During the past year I have sat in as an observer on the meetings of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Independent Task Force on U.S. Immigration Policy. The report the members have been working on was launched yesterday in Washington, DC, and is available here. For anyone interested in the foreign policy aspects of immigration, this is a must read.
President Obama has recognized that Mexico should be a high priority for his administration. In the issue of Foreign Affairs that hit the newsstands today I argue that U.S. and Mexican interests will be best met if the United States goes beyond the current focus on border control and support for Mexico’s public safety institutions and pursues a more ambitious goal: supporting Mexico’s democracy. I hope you enjoy reading it and look forward to any comments you may have.
(Photo: Presidents Barack Obama and Felipe Calderon at Los Pinos. Courtesy of El Enigma at Flickr.)
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was in Honduras yesterday, attending a meeting of the Organization of American States in which whether Cuba should be allowed to re-gain membership to the international organization was discussed. Last night I spoke on WorldFocus on what it would take for Cuba to be re-admitted into the organization, overtures from Cuba to the U.S. and Iran’s interest in Latin American countries.
How Venezuela came to claim the region’s highest murder rate.
Mention violence in Latin America today and most people think of Mexico. But if you compare the numbers, Latin America’s hotspot is somewhere else entirely: Venezuela, whose homicide rate far surpasses Mexico’s. Under a decade of President Chavez, Venezuela’s homicide rate has increased by about 140 percent, making Venezuela one of the most violent countries in the world.
Not surprisingly, crime in Venezuela has become political enemy number one. According to Latinobarometer, a well regarded regional polling agency, Venezuelans see crime and public safety as the number one challenge for their country; and Venezuela is the only Latin American country where crime is the most important personal issue cited by respondents. Crime was a major concern for voters in the run-up to the November 2008 regional elections. In speeches and ads Chavistas and opposition leaders both blamed the rising violence on their opponents. Perhaps unsure who was culpable, the Venezuelan vote was a draw. Chavez supporters won most of the states, but the opposition won five of the most populous states and some key mayorships, including that of Caracas, meaning that almost half of Venezuelans now live under opposition local governments.
So how bad is it? First, some regional context is necessary. Throughout Latin America, homicide rates hover at three times the global average. But even within that high cohort, Venezela now holds top rank – by far the highest in South America. Violent deaths have more than doubled since 1998, rising from 20 per 100,000 to 48 per 100,000. In Caracas, the government estimates an even higher 130 per 100,000 inhabitants, or seven deaths a day (though some experts believe the true number is closer to 160). By comparison, the murder rate in Capetown, South Africa, is 62 deaths per day. In the region, Mexico’s homicide rate is half of Venezuela’s: 24 per 100,000. Even the former murder capital of South America, Colombia, claims a rate around 40. In fact, the only close comparison in Latin America is the Colombian crime rate in the 1990s, when druglord Pablo Escobar and his rivals were tearing the state to shreds. These murders occur mostly at night, and spike every two weeks around payday. Young people are increasingly the victims, now three times as likely to be killed today than ten years ago.
There are any number of conjectures as to how things got so bad. Venezuela does share some of its neighbors’ security challenges – most notably drug trafficking. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (which was kicked out of Venezuela in 2005), claims drug shipments passing through the country have increased tenfold during Chavez’s tenure. The U.N.’s Office on Drugs and Crime has also tracked Venezuela’s growing role in the drug trade, and believes it is now the major transit country for shipments to Europe. This is surely linked to some rise in violence – but not all.
As in other Latin American countries, a substantial part of the problem rests with the police force. The Venezuelan police have neither the ability, nor skills, nor an interest in properly investigating crimes. In promotions, loyalty is prized over capacity, and some even suggest the government has encouraged the selective enforcement of its laws — for instance, ignoring tire burning and petty crime in poorer neighborhoods in order to avoid conflict with Chavez’s support base: the country’s poor. If the often cited “broken windows” theory holds true, allowing these petty infractions creates a climate of lawlessness that opens the door for more serious and violent crimes, such as murder. National polls show that the vast majority of citizens believe the police are involved in many of the crimes committed, with a full one-fourth of respondents claiming the police are behind nearly all crimes committed. As a result, most crimes are not even reported, leaving little to dissuade the criminally inclined.
A poor justice system is also to blame. Only three of every 100 murderers are actually sentenced. Courts are underfunded and politicized, as they often serve the interest of the government over justice. Some experts in fact link a rise in police brutality to a lack of confidence in the judiciary; police officers are more inclined to take justice into their own hands, knowing the courts will be unable or unwilling to intercede.
But the rise in violence may also have something to do with Chavez’s particular way of governing. During his weekly address “Alo Presidente” and other speeches, Chavez incites violence against anti-government protesters, justifies law breaking, accuses political figures, the media, and others of crimes, and calls on the citizenry to take on the role of the enforcement forces into its own hands. As a result, after a decade of Chavez’s rule, respect for rule of law has dwindled. Those that support the president know they can act with impunity, while those that oppose him often fear even expressing themselves.
Until recently, Venezuela had the fiscal wherewithal to do something about its crime. Several years of high oil prices allowed Chavez’s government to ramp up spending, quadrupling it from $17 billion in 2003 to over $70 billion for 2009. Billions of these dollars went to the Misiones Bolivarianas, Chavez’s centerpiece redistribution programs to bring health care, literacy programs, housing, and subsidized food to Venezuela’s citizens. Chavez doubled the defense budget, allowing the military to purchase submarines, aircrafts, helicopters, and over 100,000 AK-47-type rifles from Russia.
But very little from the oil bonanza trickled down to a basic security system desperately in need of an overhaul. The President responded to the growing calls to do something about rising crime by creating a new centralized National Police Force to eventually replace Venezuela’s numerous local forces. But rather than establishing firm and functioning democratic institutions; the new armed force appears to be just another organization at the beck and call of the executive branch.
What is most unusual in Venezuela is that crime rates skyrocketed as poverty decreased. Now, with the economy in freefall, things could get even worse. And Chavez is not helping. Over the last three months, as pointing fingers at the “American empire” has failed to pay dividends, Chavez has shifted his strategy and attacked the opposition, stripping the new opposition mayor of Caracas of much of his authority, accusing the TV station Globovision of “”media terrorism” and threatening to close it down, and bringing what may prove to be unfounded corruption charges against prominent (and popular) opposition leaders. As the Venezuelan government moves farther down the path to authoritarian rule, law enforcement institutions will surely follow, bending and breaking the rules as necessary.
Venezuela’s institutions are threatened not just by drug traffickers, organized crime, or guerrillas, but also by the decisions of elected officials. It is this challenge the Venezuelans now face, holding in the balance their safety, their prosperity, and increasingly, their very lives.
This article first appeared on Foreign Policy Passport.
As if Mexico didn’t have enough problems, it is now the epicenter of the swine flu epidemic. Confirmed cases of the influenza top 300, with 12 officially confirmed deaths. Experts, though, estimate the true number of infections in the thousands. Mexico’s economy – already on the rocks – will now definitively plummet in 2009, leading hundreds of thousands, and perhaps even millions, back into poverty. But there is a silver lining. The Mexican government’s handling of the epidemic should banish any notions of a failed state on our southern border.
While its origin and spread are still quite mysterious, cases of A/H1N1 virus, or swine flu, first appeared in Mexico and the U.S. southwestern border region in late March. Initially diagnosed as a regular flu, laboratory testing confirmed in mid-April that a new hybrid of pig, bird, and human flu virus was spreading rapidly and lethally throughout Mexico, the United States, and now the world.
In addition to the human costs, the flu is expected to hit Mexico’s economy hard. Already reeling from the U.S. and global downturn, GDP is expected to fall at least 5 percent – nearing the declines suffered during the 1995 “Tequila crisis.” Hardest hit is the $11 billion a year tourism industry, which had been holding up despite worries of drug violence. Cruise ships are rerouting away from its ports, only flights out of Mexico are full, and hotel phones ring with cancellations.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s heads to Mexico today. The main issue on the agenda with Mexican President Felipe Calderon and Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa will undoubtedly be security. The rising power and violence of Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) covers the front pages of newspapers throughout both countries, and is a priority for policymakers in both capitals. Yet as these two nations focus on their mutual security, the United States should not forget about other bilateral issues – in particular immigration. This is an important topic in and of itself, and perhaps the most important issue on the bilateral agenda for Mexico. But it is also intrinsically related to security. Immigration reform would boost U.S. and Mexican efforts to lessen the reach of the drugs cartels’ on both sides of the border.
The drug cartels’ operations are fueled by one thing: money. This money buys guns, buys people, and buys power. The vast majority of this money – estimated at some $15-20 billion dollars a year – comes from drug sales in the United States. These profits are then sent back to Mexico, and fuel the insecurity and violence.
I wrote the following for a CFR “expert brief” which originally appeared here.
Brazen assassinations, kidnappings, and political intimidation by drug lords conjure up images of Colombia in the early 1990s. Yet today, it is Mexico that is being engulfed by escalating violence. In 2007, drug related killings topped 2,250; in 2008 they reached nearly 6,000. Drug cartels are adopting guerrilla-style tactics – sending heavily-armed paramilitary battalions to attack police stations, ambush military brigades, and assassinate high-level security officials, political officials, and journalists. They also are adopting innovative public relations strategies to encourage recruits and intimidate their enemies and the population in general: hanging narcomantas–drug banners–in public places, placing videos on YouTube depicting gruesome murders, and more recently staging street protests against the military’s presence in some of Mexico’s largest cities and most violent regions.
Mexico’s drug business has changed significantly since the 1980s. Previously primarily middlemen, Mexican drug cartels now produce, transport, and distribute drugs. Every year over 500 metric tons of cocaine, 15,500 metric tons of marijuana, 18 metric tons of heroin, and a still unknown amount of methamphetamines make their way through Mexico into the United States. These cartels also supply Mexico’s growing domestic market for illegal substances, and their networks have become increasingly sophisticated. U.S. and Mexican interdiction efforts in the last two decades weeded out mom-and-pop operations, leading drug trafficking organizations to professionalize their operations and add former Mexican military officials, some of them U.S.-trained commandos, to their payrolls. They also diversified their business structures, adding new products (such as meth) and moving into U.S.-based distribution and production.
This Sunday Venezuelan voters will go to the polls to decide whether elected officials, including President Hugo Chávez, can run for re-election indefinitely. Chávez has thrown the full force of the government behind the yes vote, while the opposition and student movement have brought hundreds of thousands into the streets for the “no.” Many inside Venezuela and abroad believe this referendum could be the last straw, breaking Venezuela’s fragile and imperfect democracy if passed. Overlooked by optimists and pessimists alike is the real decider of Venezuela’s political future – the economy.
The referendum does matter. Ten years of single strong executive rule have taken a toll on the country’s democratic institutions. The referendum’s passage would open the possibility for Chávez to run again in 2012, and indeed to remain in office for decades to come. But, Chávez would still have to win reelection – and that may now prove to be the most difficult part.
High oil prices granted Chávez an extraordinary political honeymoon. Multi-year double digit economic growth, historically low unemployment, and prolific public spending on social programs fueled the adoration of previously excluded sectors of society. Skyrocketing consumption and the halving of poverty levels won the approval of the middle class. In fact, according to the pollster Latinobarometer, Venezuelans are among the most satisfied with their democracy in the region.
Testimony: Next Steps for the Mérida Initiative On May 27th I testified at a joint hearing of the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism and the Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere on “U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Next Steps for the Merida Initiative.”
What to Expect from Calderón’s Visit I was interviewed on PBS NewsHour on issues that will surface on the presidents’ agenda, including immigration, climate change, and trade.