Everyone in Bolivia is focusing on the shift toward “participatory democracy,” from the previous “representative democracy.” Some embrace this change enthusiastically, while others view it warily. What is clear is that the traditional political parties have disintegrated here, as they have in many other countries in the Andean region, including Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
It is also clear that new political parties are unlikely to arise anytime soon. Due to exclusion and corruption, the old system has been completely discredited. The MAS, which backs Evo Morales, is proud of its alternative organizational framework, based on linking various social movements and associations rather than forming a political party.
So where does this leave representation? Bolivia is institutionalizing a cycle which begins with protest marches, followed by negotiations with the government, and then ends in promises/governmental actions. These cycles are not necessarily new, as they played a key role in demand making in recent years. In fact, the inability of the governments of Sanchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa to fulfill promises made during the negotiation phase led in large part to their downfall.
But with the election of Evo Morales, these dynamics have changed in meaning. Rather than arising from the opposition, these protesters and their organizations are now part of the ruling MAS, institutionalizing this protest cycle as the main means of interest intermediation. And, the nature of demands has changed. And rather than focusing on big issues of political and social inclusion, or of national redistribution of resources, these protests tend to focus on specific group or individual needs. For instance, this week the marches in La Paz involved teachers and sellers of used clothes, each wanting an improvement in their own economic situation.
This transformation of interest intermediation – due to the decline in political parties – concentrates power in the Executive branch, and in Evo Morales. Other moves by the government – including the undermining of the judiciary – have added to this effect. What Evo does with this power remains to be seen. It may allow him to address historic injustices and issues by bypassing old elite and interest group issues. But, it may also lead to new patronage networks, inefficiency, corruption, and in the end renewed frustration by those wanting to see real change in Bolivia.
I am in Bolivia this week. In my meetings so far in La Paz, one common theme is the general support for Evo Morales. While there is significant frustration with the government, interviews with representatives from indigenous groups, from the middle class, from academic institutions and foundations, and with foreign diplomats (not to mention taxi drivers), show a general support for Morales and for his position as President. Almost all see him as genuine, as representative, and as capable of negotiating with the various interests within Bolivia.
Instead, people place blame elsewhere. Significant blame is placed on Morales cabinet and on his closest advisors. Many see them as being too radical in some cases, or not radical enough in others (especially on issues of particular interest to each group). They are also blamed for centralizing power. Instead of following through on Evo´s promise of broad participation, many view his closest advisors as making top-down and closed door decisions, much like governments in the past. Some even see the undue influence of foreign advisors, particularly Venezuelan, on government policies.
The continued support for Evo, despite the limits on actual policy changes in the first year and half of his government, questions the alarmist views often seen in the press. While frustrations continue, and marches are frequent through the downtown of the capital, there isn´t a sense here (at least in La Paz), of crisis or real unrest. That said, a few people see this as the lull before the storm, which will occur when the real negotiations happen (or more likely don´t happen in their view) within the Constituent Assembly, which is currently scheduled to conclude their process in August.
Over the last eighteen months Presidential elections occurred in twelve Latin American countries. While Hugo Chavez and his anti-American tirades grab most of the headlines, these elections actually show the rise of a new Left in Latin America. In contrast to Chavez’s more socialist populism, these new leaders promise to balance market-friendly economics with broader social policies and protections.
These new governments have already shown their commitment to free markets. In less than a year, Chile’s President Michelle Bachelet has signed free trade agreements with China, New Zealand, and Singapore, and is negotiating new accords with both Japan and Australia. Alan Garcia of Peru appointed a well-known private banker as Finance minister and vocally supports free trade agreements with the United States, Canada, and many Asian countries. Brazil’s Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva was re-elected based on his conservative first term economic policies. Tabare Vazquez of Uruguay also continued the orthodox economic choices of the previous government, attracting both Finnish and Spanish foreign investment for Uruguay’s cellulose industry.
Even the more rhetorically radical leaders are governing or likely to govern near a pragmatic center. During his first year in office, Bolivian President Evo Morales drew back from his more populist campaign appeals. He cancelled the nationalization of the mining industry, and is now negotiating gas contracts with foreign companies. While peppering campaign speeches with anti-American quips, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega left the Sandinista’s economic ideology behind. During his first weeks in office he has already started courting domestic and foreign investment, promising to uphold contracts and maintain open markets. Rafael Correa’s of Ecuador began moderating his promises in the final weeks of the presidential campaign, and even reached out to U.S. ambassador, Linda Jewel. In fact, only Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, supported by oil revenues – represents a firm holdover from the political past.
Yet while rejecting old-style socialism, Latin American voters did turn left. The winning candidates all reached out to the large portions of the population that have not benefited from economic reforms. They promised to improve the social welfare of ordinary citizens. Now in office, they are pushing forward to create jobs, eliminate hunger, and provide better access to education, social security and health care.
This shift Left reflects the real needs of Latin America’s populations. While Latin America’s economies have grown in recent years, these benefits have not trickled down. Some 25% of the population still lives in poverty. The difference between the haves and have nots stubbornly remains one of the most pronounced in the world.
More positively, this political turn reflects the spread of democracy. As more open and inclusive governments take root, politicians are responding to voter demands. The winning electoral campaigns focused not just on overall economic growth but also on increasing economic opportunities, particularly for the poor.
These newly elected leaders now will try to soften the rough edges of globalization while continuing to compete in international markets. This is a difficult balancing act for any leader, and many will not meet the challenge. But as Leftists, they have an opportunity to build a social consensus behind the long-term investments necessary for real change in these countries. To that end, this new Left represents the best chance for strengthening the economies and the democracies of Latin America.
