I wrote the following for a CFR “expert brief” which originally appeared here.
Brazen assassinations, kidnappings, and political intimidation by drug lords conjure up images of Colombia in the early 1990s. Yet today, it is Mexico that is being engulfed by escalating violence. In 2007, drug related killings topped 2,250; in 2008 they reached nearly 6,000. Drug cartels are adopting guerrilla-style tactics – sending heavily-armed paramilitary battalions to attack police stations, ambush military brigades, and assassinate high-level security officials, political officials, and journalists. They also are adopting innovative public relations strategies to encourage recruits and intimidate their enemies and the population in general: hanging narcomantas–drug banners–in public places, placing videos on YouTube depicting gruesome murders, and more recently staging street protests against the military’s presence in some of Mexico’s largest cities and most violent regions.
Mexico’s drug business has changed significantly since the 1980s. Previously primarily middlemen, Mexican drug cartels now produce, transport, and distribute drugs. Every year over 500 metric tons of cocaine, 15,500 metric tons of marijuana, 18 metric tons of heroin, and a still unknown amount of methamphetamines make their way through Mexico into the United States. These cartels also supply Mexico’s growing domestic market for illegal substances, and their networks have become increasingly sophisticated. U.S. and Mexican interdiction efforts in the last two decades weeded out mom-and-pop operations, leading drug trafficking organizations to professionalize their operations and add former Mexican military officials, some of them U.S.-trained commandos, to their payrolls. They also diversified their business structures, adding new products (such as meth) and moving into U.S.-based distribution and production.
This Sunday Venezuelan voters will go to the polls to decide whether elected officials, including President Hugo Chávez, can run for re-election indefinitely. Chávez has thrown the full force of the government behind the yes vote, while the opposition and student movement have brought hundreds of thousands into the streets for the “no.” Many inside Venezuela and abroad believe this referendum could be the last straw, breaking Venezuela’s fragile and imperfect democracy if passed. Overlooked by optimists and pessimists alike is the real decider of Venezuela’s political future – the economy.
The referendum does matter. Ten years of single strong executive rule have taken a toll on the country’s democratic institutions. The referendum’s passage would open the possibility for Chávez to run again in 2012, and indeed to remain in office for decades to come. But, Chávez would still have to win reelection – and that may now prove to be the most difficult part.
High oil prices granted Chávez an extraordinary political honeymoon. Multi-year double digit economic growth, historically low unemployment, and prolific public spending on social programs fueled the adoration of previously excluded sectors of society. Skyrocketing consumption and the halving of poverty levels won the approval of the middle class. In fact, according to the pollster Latinobarometer, Venezuelans are among the most satisfied with their democracy in the region.
Sunday’s regional elections in Venezuela saw a record turnout of 65% of eligible voters. This is high both by Venezuela’s standards (45% of voters came out for the 2004 regional elections) and by global standards (about 62% of voters came out during the U.S. presidential election this year). In the short-term, President Hugo Chavez and the opposition ended in a draw, as the opposition gained control over the mayorship of Caracas and 4 states (including the 2 most populous), but the PSUV (Chavez’s party) maintained control of 17 states. In the long-term, though, this is an important victory for the opposition. Even though they won only 5 of the 22 territories, they will govern nearly half of Venezuela’s population. This grants the opposition a better platform to share their concerns with the general population and to build a political base for future elections. It also means Chavez will also have to tolerate – and even cooperate with – opposition regional governments in order to keep the trappings of democracy. For a few more thoughts on the subject, I talked to PBS’s World Focus last night:
Nearly 10 million Latinos voted last Tuesday, setting a new record. They made up between 8% and 9% of the total vote, slightly more than in 2004. Hispanic votes shares did jump significantly in a few swing states – up 9% in New Mexico, and 5% in both Colorado and Nevada.
Tuesday’s results show that Latinos werecrucial in many states that switched fromred to blue. In 2004 56% of Florida’s Latinos (639,225) voted for George Bush, propelling him to a 5% (380,978 vote) victory. This time around, 634,500 Latinos—57%—voted for Obama, propelling him to victory with a 2.5% (204,577 votes)margin. Despite the still solid Republican vote ofFlorida’s Cuban-Americans, the growing non-Cuban Latinos pushed Obama over the top. Latino votes for Obama also exceeded his margin of victory in Colorado and New Mexico. In Nevada and Virginia, Latino votes also played an important, if not decisive, role in moving Nevada and Virginia into the Obama camp.All told, without the Latino vote, Obama would have won 41 fewer electoral college votes. Not a deal breaker, but this demographic helped orchestrate his electoral college landslide last Tuesday.
Nearly one out of every two new Americans is Latino, meaning this demographic could increasingly dominate the future electorate. But to do so, they have to get out the vote. While 10 million voters is a record, it means that nearly 7 million eligible Latino voters didn’t make it to the polls. That places Latino turnout at 58% – below the country’s 62%, and particularly lower than white voters’ 67% . To strengthen their political heft, and shape the issues that matter to them such as education, the cost of living, jobs, health care, and immigration, turnout will have to increase.As Latinos expand to become 30% of our population (expected by 2042) the question will be whether this population resides in the heart, rather than the margins, of American democracy.
This Sunday Venezuelans will vote on a referendum comprising 69 changes to the existing Constitution. Many of these push the country further toward Chavez’s 21st Century Socialism, expanding pensions for the elderly and reducing the workday to six hours. Others strengthen the power of the President and Chavez in particular, extending the Presidential term and allowing unlimited reelection, giving the President the power to appoint many more government officials, and limiting some civil liberties during states of emergency.
The polls show varying results, with some proclaiming a majority in support of the changes and others showing a majority against the proposals. What will really matter is turnout. Here, the “yes” vote has an advantage, since the government is already canvassing the media and will undoubtedly use state resources to encourage supporters to get to the polls. This mobilization will matter.
In addition, Chavez has played again the international anti-imperialist card in the lead up to the referendum. Chavez’s recent international outbursts, first with the King of Spain and more recently with Colombian President Uribe, deflect from the growing domestic discontent and confusion. His evocation of former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, who along with President George W. Bush tacitly supported the 2002 coup attempt against his government, seems designed to rally supporters before the upcoming vote, implicitly reminding voters of the turmoil brought on by political polarization. If that isn’t enough, the violence in recent weeks toward the opposition may scare some “no” voters away on Sunday.
Finally, the opposition has not been able to rally around one position, “ unlike more successful “no” campaigns, such as that leading up to Chile’s 1988 referendum. Some, notably those loyal to the old Accion Democratica political party are calling for a boycott. Others, including former Presidential candidate Manuel Rosales and his followers, are rallying for the no vote. And few seemed to have reached out to Chavez’s former defense minister, General Raul Isaias Baduel, who has criticized the proposals as effectively realizing a constitutional “coup.”
Whether the opposition can galvanize the uneasiness with these reform proposals, which encompasses not just the traditional opposition but student movements and many moderate Chavez supporters, will be answered on Sunday.
Everyone in Bolivia is focusing on the shift toward “participatory democracy,” from the previous “representative democracy.” Some embrace this change enthusiastically, while others view it warily. What is clear is that the traditional political parties have disintegrated here, as they have in many other countries in the Andean region, including Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
It is also clear that new political parties are unlikely to arise anytime soon. Due to exclusion and corruption, the old system has been completely discredited. The MAS, which backs Evo Morales, is proud of its alternative organizational framework, based on linking various social movements and associations rather than forming a political party.
So where does this leave representation? Bolivia is institutionalizing a cycle which begins with protest marches, followed by negotiations with the government, and then ends in promises/governmental actions. These cycles are not necessarily new, as they played a key role in demand making in recent years. In fact, the inability of the governments of Sanchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa to fulfill promises made during the negotiation phase led in large part to their downfall.
But with the election of Evo Morales, these dynamics have changed in meaning. Rather than arising from the opposition, these protesters and their organizations are now part of the ruling MAS, institutionalizing this protest cycle as the main means of interest intermediation. And, the nature of demands has changed. And rather than focusing on big issues of political and social inclusion, or of national redistribution of resources, these protests tend to focus on specific group or individual needs. For instance, this week the marches in La Paz involved teachers and sellers of used clothes, each wanting an improvement in their own economic situation.
This transformation of interest intermediation – due to the decline in political parties – concentrates power in the Executive branch, and in Evo Morales. Other moves by the government – including the undermining of the judiciary – have added to this effect. What Evo does with this power remains to be seen. It may allow him to address historic injustices and issues by bypassing old elite and interest group issues. But, it may also lead to new patronage networks, inefficiency, corruption, and in the end renewed frustration by those wanting to see real change in Bolivia.
Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales are closely linked, and many fear they represent a new trend away from democracy, open markets, and the United States in Latin America. Overlooked are substantial differences between these two countries and from their Latin American neighbors.
What Venezuela and Bolivia do share is the weakness of their political institutions which results in large part from their history with democracy. Democracy emerged in Venezuela in the late 1950s and Bolivia in the early 1980s after elites joined together to form a “pact” that established the rules for the new governments.
These pacts brought stable democracy to both countries no easy feat in Latin America. But, these agreements left many policy issues particularly economic issues permanently off the agenda. They also encouraged the development of cartel-like political parties, more interested in staying in power than truly representing their own populations.
These dynamics excluded large percentages of the population in both countries from politics. In the face of economic turmoil, these poorer populations searched for someone to represent their interests and found outsider candidates Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales. Their elections ended the cozy arrangements between the traditional political parties and challenged the rules of the political game.
But here is where the outcomes in each country diverge. Due to Venezuela’s oil wealth, Chavez has vast resources to satisfy his heterogeneous political base – creating new schools, health care clinics, affordable housing, and food subsidies. Morales, in contrast, does not have the public resources to provide so abundantly for his supporters. Instead, divisions within his own coalition are emerging, questioning his ability to balance campaign promises with the country’s economic realities.
Politically, Chavez has successfully consolidated power retaining control now over the judiciary, the public bureaucracies, and the Congress. In Bolivia, we see a political standoff between the Morales’ political coalition and his opposition. The opposition including the traditional political parties – retains control of several governorships, and for the last six months has stymied any substantive debate within the Constituent Assembly. These political divisions are now leading to social unrest and violence. In short, the battle between these two sides has yet to be won.
These separate outcomes in Venezuela and Bolivia are both worrisome for democracy. But since they result from domestic factors, their spread throughout Latin America is unlikely. It shows that to counter these trends, however, we need to pay more attention domestic institutions, and less to the grandstanding of particular political leaders.
Brazil as an Emerging Power: The View from the United States Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales are closely linked, and many fear they represent a new trend away from democracy, open markets, and the United States in Latin America. Overlooked are substantial differences between these two countries and from their Latin American neighbors.
What Venezuela and Bolivia do share is the [...]
Obama and the World: Latin America Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales are closely linked, and many fear they represent a new trend away from democracy, open markets, and the United States in Latin America. Overlooked are substantial differences between these two countries and from their Latin American neighbors.
What Venezuela and Bolivia do share is the [...]
Brazen assassinations, kidnappings, and political intimidation by drug lords conjure up images of Colombia in the early 1990s. Yet today, it is Mexico that is being engulfed by escalating violence. In 2007, drug related killings topped 2,250; in 2008 they reached nearly 6,000. Drug cartels are adopting guerrilla-style tactics – sending heavily-armed paramilitary battalions to attack police stations, ambush military brigades, and assassinate high-level security officials, political officials, and journalists. They also are adopting innovative public relations strategies to encourage recruits and intimidate their enemies and the population in general: hanging narcomantas–drug banners–in public places, placing videos on YouTube depicting gruesome murders, and more recently staging street protests against the military’s presence in some of Mexico’s largest cities and most violent regions.
This Sunday Venezuelan voters will go to the polls to decide whether elected officials, including President Hugo Chávez, can run for re-election indefinitely. Chávez has thrown the full force of the government behind the yes vote, while the opposition and student movement have brought hundreds of thousands into the streets for the “no.” Many inside Venezuela and abroad believe this referendum could be the last straw, breaking Venezuela’s fragile and imperfect democracy if passed. Overlooked by optimists and pessimists alike is the real decider of Venezuela’s political future – the economy.