But what happened some eight hundred miles to the west on Saturday in Ciudad Juarez, when three U.S. consulate workers–two of them U.S. citizens–were killed in their cars in broad daylight wasn’t likely masterminded by drug cartel leaders. Such assassinations would be bad for cross-border business. Instead, this first case of serious violence against U.S. citizens in the “war on narcotraffickers” waged by President Felipe Calderon’s administration was probably committed by one of Ciudad Juarez’s gangs. Initial intelligence points to the Aztecas, a local gang of hitmen who have worked with “La Linea,” the enforcement arm of the Juarez cartel, which was also implicated in the January 31 massacre of sixteen youths at a birthday party.

In places like Ciudad Juarez, the prevalent depiction of a battle between highly organized and disciplined drug cartels is misleading. Instead, these “organizations” are sprawling networks full of freelancers who might work one day for a cartel, the next on their own or with a local gang. Some of the violence of recent years is between street toughs and gangs, often resolving local turf wars. This growing problem, while fueled by the money and guns associated with the drug trade, is distinct from the presence of multinational criminal drug-trafficking organizations.

Ciudad Juarez today presents a bleak picture. City infrastructure and manpower are overwhelmed; the dominant maquila factories offer only low-wage labor; and over 40 percent of the city’s youths are neither in school nor lawfully employed. Exclusion from the hope of joining Mexico’s developing middle class along with weak control mechanisms mean disaffected youth coalesce around an alternative source of social “status”–urban gangs.

In the aftermath of the shooting, President Obama vowed to continue to work with the Calderon government “to break the power of the drug trafficking organizations that operate in Mexico and far too often target and kill the innocent.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton vowed to “ensure that the perpetrators . . . are brought to justice,” reasserting that “this is a responsibility we must shoulder together, particularly in border communities where strong bonds of history, culture, and common interest bind the Mexican and the American people closely together.”

The United States should support Mexico during this moment–as the events of the past few weeks and this weekend show how closely tied Mexico’s stability and safety are to our own. Yes, weapons and equipment are needed for Mexico’s police forces–particularly at the local level where beat cops often patrol without bulletproof vests and in rundown squad cars. Many are even required to buy their own bullets.

But it is not just more gun power that Mexico needs. Instead, it is a functioning police and court system, a better and more open education system, and programs for early intervention, and professional development for at-risk youth. Partnerships between the United States and a wide range of agencies and stake holders at Mexico’s federal, state, and, most importantly, local levels will be vital for the coordination and pooling of resources and expertise.

This broader challenge of reknitting Mexico’s social fabric in places such as Ciudad Juarez is what Mexico struggles most with today. In light of the weekend violence, the United States should prioritize efforts that will assist Mexico in pushing through the changes that will actually matter, changing today’s violent dynamic for the long term.

Caputo suggests that the military is in cahoots with the drug cartels today, much as they were in the past. Laying out what he can piece together from the few wary interviewees willing to speak to him, he depicts an independent military dismissive of human rights in the best case, and a military turned cartel in the worst. With both the Calderon and the U.S. government pinning their hopes in the war on drugs on this military, either scenario is bad news.

However corrupt the military is today, there is a fundamental difference from the earlier parallels he poses, and these differences matter for Mexico’s future. In the 1980s the secretary of defense was found to be working with no less than three drug cartels, and in the 1990s Mexico’s “drug czar” was discovered to be on the payroll of the Juarez cartel. But these incidences were part of a larger systematic relationship between drug traffickers and the long-standing ruling political party, the PRI. The military’s past drug ties can’t be seen in isolation from an organized system of control and enrichment constructed by the PRI that also encompassed the police, courts, and politicians.

Today, it isn’t that corruption has ended. But it is no longer as centralized and coordinated as in the past. Democratization opened up not just the political system to different political parties, but also the illicit economy – effectively ending the unwritten contracts that existed for years between the PRI and particular drug traffickers.

What this means is that corruption in the military today is more autonomous than in the past – not linked to a larger system, not controlled or checked by any political party, and perhaps not coming from the top of the chain of command. For some, this may be even worse news – well armed forces with no master. But, this shift may also mean that it is now much more possible to attack corruption – whether in the military or other parts of the government. With each pocket today no longer part of the larger functioning of an authoritarian system, a focused combination of vetting, training, prosecution, and long-term institution building could yield results. Mexico’s corruption remains a very difficult, but no longer insurmountable problem. And the current democratic political dynamic – forcing politicians to appeal to voters – may increase the chances that the Mexican government goes down a different road.

This better outcome is by no means guaranteed. It will take an incredible amount of work and resources over a long period of time. But the underlying dynamics today are quite different, and they provide Mexico – and the United States –an opportunity so that in ten years another journalist will not be writing a similar “Fall of Mexico” story.

Along with my own views on U.S.-Latin America relations, you can find writings from Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, and Amb. Paul D. Taylor, Senior Strategic Researcher at the Naval War College. Assuming Arturo Valenzuela will in fact be confirmed now that Congress is back in session, he will be soon facing the many issues we discussed – public security, sustainable energy, economic advancement, and hemispheric migration among others.

For those of you who may prefer to read in Spanish, my Foreign Affairs article on Mexico has been translated and appears in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica, which you can find here.

Often maligned in all three countries, NAFTA has, on balance, benefited the region. By creating one of the largest trading blocks in the world, this trade agreement not only tripled regional trade and generated an estimated 40 million new jobs during its first fifteen years, but also helped spur similar agreements world wide. Even as economic recession frightens North American citizens, it is precisely the growth of free trade that will be the basis for economic recovery in all three countries.  All efforts should be made to support its progress, resolve underlying disputes, and limit the barriers to economic integration.

Security too is a growing concern for all three North American leaders. While bloodshed so far has been concentrated in Mexico, Canadian and American citizens have also been caught up in the violence and the reach of organized crime and drug networks is apparent throughout the region. President Calderon has made a commitment to radically reduce the power of the drug cartels, but no unilateral solution is possible. The Guadalajara summit provides an opportunity to think creatively about cooperative action to address Mexico’s current challenge. Canada, as well as its NGOs , academic, and corporate communities , has a significant history of supporting democratization processes, fighting crime and corruption, and building institutions in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Lessons learned there could be helpful in dealing with similar issues on a much larger scale in its North American partnerships.
The most vivid recent example of the indelible ties between the North American nations – and the real benefits gained from close cooperation – occurred this last April with the discovery of the H1N1 virus. The spread of this flu respected no boundaries. Luckily, the response too crossed borders. With the initial cases found in Mexico, Canadian scientists first cracked the genetic makeup of the virus. As the virus spread, Canada and the United States sent epidemiologists to Mexico, who worked side by side investigating and controlling the outbreak. The three nations continue to share all data on the virus and its development in an unprecedented manner, and should use this moment to prepare together for the possible return of H1N1 this fall.

Joint programs and collaborative action to address climate change, environmental degradation, and renewable energy initiatives will make faster and deeper progress than individual activity in these areas. Mexico and the US announced in April a bilateral framework on clean energy and climate change. In July Canada announced that it will match US restrictions on greenhouse emissions. Just as NAFTA served as a catalyst for other extensive trade agreements, the US, Canada and Mexico should set the standard for regional cooperation on the global issues of climate change, cooperation in developing renewable energy technologies, and controlling carbon emissions.

Perhaps as important as the substance of trilateral relations going forward is the process. North American summits have suffered in recent years from the perception of exclusivity. As President Obama has done in other realms, it is time to open the process to a broad array of citizens, non-governmental organizations, labor unions, and private sector organizations. The recent Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago gave a strong voice and platform to these groups, as many leaders and their ministers attended a wide variety of events and discussions on regional initiatives with presentations from aboriginal groups, a youth forum, and a regional business forum in addition to the formal plenary summit sessions.  A more inclusive process would provide both a broader set of ideas and solutions, as well as greater support for summit outcomes.

As the three leaders head to their summit, they face significant tasks. Yet this is a time to take on the many challenging issues ahead, addressing issues concerning the environment, labor, and energy, and expanding on issues of most pressing concern to all three countries – economic recovery and security most importantly. The intertwining of peoples, businesses, and communities has brought these populations together; it is time the governments caught up. This Trilateral Summit presents an ideal opportunity to start this process.

Co-Authored with Jennifer A. Jeffs, Acting President of the Canadian International Council, and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation

President Obama has recognized that Mexico should be a high priority for his administration. In the issue of Foreign Affairs that hit the newsstands today I argue that U.S. and Mexican interests will be best met if the United States goes beyond the current focus on border control and support for Mexico’s public safety institutions and pursues a more ambitious goal: supporting Mexico’s democracy. I hope you enjoy reading it and look forward to any comments you may have.

(Photo: Presidents Barack Obama and Felipe Calderon at Los Pinos. Courtesy of El Enigma at Flickr.)

While its origin and spread are still quite mysterious, cases of A/H1N1 virus, or swine flu, first appeared in Mexico and the U.S. southwestern border region in late March. Initially diagnosed as a regular flu, laboratory testing confirmed in mid-April that a new hybrid of pig, bird, and human flu virus was spreading rapidly and lethally throughout Mexico, the United States, and now the world.

In addition to the human costs, the flu is expected to hit Mexico’s economy hard. Already reeling from the U.S. and global downturn, GDP is expected to fall at least 5 percent – nearing the declines suffered during the 1995 “Tequila crisis.” Hardest hit is the $11 billion a year tourism industry, which had been holding up despite worries of drug violence. Cruise ships are rerouting away from its ports, only flights out of Mexico are full, and hotel phones ring with cancellations.

The only possible upside to this human and economic catastrophe is the reaction of the Mexican government. While not perfect, it shows yet again that Mexico is far from being a failed state. In the face of a spreading influenza, the government effectively managed to identify, monitor, and combat a deadly flu outbreak. The Mexican disease surveillance system picked up on the virus in April, and immediately shared this information with other countries through international mechanisms and organizations. At the same time, the Mexican government took bold steps to curtail the spread of the virus—shutting down one of the world’s biggest cities by closing schools, museums, government offices and even restaurants; sending out the army to help distribute thousands of face masks, and managing both the safety and fears of some 24 million people. Despite the severity of the crisis, there have been no panics or riots. And while far from over, the numbers of deaths in Mexico are beginning to drop, suggesting (at least for now) that the government’s efforts are working.

Mexico’s reaction reflects the strength – not the weakness – of its government. Despite a few grumbles, citizens have supported the tough measures, even when they affect people’s very livelihoods. This is a testament to Mexico’s elected leaders, and the slowly developing trust in a government of the people actually working for the people. It is also the result of steps taken to strengthen the health care system over the last few decades. In particular, efforts under the previous democratically-elected government to increase health care coverage through the national Popular Insurance program, and to alleviate poverty through the conditional cash transfer program Opportunities, incorporated millions of citizens into the national health care system. This, in turn, has enabled a more coordinated nationwide reaction to the swine flu, and undoubtedley saved many lives.

Mexico’s reaction has, of course, not been perfect. Many are upset – some claim the government has not done enough fast enough, while others worry it has gone too far, unnecessarily damaging the economy. More people have died in Mexico so far than anywhere else in the world, though the reasons are still elusive. The still present challenges of uninsured citizens and undermanned hospitals are likely part of the explanation. So too are Mexicans’ tendencies toward of self-medication with over the counter antibiotics, limiting the doctor and hospital visits that facilitate identifying, tracking, and controlling new diseases.

As in the fight against drug traffickers, the government is working to develop and implement a comprehensive policy that reaches throughout its territory. Through the health ministry, the government has launched mobile health units to test individuals and administer antivirals throughout the nation. It is marshalling substantial internal resources, as well as coordinating closely with other governments and international organizations. While the severity and spread of this epidemic remains uncertain, the fundamental capacity of the Mexican state does not. This is the best news for Mexico, and for its neighbors.

Brazen assassinations, kidnappings, and political intimidation by drug lords conjure up images of Colombia in the early 1990s. Yet today, it is Mexico that is being engulfed by escalating violence. In 2007, drug related killings topped 2,250; in 2008 they reached nearly 6,000. Drug cartels are adopting guerrilla-style tactics – sending heavily-armed paramilitary battalions to attack police stations, ambush military brigades, and assassinate high-level security officials, political officials, and journalists. They also are adopting innovative public relations strategies to encourage recruits and intimidate their enemies and the population in general: hanging narcomantas–drug banners–in public places, placing videos on YouTube depicting gruesome murders, and more recently staging street protests against the military’s presence in some of Mexico’s largest cities and most violent regions.

Mexico’s drug business has changed significantly since the 1980s. Previously primarily middlemen, Mexican drug cartels now produce, transport, and distribute drugs. Every year over 500 metric tons of cocaine, 15,500 metric tons of marijuana, 18 metric tons of heroin, and a still unknown amount of methamphetamines make their way through Mexico into the United States. These cartels also supply Mexico’s growing domestic market for illegal substances, and their networks have become increasingly sophisticated. U.S. and Mexican interdiction efforts in the last two decades weeded out mom-and-pop operations, leading drug trafficking organizations to professionalize their operations and add former Mexican military officials, some of them U.S.-trained commandos, to their payrolls. They also diversified their business structures, adding new products (such as meth) and moving into U.S.-based distribution and production.

Sending in the Army

Mexico’s President Felipe Calderon has not taken the growing power — and increasing violence — of the drug cartels stoically. At the start of his term a little over two years ago, he launched his own war on drugs, deploying over 30,000 military troops in several states to quell the violence and take back the streets from narco-traffickers. He has pushed through legislation to reform the judicial system and to revamp Mexico’s intelligence gathering and federal police forces. He opened an academy to train federal-level police officers and instituted new evaluations to test police officer honesty (in particular potential links to narco-traffickers).

Calderon sees the increasing violence and brazenness of the cartels in recent months as evidence that the government’s multipronged attack on the drug cartels is working. The increased bloodletting is taken as a sign of cartel disorder and even disintegration, as drug kingpins are arrested and “business as usual” disrupted. Others are less sure, seeing the growing number and audacity of attacks as a threat to the very state. Newspaper pundits have already dubbed the military effort as “Calderon’s Iraq.” While the vast majority of the public, according to opinion polls, lauds Calderon for his efforts, they increasingly question whether the president’s campaign can succeed. Polls also show that most Mexicans distrust the police, highlighting that the challenges to law and order also come from within the government.

At this juncture, it is still unclear who will “win” this war on drugs. What is clear is the outcome is vital to the United States, given that the two countries share the most active border in the world (with over 500,000 crossings each day), and that Mexico is the United States’ second largest export market, our third largest oil supplier, most significant source of immigrants, and largest source of illegal drugs.

Stirrings in ‘El Norte’

The broader U.S. foreign policy community only recently woke up to this mounting violence next door. Retiring CIA chief Michael Hayden stated in January that Mexico could be as serious a challenge as Iran for the Obama administration, and may be more problematic than Iraq. The U.S. Joint Forces Command’s “Joint Operating Environment 2008″ depicts a rapid and sudden collapse in Mexico (as well as Pakistan) as one of its “worst case scenarios” — unlikely, but possible. Mexico’s nefarious criminal organizations have already infiltrated across the border. In fact, the U.S. Justice Department identifies Mexicans gangs as the “biggest organized crime threat to the United States.”

What can and should the United States do? First, the United States should “do no harm” to its southern neighbor. This, essentially, involves the United States getting its own house in order and enforcing its own laws. U.S. gun laws prohibit the sale of weapons and ammunition to foreign nationals or “straw buyers.” They also forbid the unlicensed export of guns. Nevertheless, the Mexican government and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) have tracked over 90 percent of the guns used by the cartels in Mexico to U.S. gun shops and shows, most of them within miles of the border. Enforcing U.S. gun laws and inspecting traffic on the border going south — not just north — would help reduce the tools of violence in Mexico.

South-bound traffic inspections would also hinder the smuggling of large amounts of cash from U.S. drug sales. Estimates of these flows range widely, but most believe some $15 billion to $20 billion heads across the U.S. border into the hands of Mexico’s drug cartels each year. This number overwhelms the $400 million in security-oriented funds the U.S. government provided to the Mexican government for 2009 (until last year it was only $40 million). The successful CIA-based Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center, ramped up in the years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to thwart terrorist financing, should be replicated to go after drug-related money.

It is also time for the United States to shift the emphasis of its drug policy toward demand reduction. Numerous studies show that a dollar spent in the United States in the drug war is vastly more effective than those put toward eradication and interdiction abroad. Furthermore, a study by RAND found that, in the longer term, treatment is more than five times as effective as conventional enforcement. By reducing the number of hardcore addicts (and their willingness to pay almost anything for a fix), prevention and treatment can lower the drug profits that buy guns, corrupt law enforcement agents, and undermine the Mexican government.

The United States should also work with Mexico to tackle this mutual problem. Until just last year, the United States provided less than $40 million dollars a year in security funding to its southern neighbor — in stark contrast to the over $500 million designated for Colombia. This changed with the passage of the Merida Initiative last June, which provides Mexico with $1.4 billion worth of equipment, software, and technical assistance over a three-year period. While an important corrective from the past, the Merida Initiative cannot be the full extent of U.S. involvement in Mexico’s security. It needs to be just the start of a more comprehensive program to the broader — and perhaps more intractable problems — that Mexico faces.

Building Institutions

While explicitly recognizing the need to reform and strengthen police and judicial institutions, Merida’s first year of funding is equipment heavy. Given the long-time horizons of institution-building work, back-loading U.S. support for these efforts pushes the long-term sustainability of any successes further down the road. In addition, the Merida Initiative ignores the most difficult aspects of Mexico’s situation — namely the failure of state and local law enforcement. Drug money decimated these front lines through cooptation and repression. Local civil servants are those most apt to face the difficult choice of “plata o plomo” — money or death. The deep-seated dysfunction of the local police and court systems forced Calderon to rely on the military. But the military cannot permanently fill this void. Nor can the federal police — comprising a mere 5 percent of the 380,000 officers in Mexico — take on the burden of national security. Mexico must strengthen state and local law enforcement to democratically reassert control throughout its territory. The United States (and Mexico) must recognize this reality, and refocus efforts accordingly.

Drug trafficking is a mutually-created problem demanding cooperative solutions. As long as U.S. demand for illegal drugs persists, vendors from Mexico (and elsewhere) will supply this lucrative market. Increased cooperation, funding, and law enforcement actions will not “end” the drug trade. Realistically, the best the United States and Mexico can hope for (given the presence of the illegal drug market) is for organized crime to decline from a threat to the state in Mexico to a law enforcement problem, similar to the illegal drug business in the United States and now in countries like Colombia.

The United States and Mexico are now inextricably intertwined through their economies, their societies, and their security. The United States benefits from Mexico’s successes, but also shares its challenges. In this new phase of the war against drugs, neither country can afford to lose.

I do incorrectly imply in the article that gun shops on the border sell hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The border gun shops do not legally sell these. However, these type of weapons used by Mexican drug cartels have been seized by customs officlas making their way south through the border. How they are purchased is somewhat unknown, but many of these are making their way to Mexico through the United States.

I received many skeptical emails regarding the number of gunshops along the border. In fact, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) estimates that there are about 6,650 Federal Firearms Licensees in this area, and the border is 2,000 mile long, meaning that there are 3.3 gun shops per mile (I said 3 per mile in the article). If we include all the shops in border states (not just near the border), the number rises to 9,161 locations.

Lastly, I received e-mails questioning the term “cop killer,” or “mata policias” in Spanish, which is a term commonly used in Mexico to refer to the FN Five-seveN, a weapon which if loaded with the right bullets can shoot through body armor, vehicle doors, and windows. Other weapons commonly bought on the border and trafficked to Mexico include AK-47s , AR-15 assault rifles, Colt .38 Supers, and Glock 9 millimeters.

This is not new news. The U.S. government recognizes that U.S.-purchased weapons are fueling Mexico’s violence. In fact, ATF acting director Michael Sullivan said last year that investigators have traced 90 to 95 percent of weapons seized in Mexico to the United States. William Hoover, Assistant Director for Field Operations at ATF said in a congressional testimony last year that “It is a major challenge for ATF to adequately identify and disrupt the illegal sources of firearms and ammunition, while participating in the interdiction of shipments firearms and ammunition destined for Mexico.”

What’s impressive is the lackluster response to such a serious problem. About 100 U.S. firearms agents and 35 inspectors patrol the border for gun smugglers, compared to 14,400 Border Patrol agents that patrol northward movements.