Police pay became a hot topic of discussion over the past two weeks with the release of a Mexican government report breaking down police salary by state. The disparities are stark — with police officers in Tamaulipas earning monthly salary of just $268, while their counterparts in Aguascalientes bring home about $1,342 a month.
An obvious question is how does this affect crime and violence? The answer is less obvious. Overall, the data shows no straightforward correlation. Patrick Corcoran lays out many other factors that affect public safety, including each officer’s moral compass, the chances of getting caught the severity of the punishment. Daniel Sabet’s study on corruption within the Tijuana police makes this point, laying out the complicated calculus behind an officer’s decision to fall in (or not) with the bad guys.
Still, the graph below of police salary vs. homicide rate by state suggests that police pay does matter. While we see a lot of variation at the low and the middle end of the scale, high salaries and low violence are strongly correlated. The top nine payers– including states that are in drug traffickers’ line of fire (e.g. Baja California) – have relatively few murders per capita. While not the only and last word, this should encourage lagging state governments to rethink their spending priorities.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
At least 27 people were found dead in the Guatemalan village near the border with Mexico last May. Police look at a message written with a victim's blood, which reads: ‘What’s up, Otto Salguero, you bastard? We are going to find you and behead you, too. Sincerely, Z200.’ (Courtesy Reuters).
In the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s recent hearing, “Has Merida Evolved? Part One: The Evolution of Drug Cartels and the Threat to Mexico’s Governance,” Committee Chairman Connie Mack (R-Fla), among others, expressed his support for a U.S. counterinsurgency program (COIN) to fight Mexican drug traffickers. Calling the cartels “a well-funded criminal insurgency raging along our southern border,” Mack said the only way to win the drug war is through an “all U.S. agency” COIN approach, which would require greater U.S. military involvement.
I’d tend to agree instead with this article by Patrick Corocan, which says that sending U.S. troops into Mexico will not provide a long-term solution to the country’s security challenges, first because the nature of narco-violence is distinct from that of an insurgency (so a COIN response to it would be inappropriate) and because of the “practical difficulties” involved in such an approach (including a popular backlash to it in Mexico).
This week the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control released its report, “Responding to Violence in Central America,” which draws attention to the rapid escalation of violence in the region – most of it tied to the ramped up activity of organized crime, as detailed by the Woodrow Wilson Center study I discussed last week. The report offers a number of policy recommendations to deal with the problem, the most critical (and innovative) of which include placing more emphasis on extraditions of drug traffickers to the United States, improving witness protection programs and expanding cooperation between U.S. law enforcement and regional counterparts. It also notes that while U.S. security assistance for Central America has grown over the past three years, it is likely to stagnate – or even decline – in the future, making it even more critical for countries in the region to seek other sources of security funding by reaching out to other donors and to the domestic private sector.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Narco Killings 2011 Map (Courtesy WM Consulting).
There has been much debate in Mexico about the number of drug-related killings since the start of drug war in 2006. The Mexican government provides an official database that puts this figure at some 35,000. Others, such as Reforma, provide an estimate near the official number — but more current — now totalling some 37,000.
As important as the total numbers is their breakdown. Here, the Mexican government provides some estimates, sorting the murders according to whether they were acts of aggression, executions or occurred as a result of a confrontation. Walter McKay at WM Consulting has built a useful tool by scouring local newspapers in many (but not yet all) Mexican states. This map depicts the murders according to whether the victim was a civilian, politician (or other high profile individual), or law enforcement official, and also shows the sites of car bombs and mass graves. McKay puts the number of deaths as a result of the drug war at some 47,000, significantly higher than the government estimate. As the policy debates continue, these various sources of information will be vital to informing steps forward.
This week the Woodrow Wilson Center released its report, “Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle”, which has many well researched and written chapters on the accelerated rise of criminal structures over the past three decades in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. To bolster weak rule of law institutions vulnerable to the influence of organized crime in the region, it argues, the U.S. will need to contribute more funds to the region’s security initiatives – even as individual countries play a greater part by collecting more taxes. Though overall the picture is disheartening, this useful study lays out the complex factors underlying the violence in Central America today.
It also shows that while all Central American nations struggle with crime and violence, the real security challenges are in the Northern Triangle – where the magnitude and type of organized criminal operations are unparalleled. This finding questions the traditional blanket regional approach taken by the United States (through CARSI), or the way other Latin American or European countries develop multilateral security initiatives within Central America.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
A general view of Sao Paulo, the biggest Latin American city (Paolo Whitaker/Courtesy Reuters).
A new piece by Eduardo Guerrero in Nexos looks at the growing problem of extortion in Mexico. Differentiating it from drug trafficking, he finds it more brutal and violence, and argues it is on the rise for three reasons: fragmentation of cartels, displacement of crime rings (and their response to expand into new territories), and finally rampant impunity for such acts.
Drug abuse in the United States is on the uptick overall, though use of “harder drugs” seems to be down, according to a recent study by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Marijuana use has increased some 20 percent over the last four years, particularly among young people. Today more than one in five Americans aged 18-25 get high on a regular basis. On the other hand, rates of methamphetamine and cocaine abuse have been steadily declining since 2006.
The World Economic Forum released its Global Competitiveness report this week, which measures competitiveness based on twelve benchmarks that include “basic requirements”, such as institutions, “efficiency enhancers” such as market size, and “innovation and sophistication factors”, such as innovation. Among Latin American countries, Mexico had the biggest boost in the rankings, moving up 8 spots from 66th to 58th, and improving on 10 of the 12 categories (its only drop was in macroeconomic environment). Brazil also made gains, up 5 places to 53rd overall (due largely to the size of its internal market and its sophisticated business environment), and Chile remains at the top of the region and the 31st most competitive nation worldwide. Central American countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua registered steep declines in their ratings, due to weakening institutions and rising insecurity, while Argentina and Venezuela remained generally unchanged, but near the bottom of the list at 84th and 124thoverall, respectively.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Passengers on a bus pass a vehicle painted with a slogan during an anti-drugs campaign to mark International Anti-Drug Day in Jakarta (Dadang Tri/Courtesy Reuters).
The “drug war” strategy of the last four decades revolves primarily around supply side measures. Whether eradication, interdiction, or arrests, it fixates on stopping the seemingly endless flow of drugs and cash across U.S. borders. But there is obviously another side to the equation – U.S. demand. The United States is the largest consumer of drugs across the globe (though there are signs that the cocaine and marijuana markets in Europe and the developing world are catching up) with 1 in every 7 Americans having tried an illegal substance. Marijuana accounts for the vast majority of that consumption, followed by prescription drugs and cocaine.
Three basic strategies underlie the traditional approach to dealing with drug abuse at home: prevention, treatment and enforcement. Prevention programs seek to stop substance abuse by educating primarily schoolchildren on the dangers of narcotics. Even with their memorable slogans (such as Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaign or Drug Abuse Resistance Education’s “D.A.R.E. to resist drugs and violence”) the results have been disappointing. A number of studies show these efforts – costing millions of dollars – may slightly slow marijuana experimentation among teens.
Treatment programs, particularly when focused on rehab for heavy drug users, are by far the most cost effective U.S. policy. For every million dollars spent, these programs reduce lifetime cocaine consumption by 100 grams.This may not seem like a lot, but it is more than three times as effective as preventive programs and punitive measures. Investing in treatment also yields impressive returns in terms of public safety, as every dollar spent on substance abuse rehabilitation reduces the costs of associated crime by an estimated seven dollars. Still, soaring dropout rates – even within mandatory programs — question the long-term benefits of formal treatment for the relatively few drug addicts who choose to participate.
A final major element of demand side in the United States has been enforcement, namely incarceration of those selling and using drugs. From 1972-2002, the number of drug offenders behind bars increased twelve-fold (accounting for about half of the total growth of the federal prison population). This has hit African American communities the hardest, as 1 in every 3 black males goes to prison at some point in his life (1 in 15 black adults are currently behind bars). This is at least in part because the punishments for crack are harsher than those for powder cocaine, leading to longer sentences for black vs. white offenders. This style of stepped up enforcement doesn’t seem to have changed the fundamental drug markets, at least not for the better. Cocaine and heroin prices have hit all-time lows, indicating greater availability, while purity has increased by more than half in recent years. Methamphetamine rose from near obscurity in the early nineties to become the drug of choice for roughly 1.5 million Americans today.
Latin American officials such as presidents Felipe Calderon of Mexico and Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia are increasingly calling on the United States to do more to reduce consumption, and a recent report co-authored by former President of Brazil Fernando Henrique Cardoso urged a “paradigm shift” in global drug policy to treat “drug addiction as a health issue, reducing drug demand through educational initiatives and legally regulating rather than criminalizing cannabis.” So what should the U.S. government do?
Some experts favor legalizing narcotics, putting an end to drug war once and for all. These advocates maintain that making drugs commercially available will replace illicit markets with formal ones, and thus eliminate the violence of the illegal drug trade. Researchers have found that legalizing marijuana would not necessarily lead to a rise in substance abuse (since those that want to get high today can, at least in many states, do it quite easily), and could slash one fifth of Mexican cartels’ profits. Ending the prohibition on harder drugs may not have the same effect, as legalization could prompt more consumption of cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine (because current enforcement against these drugs is more effective than for marijuana). To appreciate the potential costs of a surge in use, one need only to look at the double-edged consequences of ending the prohibition against alcohol. While the likes of Al Capone are history, Americans today are four times more likely to abuse alcohol than all illicit drugs combined. Alcohol-abusers are also more prone to break the law, as more than half of the current prison population committed their crimes drunk.
Other experts (especially those at RAND corp.) suggest we focus our anti-drug resources on enforcement that prioritizes harm reduction. The idea here is not to lock people up indiscriminately, but to go after the most violent drug traffickers and retail dealers. While this may not alter the availability and price of drugs (current policies haven’t done this either), it would they suggest reduce the effects on the larger community and population – whether here in the United States or in places such as Mexico.
For the past three decades Washington has spent the bulk (an average of two thirds) of anti-drug resources on supply side solutions. Even as the U.S. drug control budget expanded by more than 50 percent in recent years, expenditures for demand side policies remained stagnant, growing less than one percent per year over the past decade. Realizing that there is no easy solution on either side of the border, it is time to rethink these strategies, keeping in mind the brief successes and unfortunate failures of the last four decades.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Argentine President Fernandez waves to supporters after hearing the first results of the nationwide primary election in Buenos Aires (Enrique Maracarian/Courtesy Reuters).
The Pew Research Center released the results of a wide-ranging public opinion poll based on interviews with some 800 Mexicans (the study is part of their larger Global Attitudes Project). It finds strong continued support for military – 83 percent favor their role in the drug war – and for U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, with nearly 3 in 4 Mexicans supporting U.S. training and weapons for national security forces. Calderón, despite an economic recession and ever more bloody drug war, still enjoys the confidence of a majority of Mexicans, with 57% saying they view his political influence in a positive light. While these numbers look bad vis-à-vis past Mexican presidents entering their last term in office, other Western Hemisphere leaders (Barack Obama and Sebastian Piñera, for example) would be quite pleased with such levels of support.
A recent survey of the Guatemalan judiciary, on the other hand, paints rule of law institutions in a much more more troubling light. The Plaza Pública study shows that overall Guatemalans see judges as corrupt, controlled (by vested economic interests and other political elites), and inefficient.
This Cefeidas Group report provides an update on the Argentine elections, where Cristina Fernández de Kirchner looks even more likely to win a second term in the October 23rd election, due in part to the weakness of the opposition.
On a different note, Rolling Stone has an in-depth and well written article about La Barbie, a native Texan who rose to become the top drug kingpin in Acapulco. The behind the scenes narrative of his rise and fall shows why going after kingpins will not, on its own, make Mexico safer.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
U.S. Republican presidential candidate Michele Bachmann gestures beside Mitt Romney during the Republican presidential debate in Ames (Courtesy Reuters).
As primary election season gets underway, the Republican hopefuls have had little to say about Latin America. But there have been a few hints though from the leading candidates as to what they see when they look south – particularly with regard to Mexico.
Michele Bachmann is the most cut and dry so far. She opposes immigration and the legalization of undocumented migrants, and calls for the deployment of troops in south Texas. The Minnesota congresswoman wants to wall the border off completely, saying “As president of the United States, every mile, every yard, every foot, every inch will be covered on that southern border.” When Bachmann felt the need to strengthen her foreign policy chops last spring, she flew to Colombia and Mexico with the House Intelligence Committee – her first trip abroad to a country other than Israel (which she has visited multiple times courtesy of pro-Israel interest groups). Upon returning, she expressed strong support for the drug war.
Mitt Romney and Rick Perry have more nuanced takes – in part because they have more extensive experience in and with the region. Romney has a long history working in Latin America, as his firm Bain Capital invested extensively in Central and South America. On the campaign trail, he lauds those governments with business friendly policies, pointedly contrasting them to those with less open markets (e.g. Venezuela and Cuba).
During the 2008 electoral race Romney became increasingly tough on immigration , and even tougher on border enforcement, running ads attacking John McCain for his “soft” stances. His hardened views have caused somewhat of a family drama as many of his relatives (no, not from the Huntsman branch) live in northern Mexico and have openly criticized him, saying that “I don’t think Mitt understands the causes of illegal immigration.”
Rick Perry, the newest addition to the field and the now front-runner has little interest in Latin America, but does have a long history with Mexico. On immigration, the Texas governor is considerably more progressive than many of his peers. Perry’s record suggests that he supports the DREAM act and similar reforms, given that he approved a law allowing undocumented high school graduates in Texas to pay state tuition. He has even thrown his weight behind a guest worker program for Texas.
But Perry is increasingly vocal and tough on border security. Among the most outspoken critics of Obama’s border policy, he has repeatedly raised alarm bells about violence spilling over from Mexico into the lone star state, and asked for the deployment of military troops and predator drone in response. Unlike Bachmann, Perry has remained firmly opposed to the border fence, calling the idea “ridiculous on its face.”
This early in the season, most candidates and campaigns are focused on domestic issues. Those foreign policy issues at the forefront – Afghanistan, Libya, or Syria – aren’t necessarily a club Latin American nations would want to join. But many do bemoan the lack of interest and understanding of the rest of the Western Hemisphere by these presidential hopefuls.
Latin America should in fact matter more. The region is among the U.S. fastest growing trading partners, creating American jobs with each purchase. With over half a trillion dollars worth of goods going back and forth, Latin America is second only to Asia – and growing much faster – in terms of total trade with the United States. Its largest nations play important roles in multilateral organizations from the G20 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), helping the United States and others resolve difficult global challenges. And finally, according to the latest census 50 million Americans – 1/6 of the population – are descendants of these nations, many still with close ties to their original homes. Ignoring Latin America or alienating Latin Americans only adds up to a missed opportunity, both for the Republican Party and for the country.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
A customs officer is handed a passport by a motorist at the San Ysidro border crossing (Fred Greaves/Courtesy Reuters).
The U.S. debates over Mexico’s drug war increasingly focus on spillover violence. Border state governors Rick Perry and Jan Brewer insist that Mexican cartels are hitting their states hard, portraying the border as a lawless “war zone” in which the drug cartels and illegal Mexicans incite “terror and mayhem” on a daily basis. In stark contrast, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner Alan Bersin and Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano contend that the border has never been safer.
The statistics bear out the latter position. A recent study based on FBI figures shows that violent crime in cities within 50 miles of the border is consistently lower than state and national averages. The robbery rate in the Texas border region, for example, remained at least 30 percent lower than the state average for every year in the past decade. The data also show that the number of kidnapping cases in border areas dropped by more than half since 2009. This doesn’t mean that bad things don’t happen – they do. But they happen less frequently along the border, on average, than in other parts of the United States. Despite local politicians’ concerns and rhetoric, the border is more secure than in the past, and in fact safer than the rest of the country.
But the downward trend in border violence does not mean that the Mexican drug war hasn’t had spillover effects on the United States. Among the most troubling is corruption. Local newspapers recount the stories of public officials engaged in foul play; from the South Texas county Sheriff Conrado Cantú, who took bribes from drug traffickers, to Columbus, New Mexico Mayor Eddie Espinoza, charged with operating a gun smuggling ring in connection with Mexican cartels. Available data also show a rise in corruption within the ranks of the border patrol. Since the reopening of the Homeland Security Bureau’s internal affairs unit in 2003 – in and of itself a reflection of the increased risk of corruption within the agency – cases of corruption against law enforcement officials on the border have more than doubled. Tales of CBP agents turning a blind eye to, and sometimes actively aiding drug traffickers smuggling narcotics, arms and migrants across the border abound.
The increase in corruption reflects the lure of drug money and the CBP’s institutional weaknesses. Doubling the border patrol’s numbers in less than a decade made it more vulnerable to corruption, diluting the once highly disciplined force with less experienced and committed newcomers. The border patrol administers lie detector tests to only 10 percent of applicants, more than half of which fail — raising serious concerns about the capability, and even intentions, of many of its new hires.
Other spillover effects are positive for the United States – namely increasing economic activity. Seemingly every day new restaurants, stores, and private schools are opening in border towns, serving clients that once traveled further south. Many attribute Texas’ strong real estate market to the influx of Mexican citizens eager for greater peace and stability. In the spring of 2008, when foreclosures hit record highs across the United States, real estate agents in El Paso reported steady sales of houses and apartments worth more than $100,000. The President of the Greater El Paso Association of Realtors, Dan Olivas, attributed the stability of the El Paso market to “a substantial number of people from Juarez coming over to buy properties for security reasons, for fear of kidnappings, extortion, and cartel violence.” This El Paso trend has continued, and spread more broadly.
Not only do Mexicans buy homes, but many are bringing their businesses north. Immigration consultants say inquiries from Mexicans for EB-5 investor visas – which cost $500,000, and require that applicants’ create at least 10 jobs in the U.S. within two years – have doubled in recent years. Mexico has quickly risen the ranks to become one of the top recipients of these visas.
Mexico’s drug war is indeed affecting the United States – but mostly in ways that politicians overlook, misunderstand, or (more cynically) choose not to recognize. The current policy prescriptions – a higher and longer border wall, more boots on the ground and predator drones overhead – won’t slow seeping corruption, nor bolster the beneficial economic ties. Unfortunately, the wrong diagnosis means also the wrong policy prescriptions, hurting both countries in the process.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
It is becoming increasingly possible that 2011 will be the year that Mexico truly began opening its closed economy. Though political reform seems to have failed and efforts to centralize Mexico’s many police forces stalled, the political system has taken important steps in the last several months that could establish a more open and level economic playing field. What is most interesting, and perhaps hopeful, about these developments is that all three branches of government are throwing their weight behind freer markets.
First, in mid-April, the executive branch through the regulatory Federal Competition Commission, or CFC issued the largest fine for monopolistic behavior in Mexico’s history. As I discussed in an earlier post, Telcel was slapped with a $1 billion penalty for inordinately high interconnection fees. What’s more, the fine marked the second sanction against the telecommunication giant – one more strike, and the government is legally allowed to break up Telcel for good.
The legislature was the next to flex its muscles against domestic conglomerates. Following on the heels of the Telcel ruling, both houses of the senate unanimously approved a number of changes to anti-trust laws designed to foster competition. The reform put in place harsher punishments for those found guilty of monopolistic practices, who can now be fined up to 10 percent of their profits and in the most serious cases (price fixing falls under this umbrella) face 10 years in jail. They also awarded more power to the CFC, including the right to conduct unannounced raids of companies under investigation.
Now the judiciary is jumping into the fray. Pushed by business groups, the public prosecutor’s office launched last month a criminal investigation into Héctor Osuna, former vice-president of the telecom regulator COFETEL, and his colleagues. Investigators suspect that COFETEL executives engaged in back door legal maneuvering to grant Telmex (owned by Carlos Slim) access to the television market on unfair grounds. Specifically, they believe that Osuna intentionally delayed ruling on Telmex’s request for a television concession past the specified deadline – despite his own admission that “for us there was never evidence that [Telmex] had complied with its requirements” — which technically counted as a tacit approval of the request. The result of the investigation is not just vital for Telmex, which would gain substantially by entering the television market, but also for the judicial branch, whose scorecard against national giants hangs in the balance (though the courts have defended more open markets before, notably in 2007 when the Supreme Court struck down a media law that stifled competition).
To be sure, these recent actions are mostly directed at the business interests of just one individual — Carlos Slim. On the other hand, if used more broadly, the new legislation and legal precedents could be real game changers for the Mexican economy. Either way, this is the first time we have seen such a serious full court press for more open markets and sectors in Mexico — and all three branches of government deserve credit for that.
It is becoming increasingly possible that 2011 will be the year that Mexico truly began opening its closed economy. Though political reform seems to have failed and efforts to centralize Mexico’s many police forces stalled, the political system has taken important steps in the last several months that could establish a more open and level economic playing field. What is most interesting, and perhaps hopeful, about these developments is that all three branches of government are throwing their weight behind freer markets.
First, in mid-April, the executive branch through the regulatory Federal Competition Commission, or CFC issued the largest fine for monopolistic behavior in Mexico’s history. As I discussed in an earlier post, Telcel was slapped with a $1 billion penalty for inordinately high interconnection fees. What’s more, the fine marked the second sanction against the telecommunication giant – one more strike, and the government is legally allowed to break up Telcel for good.
The legislature was the next to flex its muscles against domestic conglomerates. Following on the heels of the Telcel ruling, both houses of the senate unanimously approved a number of changes to anti-trust laws designed to foster competition. The reform put in place harsher punishments for those found guilty of monopolistic practices, who can now be fined up to 10 percent of their profits and in the most serious cases (price fixing falls under this umbrella) face 10 years in jail. They also awarded more power to the CFC, including the right to conduct unannounced raids of companies under investigation.
Now the judiciary is jumping into the fray. Pushed by business groups, the public prosecutor’s office launched last month a criminal investigation into Héctor Osuna, former vice-president of the telecom regulator COFETEL, and his colleagues. Investigators suspect that COFETEL executives engaged in back door legal maneuvering to grant Telmex (owned by Carlos Slim) access to the television market on unfair grounds. Specifically, they believe that Osuna intentionally delayed ruling on Telmex’s request for a television concession past the specified deadline – despite his own admission that “for us there was never evidence that [Telmex] had complied with its requirements” — which technically counted as a tacit approval of the request. The result of the investigation is not just vital for Telmex, which would gain substantially by entering the television market, but also for the judicial branch, whose scorecard against national giants hangs in the balance (though the courts have defended more open markets before, notably in 2007 when the Supreme Court struck down a media law that stifled competition).
To be sure, these recent actions are mostly directed at the business interests of just one individual — Carlos Slim. On the other hand, if used more broadly, the new legislation and legal precedents could be real game changers for the Mexican economy. Either way, this is the first time we have seen such a serious full court press for more open markets and sectors in Mexico — and all three branches of government deserve credit for that.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents usher Fabio Ochoa, Colombian drug kingpin, to an awaiting vehicle following his extradition from Colombia to Florida, September 8, 2001(Courtesy Reuters).
One of the heralded lessons of Colombia’s fight against drug cartels is that fragmentation reduces violence. The vertical command structures of the famed Medellín and Cali cartels were legendary. Their pseudo-celebrity leaders lived extravagantly, socialized widely, and often died violently. They spent billions to buy off politicians, judges, and business leaders, and they spent more to assassinate adversaries they couldn’t buy, chasing their targets not just all over Colombia but the world. The country became, for a time, the most violent place on earth, the nationwide homicide rate topping 80 per 100,000 in 1991.
But a couple of decades later, the drastic levels of violence have fallen, the motorcycle assassins disappeared, the car bombs ended. The conventional story goes something like this: the killing first of Pablo Escobar and then the arrest and conviction of the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers fragmented the cartels and their command structures. From the ruins of the once centralized cartels sprang smaller – and less vicious – criminal organizations. While cocaine production and distribution (which hasn’t changed much) continued, violence fell.
A U.S. law enforcement official once told me that their antidrug strategy in Mexico was first to go after the wolves (the highest level cartel leaders), then go after the snakes (the next level down), and then clean up the remaining rats. The odd animal analogy aside, this strategy seems straight out of Colombia’s playbook.
Mexico has, in fact, done this fairly successfully. Of the 37 thugs on its Most Wanted list, 21 are either behind bars or six feet underground. Where once U.S. and Mexican officials cited four main criminal organizations, today the number has at least doubled, complemented by the rise of many smaller operations and local gangs. But as the Mexican cartels multiplied, violence escalated to all time highs.
Why the difference? Obviously Mexico and Colombia have different histories, and different security problems, so the reasons for divergent outcomes are multiple and complex. Perhaps one issue — seemingly forgotten in the transfer of “lessons learned” —is the direct targeting of the Colombian government by its cartels. In the early 1990s, at the peak of the violence, one of the biggest points of contention was Colombia’s extradition law. The drug cartels wrote open letters offering to stop the car bombs and assassinations, to retire from the drug business, to even pay off the national debt if extradition to the United States was taken off the table. Denied, the cartels tried to lay down their own version of the law on the nation. Fighting back, Colombian law enforcement slowly gained the advantage, and as these groups fragmented, violence declined.
In Mexico, by contrast, the cartels are not openly and directly confronting the state. Sure, they threaten, co-opt and even increasingly kill local and state police and elected representatives. But their open letters –narcomantas hung over important intersections– are primarily directed to their drug trafficking rivals, or to local political alignments. They don’t often explicitly challenge the national government, much less launch violent “campaigns” against it. Even the most high-profile recent killings – for instance DEA officer Jaime Zapata in San Luis Potosi, the brother of former Chihuahua Attorney General Mario Gonzalez or PRI gubernatorial candidate in Tamaulipas Rodolfo Torre Cantú— the assassinations don’t seem to have come from the top. If the violence isn’t ordered from on high (as it was in Colombia), then taking out the top echelons of the cartels won’t end it. Furthermore, if most of the bloodshed is between the criminals themselves, going after the heads will just escalate the cycle, as more and more mid-level criminals fight it out for control of the remaining business (catching innocent civilians and law enforcement officials in their wake).
This suggests Mexico should rethink its kingpin strategy — or at least complement it with other approaches. There are many other models out there to consider – the “broken windows” approach (perhaps the other extreme, as it focuses instead on smaller quality of life crimes before building up to the big organized crime rings); community policing models, used to good effect in U.S. cities such as Boston, Los Angeles, New Haven, and elsewhere; or a territorial approach, which integrates neighborhood level policing with other public services, and is already being used in the historic center of Mexico City. These methods may work to raise the social, in addition to the material costs of violence for the criminals.
As Mexico debates the right policy mix in the coming year under Calderón and beyond next July’s presidential elections, the big missing question is how to get Mexican society– the one weapon the cartels can’t match – involved. So far, citizens have been relegated to the status of “clients” or victims. Opening up the security policy to analysis and debate is an important first step.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
