Open any Mexican newspaper today and the drug carnage is front and center. In the last three years, narco-related murders surpassed 18,000, nearly 8,000 of these occurred in 2009 alone. The macabre nature of the violence ratcheted up too, featuring heads rolling across an Acapulco disco floor, a “stewmaker” admitting to dissolving some 300 bodies in acid and a dead man’s face stitched onto a soccer ball. The drug cartels openly taunt the authorities and each other, hanging narcomantas, or banners, over major thoroughfares boasting about their latest kills and threatening future violence if not left alone. Both the number of the attacks and their brazenness—particularly in states such as Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Michoacán—are unprecedented.

Yet crime-related violence in Mexico is not new. Mexico has always been a supplier of illegal markets in the United States, from alcohol in the prohibition era, heroin during World War II, marijuana throughout the 1960s, and in recent decades, a variety of drugs including cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines. As illicit businesses without access to formal contracts and courts, disputes and “mergers and acquisitions” have traditionally been settled with blood on the streets.

What has changed in recent decades is the scale of Mexico’s narcotics operations. U.S. demand has grown and diversified, and Mexico has increasingly become the primary supplier. While in 1990, 50 percent of U.S.-bound cocaine came through Mexico, today the figure is 90 percent.

It’s also important to note that the power base of the hemisphere’s drug trade has shifted from Colombia to Mexico. After four decades and billions of dollars, the U.S. “war on drugs” has pushed the epicenter of these illegal criminal networks closer to the U.S. border. The sheer amount of money that has accompanied this fundamental shift to transportation and smuggling just south of the U.S. border has upped the stakes. More resources have transformed the cartels into increasingly sophisticated organizations—with more professional enforcement arms.

Mexico’s democratization throughout the 1990s, which upset the long-standing collusion between some members of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and particular favored drug traffickers, has been another contributing factor. The PRI’s eroding political monopoly brought in new actors, undermined old deals, and opened up the illicit sector to those previously kept out in the cold. The combination of more lucrative opportunities, heightened competition and changes to the political game created dramatic uncertainty in the market, escalating the bloodshed. Legacies of the PRI’s 70-year rule—in particular the political manipulation of law enforcement and judicial branches, which limited professionalization and enabled widespread corruption—further aggravated the situation, leaving the new government with only weak tools to counter increasingly aggressive crime networks…

But what happened some eight hundred miles to the west on Saturday in Ciudad Juarez, when three U.S. consulate workers–two of them U.S. citizens–were killed in their cars in broad daylight wasn’t likely masterminded by drug cartel leaders. Such assassinations would be bad for cross-border business. Instead, this first case of serious violence against U.S. citizens in the “war on narcotraffickers” waged by President Felipe Calderon’s administration was probably committed by one of Ciudad Juarez’s gangs. Initial intelligence points to the Aztecas, a local gang of hitmen who have worked with “La Linea,” the enforcement arm of the Juarez cartel, which was also implicated in the January 31 massacre of sixteen youths at a birthday party.

In places like Ciudad Juarez, the prevalent depiction of a battle between highly organized and disciplined drug cartels is misleading. Instead, these “organizations” are sprawling networks full of freelancers who might work one day for a cartel, the next on their own or with a local gang. Some of the violence of recent years is between street toughs and gangs, often resolving local turf wars. This growing problem, while fueled by the money and guns associated with the drug trade, is distinct from the presence of multinational criminal drug-trafficking organizations.

Ciudad Juarez today presents a bleak picture. City infrastructure and manpower are overwhelmed; the dominant maquila factories offer only low-wage labor; and over 40 percent of the city’s youths are neither in school nor lawfully employed. Exclusion from the hope of joining Mexico’s developing middle class along with weak control mechanisms mean disaffected youth coalesce around an alternative source of social “status”–urban gangs.

In the aftermath of the shooting, President Obama vowed to continue to work with the Calderon government “to break the power of the drug trafficking organizations that operate in Mexico and far too often target and kill the innocent.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton vowed to “ensure that the perpetrators . . . are brought to justice,” reasserting that “this is a responsibility we must shoulder together, particularly in border communities where strong bonds of history, culture, and common interest bind the Mexican and the American people closely together.”

The United States should support Mexico during this moment–as the events of the past few weeks and this weekend show how closely tied Mexico’s stability and safety are to our own. Yes, weapons and equipment are needed for Mexico’s police forces–particularly at the local level where beat cops often patrol without bulletproof vests and in rundown squad cars. Many are even required to buy their own bullets.

But it is not just more gun power that Mexico needs. Instead, it is a functioning police and court system, a better and more open education system, and programs for early intervention, and professional development for at-risk youth. Partnerships between the United States and a wide range of agencies and stake holders at Mexico’s federal, state, and, most importantly, local levels will be vital for the coordination and pooling of resources and expertise.

This broader challenge of reknitting Mexico’s social fabric in places such as Ciudad Juarez is what Mexico struggles most with today. In light of the weekend violence, the United States should prioritize efforts that will assist Mexico in pushing through the changes that will actually matter, changing today’s violent dynamic for the long term.

Along with my own views on U.S.-Latin America relations, you can find writings from Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, and Amb. Paul D. Taylor, Senior Strategic Researcher at the Naval War College. Assuming Arturo Valenzuela will in fact be confirmed now that Congress is back in session, he will be soon facing the many issues we discussed – public security, sustainable energy, economic advancement, and hemispheric migration among others.

Mexico’s rise on the American foreign policy agenda should not come as a surprise. Over the last generation, deepening business, personal, cultural, and community relations have drawn the two countries closer together. Trade between them has tripled, with Mexico becoming the United States’ third-largest commercial partner. Flows of people, always part of the bilateral relationship, skyrocketed: over four million Mexican citizens have headed north in the last decade, while over a million U.S. citizens have migrated south, forming the largest nonmilitary community of American expatriates in the world. At the start of the twenty-first century, Mexico is still forging its political, economic, and social identity. It has undergone a true democratic transformation, and its three political parties now compete in clean and transparent elections. But it remains unclear whether Mexico will follow a path of growth, stability, and market-based democracy or one of instability, corruption, and crime. What is certain is that understanding Mexico — where it came from, how it got there, and where it might be headed — is vital to U.S. interests.

Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation. By Roderic Ai Camp. Oxford University Press, 2006.

In this book, now in its fifth edition, Roderic Ai Camp, one of the preeminent scholars of Mexican politics, deftly guides readers through more than 200 years of political evolution in Mexico, analyzing the events and concerns that created the Mexican state one sees today and exploring both the continuities and changes in that state’s relationship with societal organizations and interests. Camp focuses on Mexico’s extended transition to democracy, including reforms to the electoral process, the expansion of political participation, and the subsequent shifts in power among the various branches of government. Those interested in delving deeper can consult Camp’s specialized works on many of the themes presented, such as the recruitment of political leadership and popular political attitudes. But Politics in Mexico, drawing on decades of experience and innovative research, provides a comprehensive overview of the main issues and forces affecting the country today.

Mexico: Biography of Power. By Enrique Krauze. HarperCollins, 1997.

This exhaustive history, written by one of Mexico’s best-known intellectuals, chronicles nearly two centuries of Mexican politics, from independence to the early 1990s. After identifying major themes underlying the country’s political and social identity — its colonial legacy, its mestizo population, and the early power of the church — Enrique Krauze turns to a leader-driven historical narrative, examining the lives of Mexico’s various strongmen and presidents, who, from the battlefield to the executive office, shaped Mexico’s political development. This personalized dynamic has faded with democratization, but the memory and vestiges of it remain relevant in Mexican politics today.

Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy. By Julia Preston and Sam Dillon. Macmillan, 2005.

Written by Julia Preston and Sam Dillon, the New York Times correspondents covering Mexico in the late 1990s, this readable narrative provides a thoughtful analysis of the country’s democratic opening. Spanning the period from the devastating 1985 earthquake in Mexico City to the 2000 presidential elections, the authors investigate the economic changes, security threats, and political intrigue crucial to understanding the shifts that occurred in Mexican politics. The book explores the many pressures on the old one-party PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) system, the individuals and organizations that pushed for change, and the events leading up to democracy’s final breakthrough: the election of the opposition PAN (National Action Party) presidential candidate Vicente Fox.

First Stop in the New World: Mexico City, the Capital of the Twenty-First Century. By David Lida. Riverhead, 2008.

Spanning 570 square miles and home to more than 20 million people, Mexico City is the largest metropolis in the Western Hemisphere. Even as federalism has decentralized power to Mexico’s states, the capital remains the political, cultural, and economic center of the nation. In this journalistic account, David Lida offers many telling vignettes that capture politics, culture, and life in el D.F., the federal district. He lays out the intricacies of Mexico’s economic inequalities, its sex and age discrimination, its traffic jams, and its deep-seated corruption. But he also illuminates the thriving high- and low-brow art scenes, from well-respected galleries and theaters to lucha libre (Mexico’s version of professional wrestling). Lida explores the country’s cabarets, cantinas, and street food, as well as the coexistence of traditional markets and Wal-Marts that make the city — and Mexico — what it is now.

The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict. By Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro. Routledge, 2001.

At the turn of the twentieth century, strongman Porfirio Díaz lamented, “Poor Mexico! So far from God, so close to the United States.” Some still share that view, but whatever the tone of bilateral relations, all would agree that Mexican politics cannot be understood in isolation from the United States. Expertly dissecting the complicated relationship of these two neighbors, Jorge Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro analyze the impact of the end of the Cold War, internal changes within Mexico and the United States, and the creation and strengthening of bilateral and multilateral institutions over the last two decades. The authors show how these multiple factors led to closer ties in areas as diverse as security, the economy, and the border.

The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 9/11. By Edward Alden. Harper, 2008.

Mexico’s possible futures cannot be fully understood without a thorough comprehension of U.S. concerns over and approaches to border management. Edward Alden skillfully investigates the transformations of U.S. border policy since 9/11 — in particular, the rise of immigration enforcement as the predominant means of protecting the United States against further terrorist attacks. This shift has had strong repercussions for Mexico, because of the 2,000-mile-long border it shares with the United States, its estimated ten million citizens living in El Norte, and the deep economic and social links between many U.S. and Mexican communities. It also has had significant consequences for policymakers trying to develop more effective bilateral relations, as this mindset influences approaches to issues of organized crime, trade and economic development, and the health and safety of populations on both sides of the border.

(Photo courtesy of Flickr user kgardinger.)

For those of you who may prefer to read in Spanish, my Foreign Affairs article on Mexico has been translated and appears in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica, which you can find here.

Mention violence in Latin America today and most people think of Mexico. But if you compare the numbers, Latin America’s hotspot is somewhere else entirely: Venezuela, whose homicide rate far surpasses Mexico’s. Under a decade of President Chavez, Venezuela’s homicide rate has increased by about 140 percent, making Venezuela one of the most violent countries in the world.

Not surprisingly, crime in Venezuela has become political enemy number one. According to Latinobarometer, a well regarded regional polling agency, Venezuelans see crime and public safety as the number one challenge for their country; and Venezuela is the only Latin American country where crime is the most important personal issue cited by respondents. Crime was a major concern for voters in the run-up to the November 2008 regional elections. In speeches and ads Chavistas and opposition leaders both blamed the rising violence on their opponents. Perhaps unsure who was culpable, the Venezuelan vote was a draw. Chavez supporters won most of the states, but the opposition won five of the most populous states and some key mayorships, including that of Caracas, meaning that almost half of Venezuelans now live under opposition local governments.

So how bad is it? First, some regional context is necessary. Throughout Latin America, homicide rates hover at three times the global average. But even within that high cohort, Venezela now holds top rank – by far the highest in South America. Violent deaths have more than doubled since 1998, rising from 20 per 100,000 to 48 per 100,000. In Caracas, the government estimates an even higher 130 per 100,000 inhabitants, or seven deaths a day (though some experts believe the true number is closer to 160). By comparison, the murder rate in Capetown, South Africa, is 62 deaths per day. In the region, Mexico’s homicide rate is half of Venezuela’s: 24 per 100,000. Even the former murder capital of South America, Colombia, claims a rate around 40. In fact, the only close comparison in Latin America is the Colombian crime rate in the 1990s, when druglord Pablo Escobar and his rivals were tearing the state to shreds. These murders occur mostly at night, and spike every two weeks around payday. Young people are increasingly the victims, now three times as likely to be killed today than ten years ago.

There are any number of conjectures as to how things got so bad. Venezuela does share some of its neighbors’ security challenges – most notably drug trafficking. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (which was kicked out of Venezuela in 2005), claims drug shipments passing through the country have increased tenfold during Chavez’s tenure. The U.N.’s Office on Drugs and Crime has also tracked Venezuela’s growing role in the drug trade, and believes it is now the major transit country for shipments to Europe. This is surely linked to some rise in violence – but not all.

As in other Latin American countries, a substantial part of the problem rests with the police force. The Venezuelan police have neither the ability, nor skills, nor an interest in properly investigating crimes. In promotions, loyalty is prized over capacity, and some even suggest the government has encouraged the selective enforcement of its laws — for instance, ignoring tire burning and petty crime in poorer neighborhoods in order to avoid conflict with Chavez’s support base: the country’s poor. If the often cited “broken windows” theory holds true, allowing these petty infractions creates a climate of lawlessness that opens the door for more serious and violent crimes, such as murder. National polls show that the vast majority of citizens believe the police are involved in many of the crimes committed, with a full one-fourth of respondents claiming the police are behind nearly all crimes committed. As a result, most crimes are not even reported, leaving little to dissuade the criminally inclined.

A poor justice system is also to blame. Only three of every 100 murderers are actually sentenced. Courts are underfunded and politicized, as they often serve the interest of the government over justice. Some experts in fact link a rise in police brutality to a lack of confidence in the judiciary; police officers are more inclined to take justice into their own hands, knowing the courts will be unable or unwilling to intercede.

But the rise in violence may also have something to do with Chavez’s particular way of governing. During his weekly address “Alo Presidente” and other speeches, Chavez incites violence against anti-government protesters, justifies law breaking, accuses political figures, the media, and others of crimes, and calls on the citizenry to take on the role of the enforcement forces into its own hands. As a result, after a decade of Chavez’s rule, respect for rule of law has dwindled. Those that support the president know they can act with impunity, while those that oppose him often fear even expressing themselves.

Until recently, Venezuela had the fiscal wherewithal to do something about its crime. Several years of high oil prices allowed Chavez’s government to ramp up spending, quadrupling it from $17 billion in 2003 to over $70 billion for 2009. Billions of these dollars went to the Misiones Bolivarianas, Chavez’s centerpiece redistribution programs to bring health care, literacy programs, housing, and subsidized food to Venezuela’s citizens. Chavez doubled the defense budget, allowing the military to purchase submarines, aircrafts, helicopters, and over 100,000 AK-47-type rifles from Russia.

But very little from the oil bonanza trickled down to a basic security system desperately in need of an overhaul. The President responded to the growing calls to do something about rising crime by creating a new centralized National Police Force to eventually replace Venezuela’s numerous local forces. But rather than establishing firm and functioning democratic institutions; the new armed force appears to be just another organization at the beck and call of the executive branch.

What is most unusual in Venezuela is that crime rates skyrocketed as poverty decreased. Now, with the economy in freefall, things could get even worse. And Chavez is not helping. Over the last three months, as pointing fingers at the “American empire” has failed to pay dividends, Chavez has shifted his strategy and attacked the opposition, stripping the new opposition mayor of Caracas of much of his authority, accusing the TV station Globovision of “”media terrorism” and threatening to close it down, and bringing what may prove to be unfounded corruption charges against prominent (and popular) opposition leaders. As the Venezuelan government moves farther down the path to authoritarian rule, law enforcement institutions will surely follow, bending and breaking the rules as necessary.

Venezuela’s institutions are threatened not just by drug traffickers, organized crime, or guerrillas, but also by the decisions of elected officials. It is this challenge the Venezuelans now face, holding in the balance their safety, their prosperity, and increasingly, their very lives.

This article first appeared on Foreign Policy Passport.