Mention violence in Latin America today and most people think of Mexico. But if you compare the numbers, Latin America’s hotspot is somewhere else entirely: Venezuela, whose homicide rate far surpasses Mexico’s. Under a decade of President Chavez, Venezuela’s homicide rate has increased by about 140 percent, making Venezuela one of the most violent countries in the world.

Not surprisingly, crime in Venezuela has become political enemy number one. According to Latinobarometer, a well regarded regional polling agency, Venezuelans see crime and public safety as the number one challenge for their country; and Venezuela is the only Latin American country where crime is the most important personal issue cited by respondents. Crime was a major concern for voters in the run-up to the November 2008 regional elections. In speeches and ads Chavistas and opposition leaders both blamed the rising violence on their opponents. Perhaps unsure who was culpable, the Venezuelan vote was a draw. Chavez supporters won most of the states, but the opposition won five of the most populous states and some key mayorships, including that of Caracas, meaning that almost half of Venezuelans now live under opposition local governments.

So how bad is it? First, some regional context is necessary. Throughout Latin America, homicide rates hover at three times the global average. But even within that high cohort, Venezela now holds top rank – by far the highest in South America. Violent deaths have more than doubled since 1998, rising from 20 per 100,000 to 48 per 100,000. In Caracas, the government estimates an even higher 130 per 100,000 inhabitants, or seven deaths a day (though some experts believe the true number is closer to 160). By comparison, the murder rate in Capetown, South Africa, is 62 deaths per day. In the region, Mexico’s homicide rate is half of Venezuela’s: 24 per 100,000. Even the former murder capital of South America, Colombia, claims a rate around 40. In fact, the only close comparison in Latin America is the Colombian crime rate in the 1990s, when druglord Pablo Escobar and his rivals were tearing the state to shreds. These murders occur mostly at night, and spike every two weeks around payday. Young people are increasingly the victims, now three times as likely to be killed today than ten years ago.

There are any number of conjectures as to how things got so bad. Venezuela does share some of its neighbors’ security challenges – most notably drug trafficking. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (which was kicked out of Venezuela in 2005), claims drug shipments passing through the country have increased tenfold during Chavez’s tenure. The U.N.’s Office on Drugs and Crime has also tracked Venezuela’s growing role in the drug trade, and believes it is now the major transit country for shipments to Europe. This is surely linked to some rise in violence – but not all.

As in other Latin American countries, a substantial part of the problem rests with the police force. The Venezuelan police have neither the ability, nor skills, nor an interest in properly investigating crimes. In promotions, loyalty is prized over capacity, and some even suggest the government has encouraged the selective enforcement of its laws — for instance, ignoring tire burning and petty crime in poorer neighborhoods in order to avoid conflict with Chavez’s support base: the country’s poor. If the often cited “broken windows” theory holds true, allowing these petty infractions creates a climate of lawlessness that opens the door for more serious and violent crimes, such as murder. National polls show that the vast majority of citizens believe the police are involved in many of the crimes committed, with a full one-fourth of respondents claiming the police are behind nearly all crimes committed. As a result, most crimes are not even reported, leaving little to dissuade the criminally inclined.

A poor justice system is also to blame. Only three of every 100 murderers are actually sentenced. Courts are underfunded and politicized, as they often serve the interest of the government over justice. Some experts in fact link a rise in police brutality to a lack of confidence in the judiciary; police officers are more inclined to take justice into their own hands, knowing the courts will be unable or unwilling to intercede.

But the rise in violence may also have something to do with Chavez’s particular way of governing. During his weekly address “Alo Presidente” and other speeches, Chavez incites violence against anti-government protesters, justifies law breaking, accuses political figures, the media, and others of crimes, and calls on the citizenry to take on the role of the enforcement forces into its own hands. As a result, after a decade of Chavez’s rule, respect for rule of law has dwindled. Those that support the president know they can act with impunity, while those that oppose him often fear even expressing themselves.

Until recently, Venezuela had the fiscal wherewithal to do something about its crime. Several years of high oil prices allowed Chavez’s government to ramp up spending, quadrupling it from $17 billion in 2003 to over $70 billion for 2009. Billions of these dollars went to the Misiones Bolivarianas, Chavez’s centerpiece redistribution programs to bring health care, literacy programs, housing, and subsidized food to Venezuela’s citizens. Chavez doubled the defense budget, allowing the military to purchase submarines, aircrafts, helicopters, and over 100,000 AK-47-type rifles from Russia.

But very little from the oil bonanza trickled down to a basic security system desperately in need of an overhaul. The President responded to the growing calls to do something about rising crime by creating a new centralized National Police Force to eventually replace Venezuela’s numerous local forces. But rather than establishing firm and functioning democratic institutions; the new armed force appears to be just another organization at the beck and call of the executive branch.

What is most unusual in Venezuela is that crime rates skyrocketed as poverty decreased. Now, with the economy in freefall, things could get even worse. And Chavez is not helping. Over the last three months, as pointing fingers at the “American empire” has failed to pay dividends, Chavez has shifted his strategy and attacked the opposition, stripping the new opposition mayor of Caracas of much of his authority, accusing the TV station Globovision of “”media terrorism” and threatening to close it down, and bringing what may prove to be unfounded corruption charges against prominent (and popular) opposition leaders. As the Venezuelan government moves farther down the path to authoritarian rule, law enforcement institutions will surely follow, bending and breaking the rules as necessary.

Venezuela’s institutions are threatened not just by drug traffickers, organized crime, or guerrillas, but also by the decisions of elected officials. It is this challenge the Venezuelans now face, holding in the balance their safety, their prosperity, and increasingly, their very lives.

This article first appeared on Foreign Policy Passport.

The polls show varying results, with some proclaiming a majority in support of the changes and others showing a majority against the proposals. What will really matter is turnout. Here, the “yes” vote has an advantage, since the government is already canvassing the media and will undoubtedly use state resources to encourage supporters to get to the polls. This mobilization will matter.

In addition, Chavez has played again the international anti-imperialist card in the lead up to the referendum. Chavez’s recent international outbursts,  first with the King of Spain and more recently with Colombian President Uribe, deflect from the growing domestic discontent and confusion. His evocation of former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, who along with President George W. Bush tacitly supported the 2002 coup attempt against his government, seems designed to rally supporters before the upcoming vote, implicitly reminding voters of the turmoil brought on by political polarization. If that isn’t enough, the violence in recent weeks toward the opposition may scare some “no” voters away on Sunday.

Finally, the opposition has not been able to rally around one position, “ unlike more successful “no” campaigns, such as that leading up to Chile’s 1988 referendum. Some, notably those loyal to the old Accion Democratica political party are calling for a boycott. Others, including former Presidential candidate Manuel Rosales and his followers, are rallying for the no vote. And few seemed to have reached out to Chavez’s former defense minister, General Raul Isaias Baduel, who has criticized the proposals as effectively realizing a constitutional “coup.”

Whether the opposition can galvanize the uneasiness with these reform proposals, which encompasses not just the traditional opposition but student movements and many moderate Chavez supporters, will be answered on Sunday.

Chavez’s ability to carry out these nationalizations rests on the confluence of political and economic power he holds. In recent years he consolidated political power in Venezuela by undermining the independence of the judiciary, the national electoral council, the bureaucracy, and he gained complete control of the Congress. On the economic side, high oil prices provide Chavez the resources to compensate the private owners of these or even other companies in Venezuela. Venezuela now holds over $50 billion dollars in international reserves, providing a war chest for not only his social programs but for expenditures like nationalizations.

What is important to understand is that it is unlikely his efforts will spread to other Latin American nations. Most of the recently elected leaders in Latin America (there have been twelve elections in as many months) are turning toward free markets, not away from them. Leftist leaders in countries such as Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and even Argentina are opening their markets while also instituting broader social protections, including social security, health care, and assistance programs. Even those leaders who may be more ideologically inclined toward state intervention in the economy, such as the presidents of Bolivia and Nicaragua, don’t have the luxury of strong oil revenues. So large-scale nationalizations are unlikely outside of Venezuela. In many ways this is an isolated, anachronistic turn to socialism, ironically buoyed by global capital markets and the increasing demand for oil due to globalization.

Finally, some commentators are pointing to the Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Venezuela (his second in five months) as a threat to U.S. interests. These meetings, and strategic agreements signed at them, are less important than many fear. While there are several reasons why the United States should worry about its relationship with Iran, the alliance with Chavez will not seriously influence these foreign relations. We should keep or foreign policy strategies and decisions toward each country separate, as their shared anti-Americanism shouldn’t negate their vast differences.

For more thoughts on Chavez’s announcements, please check out my interview with Mike McKee from Bloomberg earlier this week about this development:

Bloomberg interview

These new governments have already shown their commitment to free markets. In less than a year, Chile’s President Michelle Bachelet has signed free trade agreements with China, New Zealand, and Singapore, and is negotiating new accords with both Japan and Australia. Alan Garcia of Peru appointed a well-known private banker as Finance minister and vocally supports free trade agreements with the United States, Canada, and many Asian countries. Brazil’s Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva was re-elected based on his conservative first term economic policies. Tabare Vazquez of Uruguay also continued the orthodox economic choices of the previous government, attracting both Finnish and Spanish foreign investment for Uruguay’s cellulose industry.

Even the more rhetorically radical leaders are governing or likely to govern near a pragmatic center. During his first year in office, Bolivian President Evo Morales drew back from his more populist campaign appeals. He cancelled the nationalization of the mining industry, and is now negotiating gas contracts with foreign companies. While peppering campaign speeches with anti-American quips, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega left the Sandinista’s economic ideology behind. During his first weeks in office he has already started courting domestic and foreign investment, promising to uphold contracts and maintain open markets. Rafael Correa’s of Ecuador began moderating his promises in the final weeks of the presidential campaign, and even reached out to U.S. ambassador, Linda Jewel. In fact, only Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, supported by oil revenues – represents a firm holdover from the political past.

Yet while rejecting old-style socialism, Latin American voters did turn left. The winning candidates all reached out to the large portions of the population that have not benefited from economic reforms. They promised to improve the social welfare of ordinary citizens. Now in office, they are pushing forward to create jobs, eliminate hunger, and provide better access to education, social security and health care.

This shift Left reflects the real needs of Latin America’s populations. While Latin America’s economies have grown in recent years, these benefits have not trickled down. Some 25% of the population still lives in poverty. The difference between the haves and have nots stubbornly remains one of the most pronounced in the world.

More positively, this political turn reflects the spread of democracy. As more open and inclusive governments take root, politicians are responding to voter demands. The winning electoral campaigns focused not just on overall economic growth but also on increasing economic opportunities, particularly for the poor.

These newly elected leaders now will try to soften the rough edges of globalization while continuing to compete in international markets. This is a difficult balancing act for any leader, and many will not meet the challenge. But as Leftists, they have an opportunity to build a social consensus behind the long-term investments necessary for real change in these countries. To that end, this new Left represents the best chance for strengthening the economies and the democracies of Latin America.