The two panels also featured testimonies by Roberta S. Jacobson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the Department of State; Mariko Silver, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs at DHS; Alonzo R. Pena, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement at DHS; Allen Gina, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, U.S. Customs and Border Protection at DHS; Bill McDonald, a rancher in Cochise County in Arizona; and John D.  Negroponte, Vice Chairman of McLarty Associates.

My testimony is available here and a video of the hearing can be viewed here.

NewsHour: What is President Calderon looking to get out of this trip?

There are two major things that are on agenda.

One is security. There’s been a buildup of cooperation over the last three years, and he is coming to reaffirm that cooperation, and to get explicit support in that area. The second issue is the issue of immigration and this is particularly in light of what we’ve seen in Arizona. This is really for his domestic audience at home. Mexicans are very upset and as he goes into big gubernatorial elections this July, he needs to take a firm stand on immigration when talking with President Obama to appease that sentiment. Obviously, that is difficult within the United States political context that we see very clearly.

The other two issues that will be put on the agenda are climate change — in the lead-up to the UNFCCC (U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change) Cancun summit, and economic issues such as the trucking dispute.

What is President Obama hoping to get out of it?

President Obama is hoping to get a reaffirmation of what has been a quite close relationship over the year. Obama has met with Calderon several times. They talked as a president-elect, Obama went to Mexico in April and August of last year, they’ve met on sidelines of multilateral meetings, and a whole host of Cabinet and high-ranking officials have gone to Mexico City. Furthermore, first lady Michelle Obama’s first solo trip was to Mexico.

Can you spell out some of the legitimacy issues that are affecting Calderon?

The legitimacy questions are really on Calderon’s agenda. Security is the signature issue of his presidency. What we’ve seen so far is a militarized approach to the cartels, alongside the build-up of a federal police force. But violence has just increased, so today there is a waning of public support for the way the war on narcotrafficking has been conducted. To strengthen the legitimacy of the continued fight, the Calderon government — along with the U.S. government — has begun moving away from the military focus to take out high-value targets, to an approach that encompasses a much broader spectrum of issues. They are talking about a 21st century border that incorporates more technology and can weed out good trade from bad trade, and about building resilient communities, which really means getting at socioeconomic factors that contribute to youths going into the drug trade.

And how have such new initiatives been received?

The idea of these initiatives has been received quite well. But they are quite new, and it is not clear how they will be implemented. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton led a delegation to Mexico in March, to affirm these new directions, but most of the programs are still on the drawing board. Calderon is now more than halfway through his term. His political ability to move security cooperation in this new direction is uncertain. Even if it is implemented, these new party issues — changing the way the border works is a long-term and cooperative process with the United States and others to change the underlying institutions and structures — is going to be very important. There is not going to be a turnaround over night.

What does Calderon need from the United States as far as security?

The governments have already been working together on the Merida Initiative for the last three years, providing equipment and some training to Mexico. The Obama administration has already laid out, with the Calderon government, a new direction for future funding. These new programs will be much less focused on the military, expanding to focus on the border and on building communities. During these last few years, we’ve also seen a real increase in cooperation and intelligence sharing, back in forth between agencies as well. Calderon is coming for legitimization of the approach being taken to make sure that is really solidified in the U.S., in Congress, and not just with Obama. He wants to make sure that the U.S. is on board for the long haul.

Are trade issues also on the table?

Trade issues will come up. Particularly there’s been a contentious issue about trucking, this was part of the NAFTA treaty signed in 1993, and a U.S. pilot program under President George H.W. Bush allowed pre-screened trucks to come across the borders, but it was canceled last year. Both sides want an agreement, and Mexico wants a path forward to allowing drivers into the U.S. Some states would like a resolution as well. This will be an issue that is talked about. The Obama administration says a resolution will be coming very, very soon. What it is, though, remains to be seen.

On his state visit to Washington May 19-20, Mexican President Felipe Calderón will call attention to his country’s new hard line against escalating drug-gang violence that has triggered cross-border concerns. But the issue of immigration could generate heat because of the new Arizona law on illegal immigrants and the controversy it has aroused within both Mexico and the United States. While Calderón is likely to address immigration reform in his May 20 speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, his focus will be on U.S. backing for his aggressive approach to dealing with drug gangs. He wants explicit U.S. support for his programs, even as these are beginning to shift (with U.S. assistance) toward a more comprehensive approach toward the problems of narco-violence.

President Felipe Calderón has condemned Arizona’s new crackdown on illegal immigrants and said it has damaged bilateral relations. Is this likely to figure heavily in his address to Congress on May 20?

President Calderón almost has to mention the Arizona law in his address to Congress; it is a critical issue not just for bilateral relations with the United States but within Mexico’s domestic politics. Mexico is heading into gubernatorial and other elections in July, in many towns and in states along the border, so a strong message back to Mexico is crucial for the president and his party.

At the same time that Calderón is appealing to his home audience with a tough message about the Arizona law, he has to be careful about the signals he sends within the United States. Immigration reform is seen solely as a domestic issue in the United States–and a heavily politicized one at that. Too strong a statement by Calderón could backfire, hurting the possibilities of comprehensive immigration reform.

He is also expected to appeal in that address for cooperation in combating Mexico’s cartels. Discuss the gravity of the cartel-related violence, which some have called “narco-terror.”

Violence has continued increasing in Mexico over the last three years, even as the Calderón government has brought out some forty thousand troops and increased the size of the federal police force (responsible for crimes such as drug trafficking). Drug-related murders reached nearly four thousand during the first four months of 2010, making them the bloodiest yet during Calderón’s term. Fighting the drug cartels has been the signature issue of Calderón’s government, but one where the tide of public opinion is now turning against him. Calderón comes to Washington asking for recognition for the militarized path he has chosen. He wants explicit U.S. support for his programs, even as these are beginning to shift (with U.S. assistance) toward a more comprehensive approach toward the problems of narco-violence.

How would you rate progress in the Merida Initiative?

The Merida Initiative represents a real advancement in U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. It has provided funds–some $1.3 billion over three years–to Mexico as well as substantial cooperation and coordination in the fight against drug trafficking organizations that span borders.

In recent months, the Obama administration, along with Calderón’s team, has revamped Merida. After two years of funding heavily weighted toward military and police equipment, future U.S. security cooperation will focus much more on law enforcement and judicial institution-building, as well as begin to address the underlying socioeconomic factors that lead many of Mexico’s youth into illicit trades. This is a substantial shift, but one that is essential for Mexico to strengthen its rule of law and, in the long term, reduce today’s levels of violence and crime.

In addition to helping with arms flows across the border, can Washington be of help in reforming Mexico’s police, often cited as a central problem in counternarcotics?

Washington has already been working with Mexico on helping reform its police force, starting with the recently formed federal police. The United States has provided funds for equipment, as well as for training of the thirty thousand-plus strong (and growing) force. The next phase of Merida will increase this type of assistance, extending beyond the federal level to reach state and even some municipal forces.

Mexico is also concerned with U.S.-imposed limits on Mexican trucking on U.S. highways, a dispute which last year led to retaliatory Mexican tariffs against U.S. goods. Is there likely to be progress on that issue during his visit to Washington?

U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray La Hood has repeatedly said that a new proposal on trucking that would bring the United States in line with its NAFTA obligations is in the works and will be released “very soon.” It is possible that there will be some progress made in time for Calderón’s visit, as it is important not just to Mexico but to many U.S. states whose exports have been hurt by the retaliatory tariffs.

It is important that the U.S. and Mexico make progress not only on trucking, but also that they begin to build a more competitive North America. Mexico is the second-largest destination for U.S. exports today, and it is a growing market. If the United States hopes to boost its own economic growth through exports (as President Obama promised to do in his State of the Union address), Mexico will be a crucial market and participant in that growth. Facilitating cross-border commerce by lowering transportation costs will be essential for both economies to grow.

What would be a signal that this visit from Calderón was successful?

If the outcome of Calderón’s time in DC reinforces ongoing U.S.-Mexico cooperation across many areas–including security, trade, economic growth, climate change–and avoids getting bogged down in contentious debates surrounding immigration, then this trip will be a success for President Calderón.

A C-SPAN video of the event can be seen here.

Open any Mexican newspaper today and the drug carnage is front and center. In the last three years, narco-related murders surpassed 18,000, nearly 8,000 of these occurred in 2009 alone. The macabre nature of the violence ratcheted up too, featuring heads rolling across an Acapulco disco floor, a “stewmaker” admitting to dissolving some 300 bodies in acid and a dead man’s face stitched onto a soccer ball. The drug cartels openly taunt the authorities and each other, hanging narcomantas, or banners, over major thoroughfares boasting about their latest kills and threatening future violence if not left alone. Both the number of the attacks and their brazenness—particularly in states such as Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Michoacán—are unprecedented.

Yet crime-related violence in Mexico is not new. Mexico has always been a supplier of illegal markets in the United States, from alcohol in the prohibition era, heroin during World War II, marijuana throughout the 1960s, and in recent decades, a variety of drugs including cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines. As illicit businesses without access to formal contracts and courts, disputes and “mergers and acquisitions” have traditionally been settled with blood on the streets.

What has changed in recent decades is the scale of Mexico’s narcotics operations. U.S. demand has grown and diversified, and Mexico has increasingly become the primary supplier. While in 1990, 50 percent of U.S.-bound cocaine came through Mexico, today the figure is 90 percent.

It’s also important to note that the power base of the hemisphere’s drug trade has shifted from Colombia to Mexico. After four decades and billions of dollars, the U.S. “war on drugs” has pushed the epicenter of these illegal criminal networks closer to the U.S. border. The sheer amount of money that has accompanied this fundamental shift to transportation and smuggling just south of the U.S. border has upped the stakes. More resources have transformed the cartels into increasingly sophisticated organizations—with more professional enforcement arms.

Mexico’s democratization throughout the 1990s, which upset the long-standing collusion between some members of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and particular favored drug traffickers, has been another contributing factor. The PRI’s eroding political monopoly brought in new actors, undermined old deals, and opened up the illicit sector to those previously kept out in the cold. The combination of more lucrative opportunities, heightened competition and changes to the political game created dramatic uncertainty in the market, escalating the bloodshed. Legacies of the PRI’s 70-year rule—in particular the political manipulation of law enforcement and judicial branches, which limited professionalization and enabled widespread corruption—further aggravated the situation, leaving the new government with only weak tools to counter increasingly aggressive crime networks…

Introduction
In the last century, the US has viewed Brazil as an important nation on the world stage – based on the sheer size of its territory, economy, and population, as well as its shared Western values. At times, the US has pushed for a ‘special relationship’ with Brazil, recognizing its importance for hemispheric and global stability. During World War II, the US promised support for Brazil’s development agenda and, in exchange, Brazil became the only Latin American nation to send troops to Europe’s battlefields. Although the pledged alliance faded after the war, throughout the 1950s Brazil largely supported US Cold War policies, if at somewhat of a distance. This support continued under Brazil’s military government in the 1960s. During the 1970s the US – especially Henry Kissinger – tried to reaffirm the ‘special relationship’ between the two nations, envisioning greater consultation and cooperation on an array of issues. These efforts were scuttled by a Carter administration more concerned with Brazil’s equivocal position on human rights and nuclear nonproliferation. These differences led not to conflict, but to detachment between the two governments.

By the 1980s, relations tilted further toward tensions and away from commonalities. The US disapproved of Brazilian trade policies and of its hardline stance when negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other creditors in the wake of the debt crisis. As the largest of all Third World debtors, Brazil repeatedly refused to pay interest on its arrears, threatening the deals US banks were negotiating with other nations. Newly democratic Brazil and the United States were also at odds over US military involvement in Central America.

By the 1990s, the debt crisis was resolved, and Brazil again became a welcome partner for the United States in the evolving post-Cold War world. Even if few concrete actions were taken, Presidents Cardoso and Clinton agreed on many matters. Some progress was made in the realm of democracy. Both the US and Brazil supported the consolidation of democracy in the region and leaned on Paraguay to reverse the attempted coup by an army commander against the elected government in 1996. Later, Brazil would prove important in pushing through the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which binds all 34 active member states to strengthen and uphold democratic institutions in the hemisphere.

Yet, as globalization became the driver behind much of US foreign policy, trade again became a sticking point between the two nations. In particular, Brazil’s reluctance to fully support the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) frustrated the Clinton administration and thwarted a closer relationship.

Generalizing five decades of foreign policy, the US rhetorically recognized Brazil’s importance, but concrete, practical initiatives or partnerships were few. This left little in the way of tangible policy outcomes between the US and Brazil. Instead, the two countries maintained a fairly warm, if distant, status quo, befitting Washington’s viewpoint that Brazil occupied an influential — but not central — role in the world pecking order.

A Turning Point in US-Brazil Relations
The urgency for bilateral relations began to change in the last decade. While blessed with natural resources, an almost 200 million-strong domestic market, and a well diversified economy (with robust agricultural, mining, manufacturing and service sectors), for decades Brazil suffered from high inflation, exchange rate instability, and low growth. This chronic economic instability meant that while viewed as geographically and geostrategically important, Brazil was seen by many in Washington, to quote General Charles de Gaulle, as ‘not a serious country’.

These reservations began to fade with the rise of Brazil’s economy. Anchored by the 1994 Plan Real, Brazil finally tamed its historically high inflation through solid macroeconomic and monetary policies and embarked on a process of privatization and other economic reforms. Put in place by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, these initiatives were adopted and deepened by his leftist successor and current president Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva.

By 2001, Brazil’s ascent was recognized by the financial markets. Banking giant Goldman Sachs named it one of the countries — alongside Russia, India and China (BRICs) – that could potentially eclipse the G8 in the coming decades. By the mid 2000s, Brazil’s macroeconomic instability seemed fully relegated to the past, and its economy boomed with higher commodity prices and the long awaited expansion of its own middle class.

At the same time, climbing worldwide energy prices and rising concerns over climate change brought Brazil’s biofuel successes and technology to Washington’s attention. Brazil’s biofuel industry dates back to the 1970s when the military government launched an ethanol program mandating a blend of sugar cane ethanol into transportation fuel with the hope of weaning the country off its dependence on imported fossil fuels. The program gained competitive traction by the late 1980s when more than a third of the country’s motor vehicle fleet was running on pure ethanol. In the 1990s the program experienced some growing pains as a 1993 federal law increased the mandate to a 25% ethanol blend, and demand outstripped local supply. The later technological breakthrough of flex-fuel vehicles restored widespread confidence (and investment) in ethanol, allowing motorists to switch to any blend of gasoline and ethanol at anytime.

By the turn of the 21st century, Brazil boasted the most efficient biofuel production in the world, with volumes rivaling those of the United States, and vast expanses of pasture land ready for planting more sugar cane. In February 2008, the market share of ethanol surpassed that of traditional gasoline at Brazilian pumps, proving the market viability of alternative fuels in one of the world’s largest economies. Add to this the recent discovery of significant oil fields off its coast and Brazil’s image as a global energy leader was secured.

Politically, the United States came to see Brazil’s well-grounded democracy and President Lula’s centrist even-handedness – particularly in comparison to some of its neighbors such as Venezuela – as important for US interests in the hemisphere. In addition, Presidents George W. Bush and Lula seemed to genuinely like each other, encouraging greater efforts to work together.

For Washington, Brazil’s rise came at a propitious time, one of changing policies and priorities. As the Bush administration took on two wars abroad, little bandwidth remained for policing its own hemisphere, despite what many saw as worrisome political shifts in the Andean region. The White House hoped that Brazil, as an important stakeholder and leader, would also take on the responsibility to push for stability and democracy in South America. During his visit in 2005, George W. Bush recognized Brazil as a ‘leader — …exercising its leadership across the globe’ and reassured Lula that as he ‘works for a better tomorrow, Brazil must know (it has) a strong partner in the United States’.

The US View Today
The events of the last few years and a change in the US administration make Brazil perhaps even more important than ever for US foreign policy. After the worldwide financial meltdown, the relative success of Brazil, China, and other developing economies has definitively shifted the multilateral center of global financial agreements from the G8 to the G20. This gives Brazil a permanent seat going forward in all major global macroeconomic discussions, where it has already become a vital voice in the North-South dialogue.

With climate change a priority for the Obama administration, Brazil’s perceived importance has grown, both on account of its leadership in alternative energy and its fight against deforestation. Brazil already boasts one of the most eco-friendly energy matrices in the world, with 46% of primary energy coming from renewable energies, far above the world average of 8%. In addition, as the majority owner of the planet’s largest rainforest, the Amazon, Brazil will play perhaps the central role in slowing worldwide deforestation, the leading cause of carbon emissions, ahead of the global transportation network.

While still not given as much airtime in Washington as many of its BRIC partners – China in particular – Brazil is seen as an emerging power that the United States can work with, be it on issues of global financial stability, climate change, reform of multilateral institutions (e.g.: the UN, G20, WTO, IMF) or regional security, stability and development.

Stumbling to Translate Interest into Policy
For all these reasons, many in Washington are calling yet again for a new special relationship with Brazil. While this is progress, significant limitations exist to translating growing US interest in Brazil as an emerging power into concrete policies.

On a practical level, the US-Latin America policy community has historically been biased toward Spanish-speaking Latin America. Few in Washington know Brazil well or speak Portuguese. The lack of a dedicated group of experts – both inside and outside of government – limits the constant pressure needed to keep Brazil firmly on the US foreign policy agenda. Adding to this, due to US domestic political battles it took nearly a year for President Obama to confirm his new Ambassador to Brazil. To date, this gap has severely hampered the administration’s ability to create a more dynamic engagement with Brazil.
Beyond these logistical challenges, it is still unclear how best to promote the two countries’ common interests. While they share many concerns in principle, priorities and policies are often not aligned, and at times even in conflict. In the realm of security, the United States prioritizes counterterrorism, which sits low on the list of Brazilian concerns. Regarding drug trafficking, US counter-narcotics assistance to the region often focuses on military responses, while Brazil has tended toward policing and law enforcement solutions. Add to this long-standing suspicion over US military involvement in the region, which recently resurfaced with the Colombian base agreement that granted the US military access to seven Colombian bases to combat drug trafficking and the guerrillas, or US concerns about Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s official visit to Brasilia in November 2009, and these differences may make it difficult to find a middle ground for deeper partnership around security issues in the hemisphere – while highlighting the need for Washington to more openly communicate with its regional partners.
The debate over free trade poses similar dilemmas. While both the US and Brazil rhetorically support the expansion of global free trade through the World Trade Organization’s Doha round and other mechanisms, their fundamental interests often diverge. Brazil wants the reduction and/or elimination of extensive US agricultural subsidies and protections, as well as tariffs on products such as ethanol. The vagaries of US domestic politics will make it difficult to deliver on these demands. The US, in turn, is suspicious of Brazilian protection of its industrial sector, and of what it sees as a weak intellectual property rights regime, and hopes Brazil is willing to change its position on services and market access.

Finally, assuming that Washington stays focused on developing and deepening its relationship with Brazil (a big assumption), it is unclear whether Brazil actually aspires to closer relations with the United States. It might benefit Brazil to keep the northern behemoth at arm’s length, particularly given the role the United States likely envisions for Brazil as an active regional ‘stakeholder’, shouldering greater responsibilities in the hemisphere and acting in US interests.

Conclusion
In recent years, the US view of Brazil has likely changed permanently, recognizing the nation’s importance for regional and world order. Brazil is finally seen by the United States as a genuine emerging power. The enhanced strategic dialogue and cooperative steps taken in recent years in light of this recognition has benefited both countries. Nevertheless, many areas of disengagement and even conflict remain. Whether the newly invoked ‘special relationship’ will be more multifaceted and long-lasting this time than on previous attempts remains to be seen.

Recommendations
• Brazil’s rise as an economic and global emerging power has finally been recognized by the US. To effectively leverage this interest, Washington needs to strengthen the policy community dedicated to Brazil – perhaps separately from Spanish-speaking Latin America, thus reflecting its emerging power status – in order to ensure more thorough and consistent attention to US-Brazil relations.
• Despite the potential, an ambitious ‘special relationship’ may be difficult to achieve. Too many differences in policies and priorities remain, particularly in the areas of security and trade. This is most evident in the context of regional leadership and a broader vision for the Americas.
• Bilateral relations should focus on a more permanent dialogue across multiple issue areas, thus converting growing areas of interest into concrete action and policy on a bilateral and multilateral level.
• The United States and Brazil should identify clear issues and strategies of mutual interest to start deepening the bilateral partnership and multilateral engagement. Energy and climate change, as well as global financial stability, are good starting points.
• The biofuel industry and associated technology development is an area of mutual interest that satisfies national and multilateral ambitions related to climate change. This is an obvious point of intersection between the US and Brazil where bilateral cooperation would have a global impact.

This piece was first published by the South African Institute of International Affairs and is available to download here

Along with my own views on U.S.-Latin America relations, you can find writings from Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, and Amb. Paul D. Taylor, Senior Strategic Researcher at the Naval War College. Assuming Arturo Valenzuela will in fact be confirmed now that Congress is back in session, he will be soon facing the many issues we discussed – public security, sustainable energy, economic advancement, and hemispheric migration among others.

Mexico’s rise on the American foreign policy agenda should not come as a surprise. Over the last generation, deepening business, personal, cultural, and community relations have drawn the two countries closer together. Trade between them has tripled, with Mexico becoming the United States’ third-largest commercial partner. Flows of people, always part of the bilateral relationship, skyrocketed: over four million Mexican citizens have headed north in the last decade, while over a million U.S. citizens have migrated south, forming the largest nonmilitary community of American expatriates in the world. At the start of the twenty-first century, Mexico is still forging its political, economic, and social identity. It has undergone a true democratic transformation, and its three political parties now compete in clean and transparent elections. But it remains unclear whether Mexico will follow a path of growth, stability, and market-based democracy or one of instability, corruption, and crime. What is certain is that understanding Mexico — where it came from, how it got there, and where it might be headed — is vital to U.S. interests.

Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation. By Roderic Ai Camp. Oxford University Press, 2006.

In this book, now in its fifth edition, Roderic Ai Camp, one of the preeminent scholars of Mexican politics, deftly guides readers through more than 200 years of political evolution in Mexico, analyzing the events and concerns that created the Mexican state one sees today and exploring both the continuities and changes in that state’s relationship with societal organizations and interests. Camp focuses on Mexico’s extended transition to democracy, including reforms to the electoral process, the expansion of political participation, and the subsequent shifts in power among the various branches of government. Those interested in delving deeper can consult Camp’s specialized works on many of the themes presented, such as the recruitment of political leadership and popular political attitudes. But Politics in Mexico, drawing on decades of experience and innovative research, provides a comprehensive overview of the main issues and forces affecting the country today.

Mexico: Biography of Power. By Enrique Krauze. HarperCollins, 1997.

This exhaustive history, written by one of Mexico’s best-known intellectuals, chronicles nearly two centuries of Mexican politics, from independence to the early 1990s. After identifying major themes underlying the country’s political and social identity — its colonial legacy, its mestizo population, and the early power of the church — Enrique Krauze turns to a leader-driven historical narrative, examining the lives of Mexico’s various strongmen and presidents, who, from the battlefield to the executive office, shaped Mexico’s political development. This personalized dynamic has faded with democratization, but the memory and vestiges of it remain relevant in Mexican politics today.

Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy. By Julia Preston and Sam Dillon. Macmillan, 2005.

Written by Julia Preston and Sam Dillon, the New York Times correspondents covering Mexico in the late 1990s, this readable narrative provides a thoughtful analysis of the country’s democratic opening. Spanning the period from the devastating 1985 earthquake in Mexico City to the 2000 presidential elections, the authors investigate the economic changes, security threats, and political intrigue crucial to understanding the shifts that occurred in Mexican politics. The book explores the many pressures on the old one-party PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) system, the individuals and organizations that pushed for change, and the events leading up to democracy’s final breakthrough: the election of the opposition PAN (National Action Party) presidential candidate Vicente Fox.

First Stop in the New World: Mexico City, the Capital of the Twenty-First Century. By David Lida. Riverhead, 2008.

Spanning 570 square miles and home to more than 20 million people, Mexico City is the largest metropolis in the Western Hemisphere. Even as federalism has decentralized power to Mexico’s states, the capital remains the political, cultural, and economic center of the nation. In this journalistic account, David Lida offers many telling vignettes that capture politics, culture, and life in el D.F., the federal district. He lays out the intricacies of Mexico’s economic inequalities, its sex and age discrimination, its traffic jams, and its deep-seated corruption. But he also illuminates the thriving high- and low-brow art scenes, from well-respected galleries and theaters to lucha libre (Mexico’s version of professional wrestling). Lida explores the country’s cabarets, cantinas, and street food, as well as the coexistence of traditional markets and Wal-Marts that make the city — and Mexico — what it is now.

The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict. By Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro. Routledge, 2001.

At the turn of the twentieth century, strongman Porfirio Díaz lamented, “Poor Mexico! So far from God, so close to the United States.” Some still share that view, but whatever the tone of bilateral relations, all would agree that Mexican politics cannot be understood in isolation from the United States. Expertly dissecting the complicated relationship of these two neighbors, Jorge Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro analyze the impact of the end of the Cold War, internal changes within Mexico and the United States, and the creation and strengthening of bilateral and multilateral institutions over the last two decades. The authors show how these multiple factors led to closer ties in areas as diverse as security, the economy, and the border.

The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 9/11. By Edward Alden. Harper, 2008.

Mexico’s possible futures cannot be fully understood without a thorough comprehension of U.S. concerns over and approaches to border management. Edward Alden skillfully investigates the transformations of U.S. border policy since 9/11 — in particular, the rise of immigration enforcement as the predominant means of protecting the United States against further terrorist attacks. This shift has had strong repercussions for Mexico, because of the 2,000-mile-long border it shares with the United States, its estimated ten million citizens living in El Norte, and the deep economic and social links between many U.S. and Mexican communities. It also has had significant consequences for policymakers trying to develop more effective bilateral relations, as this mindset influences approaches to issues of organized crime, trade and economic development, and the health and safety of populations on both sides of the border.

(Photo courtesy of Flickr user kgardinger.)