collection (22 percent). Perhaps more shocking, 15 percent of the respondents have paid to bring a case to court, while 9 percent speeded up hospital treatments with a financial incentive.

Overall, the data are sobering. Mexicans pay some $2.5 billion a year in bribes – no small change. These costs hit the poor the hardest – a regressive tax if ever there was one. While some federal programs – including the postal service and utilities – have been cleaned up; across the board the numbers aren’t improving. Compared to 2007, if anything things are getting worse, with the amounts charged rising ahead of inflation – today, the average fine is $14, up from $12 in 2007.

This reality makes life for many Mexicans more difficult. A big cut of their hard earned pesos goes to graft. But it also importantly makes the fight against insecurity and violence all the harder. If law enforcement officials often (if not almost always) prey on citizens in these smaller ways, how can the population trust them enough to work together on the bigger threats to their communities and country?

Latin America’s Growing Middle Class

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Thousands of commuters pack the Se metro subway station in Sao Paulo (Paulo Whitaker / Courtesy Reuters).

Thousands of commuters pack the Se metro subway station in Sao Paulo (Paulo Whitaker / Courtesy Reuters).

Two recent studies look at the rise of Latin America’s middle class. The first, by ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), shows that nearly across the board, the share of Latin America’s middle has expanded (the exceptions being Argentina, where it shrank and Colombia, where it held steady).  The second study from Brookings places Latin America in a global comparison and looks toward the future. Here, they define the middle class on global terms, as those that earn enough to be above the poverty line in the two advanced European countries with the lowest poverty lines (Portugal and Italy) and earn less than double the median income of Luxemburg (the richest advanced country). Again the Latin American metrics are impressive. Using 2005 numbers, it finds the middle class now comprises over half of the population in four countries: Mexico (61 percent), Uruguay (56), Argentina (52), and Costa Rica (52). Data since then show that Brazil too has crossed this threshold. Impressive too are the results of their simulations for the future – even in their more conservative estimates, most Latin American countries will become solidly middle class over the next two decades (the current leaders overwhelmingly so).

Three interesting points come out of these studies. First, it reaffirms Latin America’s increasingly positive economic story. In addition to exports, Latin American countries can increasingly rely on domestic consumption to fuel economic growth and advance well-being.

Second, on these metrics Latin American nations far outpace China and India. While the absolute numbers of the middle class in these Asian giants are substantial, as a percentage of the overall population they remain miniscule – a paltry 3.8 percent in China and 2.5 percent in India. And they aren’t likely to catch up any time soon. Even in the best case scenarios this gap won’t close for two decades. This vast difference – and the structural ramifications for these economies – grants Latin America a potential competitive edge in today’s globalized world.

Finally, if the old truism holds, the rising middle class should be good for democracy. Preliminary evidence suggests that this is indeed the case. The expansion of the middle class and of democracy have coincided in most places in the region. But more telling than this correlation, policies favored by the middle – health care, security, education, and general economic openness – are increasingly on the political agenda,  suggesting that the votes of this group matter. These dual trends hold out the hope that an expanding middle can provide both more resources to the state (through increased tax intakes) and demand greater accountability and transparency of their respective governments, deepening democracy in the process.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

“The Real War in Mexico: How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009

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Presidents Barack Obama and Felipe Calderon at Los Pinos. Courtesy of El Enigma at Flickr.

President Obama has recognized that Mexico should be a high priority for his administration. In the issue of Foreign Affairs that hit the newsstands today I argue that U.S. and Mexican interests will be best met if the United States goes beyond the current focus on border control and support for Mexico’s public safety institutions and pursues a more ambitious goal: supporting Mexico’s democracy. I hope you enjoy reading it and look forward to any comments you may have.

(Photo: Presidents Barack Obama and Felipe Calderon at Los Pinos. Courtesy of El Enigma at Flickr.)