Three weeks ago, Reynosa, Mexico–just across the Rio Grande from McAllen, Texas–exploded in violence. The Zetas and the Gulf cartels, once allies, began what may become a fight to the death. The turf war over a lucrative passageway to the United States reportedly claimed over one hundred lives, though no official headcount is available, as observers bemoan the lack of official presence–the local government as well as the army.
But what happened some eight hundred miles to the west on Saturday in Ciudad Juarez, when three U.S. consulate workers–two of them U.S. citizens–were killed in their cars in broad daylight wasn’t likely masterminded by drug cartel leaders. Such assassinations would be bad for cross-border business. Instead, this first case of serious violence against U.S. citizens in the “war on narcotraffickers” waged by President Felipe Calderon’s administration was probably committed by one of Ciudad Juarez’s gangs. Initial intelligence points to the Aztecas, a local gang of hitmen who have worked with “La Linea,” the enforcement arm of the Juarez cartel, which was also implicated in the January 31 massacre of sixteen youths at a birthday party.
In places like Ciudad Juarez, the prevalent depiction of a battle between highly organized and disciplined drug cartels is misleading. Instead, these “organizations” are sprawling networks full of freelancers who might work one day for a cartel, the next on their own or with a local gang. Some of the violence of recent years is between street toughs and gangs, often resolving local turf wars. This growing problem, while fueled by the money and guns associated with the drug trade, is distinct from the presence of multinational criminal drug-trafficking organizations.
Ciudad Juarez today presents a bleak picture. City infrastructure and manpower are overwhelmed; the dominant maquila factories offer only low-wage labor; and over 40 percent of the city’s youths are neither in school nor lawfully employed. Exclusion from the hope of joining Mexico’s developing middle class along with weak control mechanisms mean disaffected youth coalesce around an alternative source of social “status”–urban gangs.
In the aftermath of the shooting, President Obama vowed to continue to work with the Calderon government “to break the power of the drug trafficking organizations that operate in Mexico and far too often target and kill the innocent.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton vowed to “ensure that the perpetrators . . . are brought to justice,” reasserting that “this is a responsibility we must shoulder together, particularly in border communities where strong bonds of history, culture, and common interest bind the Mexican and the American people closely together.”
The United States should support Mexico during this moment–as the events of the past few weeks and this weekend show how closely tied Mexico’s stability and safety are to our own. Yes, weapons and equipment are needed for Mexico’s police forces–particularly at the local level where beat cops often patrol without bulletproof vests and in rundown squad cars. Many are even required to buy their own bullets.
But it is not just more gun power that Mexico needs. Instead, it is a functioning police and court system, a better and more open education system, and programs for early intervention, and professional development for at-risk youth. Partnerships between the United States and a wide range of agencies and stake holders at Mexico’s federal, state, and, most importantly, local levels will be vital for the coordination and pooling of resources and expertise.
This broader challenge of reknitting Mexico’s social fabric in places such as Ciudad Juarez is what Mexico struggles most with today. In light of the weekend violence, the United States should prioritize efforts that will assist Mexico in pushing through the changes that will actually matter, changing today’s violent dynamic for the long term.
Last night Chris Sabatini from the Council of the Americas and I joined Martin Savidge on WorldFocus to discuss the Obama administration’s policy toward Latin America. The conversation focused on natural resources, relations with Cuba, Venezuela and the war on drugs.
Philip Caputo paints a grim picture of Mexico’s current war on drugs in which appears in the December 2009 issue of The Atlantic. His pessimism reflects more than just skyrocketing murders in places such as Ciudad Juarez, or the seeming inability of the local police forces and courts to get to the bottom of these crimes. His chief concern revolves around Mexico’s military.
Caputo suggests that the military is in cahoots with the drug cartels today, much as they were in the past. Laying out what he can piece together from the few wary interviewees willing to speak to him, he depicts an independent military dismissive of human rights in the best case, and a military turned cartel in the worst. With both the Calderon and the U.S. government pinning their hopes in the war on drugs on this military, either scenario is bad news.
However corrupt the military is today, there is a fundamental difference from the earlier parallels he poses, and these differences matter for Mexico’s future. In the 1980s the secretary of defense was found to be working with no less than three drug cartels, and in the 1990s Mexico’s “drug czar” was discovered to be on the payroll of the Juarez cartel. But these incidences were part of a larger systematic relationship between drug traffickers and the long-standing ruling political party, the PRI. The military’s past drug ties can’t be seen in isolation from an organized system of control and enrichment constructed by the PRI that also encompassed the police, courts, and politicians.
Today, it isn’t that corruption has ended. But it is no longer as centralized and coordinated as in the past. Democratization opened up not just the political system to different political parties, but also the illicit economy – effectively ending the unwritten contracts that existed for years between the PRI and particular drug traffickers.
What this means is that corruption in the military today is more autonomous than in the past – not linked to a larger system, not controlled or checked by any political party, and perhaps not coming from the top of the chain of command. For some, this may be even worse news – well armed forces with no master. But, this shift may also mean that it is now much more possible to attack corruption – whether in the military or other parts of the government. With each pocket today no longer part of the larger functioning of an authoritarian system, a focused combination of vetting, training, prosecution, and long-term institution building could yield results. Mexico’s corruption remains a very difficult, but no longer insurmountable problem. And the current democratic political dynamic – forcing politicians to appeal to voters – may increase the chances that the Mexican government goes down a different road.
This better outcome is by no means guaranteed. It will take an incredible amount of work and resources over a long period of time. But the underlying dynamics today are quite different, and they provide Mexico – and the United States –an opportunity so that in ten years another journalist will not be writing a similar “Fall of Mexico” story.
For those of you who may prefer to read in Spanish, my Foreign Affairs article on Mexico has been translated and appears in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica, which you can find here.
It’s hard to believe that Calderon is coming up for 2 years in office, one-third of his term. Much has been said of Calderon’s domestic agenda, but in the op-ed below, published in Mexico’s major English-language newspaper, The News, I analyze his foreign policy achievements. I argue that President Calderon has done much to restore Mexico’s bilateral relationships, but that so far his administration has failed to take on a global leadership role. With four more years in office, Calderon should shift Mexico’s foreign policy course to actively shape the international agenda.
It’s time for Mexico to lead
BY Shannon O’Neil
Special to The News
November 28, 2008
As he celebrates his two-year anniversary in office, President Felipe Calderón gets mixed reviews on his domestic and foreign policy. Many point to the numerous successful reforms – pension, tax, justice, and energy – that have passed as evidence he can deftly guide serious issues through a divided Congress. These achievements do stand in stark contrast to the gridlocked Vicente Fox administration. Yet others dismiss these reforms as too little, too late, and lament the wasted potential for real change.
This ambivalence is not limited to national politics. While much lower in profile, Calderón´s foreign policy elicits both praise and dismissals. It shines in comparison to Fox´s, which left Mexico’s relations with Venezuela and Cuba in tatters and U.S. relations weakened by recriminations on both sides. But as in the domestic arena, many worry Calderón is wasting the opportunity to fundamentally transform Mexico’s role on the world stage.
Upon entering Los Pinos, Calderón quickly moved to repair broken bilateral fences. In his first year, he returned Mexican ambassadors to both Venezuela and Cuba, taking the first necessary steps to re-engage with all of Latin America. He followed up with visits to Argentina and Chile, and received Presidents Tabaré Vázquez of Uruguay and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil at home. Through these renewed ties, his government pushed to increase trade and to further energy partnerships – all important for Mexico´s future. This new hemispheric camaraderie permitted Mexico´s successful U.N. Security Council seat bid, providing Calderón a new international platform in 2009.
While at times seeming almost desperate to ignore his northern neighbor – during his first trip there as head of state in April he even bypassed Washington – Calderón’s administration has actually made more concrete headway with the United States than many of his predecessors. The harsh realities of his “get tough” domestic agenda, and the increasing worries of U.S. policy-makers about drug-related violence in Mexico, have facilitated this newfound cooperation.
Negotiations with President George W. Bush culminated in the three-year package known as the Mérida Initiative, which provides $400 million in the first year for the fight against the drug cartels. Just as important, these discussions changed the terms of the drug war debate, getting the United States to at least grudgingly accept some responsibility in the violence and to promise to stem the flow of illegal guns and money into Mexico.
QUIET CONFIDENCE
On other bilateral issues, Calderón has been notably silent. Coming on Fox’s burned heels, he has virtually ignored U.S.-bound migration in his discussions with the U.S. president. Calls for better treatment of Mexico’s citizens abroad, and for economic development and job creation at home to stem the steady human flow outward, have been geared almost exclusively to his domestic audience. On NAFTA, too, the administration has been uncommonly reticent, particularly amid calls by U.S. democrats for its renegotiation.
Two years in, Calderón’s foreign policy has promoted better Latin American relations, and assuaged past rifts with the United States. Not bad – but not visionary. As the 13th-largest economy in the world, and according to The Economist, soon to break into the ranks of the top 10, Mexico has been decidedly quiet on the international front. It is time for Mexico to lead.
The current financial crisis provides an unprecedented opportunity. Given its own tortuous history with financial upheaval (and more than one near-death experience of its banking sector), Mexico has quite a lot of wisdom to share. And since the exclusive G-7 has given way to the G-20 in worldwide negotiations, Mexico now has a seat at the table.
Other countries understand this. Brazil is the most obvious example, and one to be emulated rather than envied. Its steady and confident leadership on the world stage (backed by good macroeconomic policies and solid domestic economic growth), seduces not just international businesses and investors, but also worldwide diplomats. Having the world’s ear, Brazil´s eminence has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In contrast, Mexico´s more timid foreign policy stance leaves it out of the game.
In the coming months, we will likely see a narrowing of the Mexican government’s domestic policy agenda. The unfortunate combination of escalating criminal violence, the almost certain National Action Party losses in next year´s midterm elections, and the deepening of the global financial crisis will prove too much for an ambitious reform program in the second half of the president´s term. But this unlucky trifecta for the home front opens the opportunity for a more aggressive foreign policy approach. Mexico should turn outward in earnest, building on the solid blocks of support developed so far by Mexico´s diplomats. With now two years of distance from Fox´s unfortunate travails, the arrival of a new administration in Washington provides an opening for the Calderón government to shift Mexico´s foreign policy course. Through the U.N. Security Council seat, its OECD and G-20 membership, and its intricate economic, security, social, and cultural ties with what is still the most powerful world economy and government, Mexico has a chance to shape the international agenda. It is an opportunity Calderón should not waste.
About the writer: Shannon O’Neil is Douglas Dillon Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
I’ve finally seen a full breakdown and explanation of the numbers behind the first year of the Merida Initiative, the Bush Administration’s proposal to cooperate with and aid Mexico in the fight against drugs and terrorism. It can be found here in the second Appendix. This ambitious plan aims to better arm Mexico’s front line civilian and military agencies, to create new roles and offices necessary to better monitor and fight crime, to transform the workings of police and judicial institutions, and to increase the role of civil society organizations in these processes.
Looking at the actual budget breakdown, the focus on long-term institutional changes and professionalization of law enforcement and judicial agencies – which are essential for the sustainability of any success in the war against drugs – is not particularly impressive. Direct training for police and judicial officials comprises only $35mn of the $500 mn. Adding in office equipment, computer systems, forensic labs, and support for civil society that is directly tied toward increasing transparency and accountability increases the amount for institutional improvements to nearly $100 mn. Yet this is still just 20% of the money designated for FY2008.
Instead, the Merida expenditure is front-loaded toward the gear. These include over $100 mn for 8 transport helicopters, $100 mn for 2 surveillance planes, and $140 mn for other equipment including satellite communication systems, ion scanners, x-ray technologies, and extensive database development.
The main reason given for this breakdown is that the Mexican military and civilian agencies need more sophisticated machinery right now to combat the drug trade. While this may be true, there are significant drawbacks to this approach. First, institutional changes and professionalization take a long time to take root and achieve real results ‑ so the sooner these changes begin the better for Mexico and the United States.
Second, policies to reduce corruption and strengthen the rule of law provide less quantifiable benefits. They are much more likely to get cut from future budgets, particularly if the Merida Initiative is not deemed an rapid success (which, without improvements in the performance of the police and judiciary, is likely).
Finally, given the real deficiencies in law enforcement and judicial institutions in Mexico, does the United States really want to equip them with sophisticated technologies before beginning expansive efforts at professionalization? Until these institutions are more transparent and accountable, improving surveillance and other capacities may be counterproductive.
These issues need to be debated when Congress takes up the Merida Initiative, most likely in February. While this agreement is an important step for U.S. security and for bilateral relations, its success will depend in large part on its structure. In order to make the most of this opportunity to work closely with Mexico and to improve the safety of citizens on both sides of the border, greater support for real changes to Mexico’s institutions – from the start – is vital.
Here is a recent interview I conducted with Bernard Gwertzman at the Council on Foreign Relations:
Interview November 6, 2007
So the long awaited “Plan Mexico” has finally been announced by President Bush. He is asking for $500 million for Mexico in the coming year, and $1.4 billion over the next two years. Smaller amounts of money – $50 million – will be provided to Central American countries. The package stresses equipment and training to bolster the Mexican government’s current fight against narcotraffickers.
Here in Mexico, there are worries about the strings attached to this agreement. While the Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa has said that there will be no U.S. military officials brought in, that didn’t stop radio programs, other press, and public figures from worrying about potential concessions that have or will have to be made.
While U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Tony Garza is calling this a “fundamental shift” in U.S. policy, it is really more money for much of the same – improving security by combating drug cartels directly with better intelligence and firepower. Almost nothing has been said about the more fundamental problems that face Mexico – namely the weakness of the police and judicial institutions that are necessary to enforce the rule of law, be it against the illegal drug trade or any other sort of crime. Better equipment may only help in the short term. Unless Mexico can strengthen its institutions – to serve and protect its population, to professionally investigate crimes, and to prosecute and convict criminals – the influx of money and equipment will not resolve Mexico’s, nor the United States’, problems.
