In late September Venezuelan President Chavez traveled to China. This is what I had to say about this for PBS’s new show WorldFocus.

This opinion piece I wrote for the Washington Post lays out many of the findings and recommendations of the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S.-Latin America Relations, for which I served as Director.

The report has gotten some great feedback so far, and I hope will help jumpstart a new conversation within the next Administration and Congress with regard to the region.

The Task Force report co-chairs, Charlene Barshefsky and General James T. Hill, published an editorial yesterday in the Miami Herald. It lays out the main themes of the report, in particular the call to recognize that U.S.-Latin American relations is increasingly about U.S. domestic policy.

After taking a 3 plus month maternity hiatus, I am back and will be posting regularly again.

To kick things off, here is a link to a new Independent Task Force report from the Council on Foreign Relations, titled U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality. The Council brought together 19 individuals of various interest and expertise under the chairmanship of Charlene Barshefsky and General James T. Hill. As director of the project, I can attest to the long hours of intense and at times spirited discussion among its members.
The group decided that U.S. policy should focus on four critical areas: poverty and inequality, public security, migration, and energy integration. The main recommendations are the following:

Poverty and Inequality:

• U.S. should expand targeted assistance for poverty alleviation and institution building by fully funding the Millennium Challenge Account and developing new initiatives to reach the poor regions of the larger middle income countries. These programs should reflect the priorities of Latin American governments and also involve restructuring and integrating the programs of various U.S. government bureaucracies and multilateral institutions.
• Alongside aid, the United States should approve pending free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama and extend trade preferences to Bolivia and Ecuador to encourage productive relations with these complex countries.

Public Security:

• The United States should assist Latin American countries in strengthening their law enforcement and judicial systems. Only through strong institutions can criminal networks and drug traffickers be controlled in the long term. The United States should also focus more on the demand side of the drug equation, working closely with other large drug consuming nations, specifically those in the European Union.

Migration:

• Push through a comprehensive reform in 2009. This must deal with border security, employer responsibility, some sort of regularization of the 12 million unauthorized workers here today, and a flexible guest worker program to deal with future labor demands.

Energy Security:

• The United States should provide FDI incentives to help build energy infrastructure i the region. It should also sponsor regional and subregional working groups to forward best practices.

Finally, the task force touches briefly on 4 bilateral relations. It recommends deepening U.S. relations with Brazil to promote global trade negotiations and manage energy demands; strengthening cooperation with Mexico to stop narcotics trafficking, increase U.S. investment in energy production, and reform immigration policies; using multilateral institutions to address foreign and domestic policies of Venezuela; and opening informal and formal channels of communication with Cuba, with the eventual goal of lifting the embargo.

This Sunday Venezuelans will vote on a referendum comprising 69 changes to the existing Constitution. Many of these push the country further toward Chavez’s “21^st Century Socialism,” expanding pensions for the elderly and reducing the workday to six hours. Others strengthen the power of the President and Chavez in particular, extending the Presidential term and allowing unlimited reelection, giving the President the power to appoint many more government officials, and limiting some civil liberties during states of emergency.

The polls show varying results, with some proclaiming a majority in support of the changes and others showing a majority against the proposals. What will really matter is turnout. Here, the “yes” vote has an advantage, since the government is already canvassing the media and will undoubtedly use state resources to encourage supporters to get to the polls. This mobilization will matter.

In addition, Chavez has played again the international anti-imperialist card in the lead up to the referendum. Chavez’s recent international outbursts – first with the King of Spain and more recently with Colombian President Uribe –deflect from the growing domestic discontent and confusion. His evocation of former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, who along with President George W. Bush tacitly supported the 2002 coup attempt against his government, seems designed to rally supporters before the upcoming vote, implicitly reminding voters of the turmoil brought on by political polarization. If that isn’t enough, the violence in recent weeks toward the opposition may scare some “no” voters away on Sunday.

Finally, the opposition has not been able to rally around one position – unlike more successful “no” campaigns, such as that leading up to Chile’s 1988 referendum. Some, notably those loyal to the old Accion Democratica political party are calling for a boycott. Others, including former Presidential candidate Manuel Rosales and his followers, are rallying for the no vote. And few seemed to have reached out to Chavez’s former defense minister, General Raul Isaias Baduel, who has criticized the proposals as effectively realizing a constitutional “coup.”

Whether the opposition can galvanize the uneasiness with these reform proposals – which encompasses not just the traditional opposition but student movements and many moderate Chavez supporters – will be answered on Sunday.

The one area of real triumph for market-oriented reforms in Latin America was inflation. Unlike the uneven record on poverty, inequality, and economic volatility, structural adjustment and austerity programs of the early 1990s ended high and hyper inflation. These programs brought the Latin American average from 235% per year in the early 1990s to less than 8% by the turn of the century. Low and steady inflation has been a crucial element for attracting both foreign and domestic investment, increasing economic production, and encouraging the economic growth of the last several years.

But heterdox economic policies - reminiscent of Sarney’s Brazil, Alfonsin’s Argentina, and Garcia’s Peru (the first time around) - have reemerged. In both Argentina and Venezuela, the Kirchner and Chavez governments are using wage and price controls on basic goods as key parts of economic policy. Venezuela has gone a step further to reintroduce public control and management of “key” industries, including telecommunications, oil, and now perhaps steel and the banking sector. These policies are bringing back worries of inflation and leading to shortages in basic goods.

Venezuela’s inflation for 2006 topped 17%, the highest in Latin America. Most expect it to surpass 20% this year. Argentina too has seen increasing inflation, from a negative rate in the late 1990s to 10% last year. As worrisome, Kirchner fired the head of the national statistics agency, INDEC, briefly replacing her with a more malleable political appointee until public clamor forced the promotion of a INDEC senior employee.

Shortages in these economies are as important, and hamper both consumer-led and manufacturing-led growth. A recent Wall Street journal article argues that Chavez’s threat to nationalize the steel and banking industries has as much to do with the issue of shortages as with nationalism. News articles, as well as personal conversations, show that shortages and economic bottlenecks are again appearing in Argentina. These mismatches are hampering growth, not to mention the quality of life of individuals within the country.

Poverty, inequality, and equal opportunity are key issues for the future of Latin American nations. Government programs to directly improve the health care, education, and resources of the poor are important and laudable. But, these governments should not overlook the dire effects of inflation on poverty and inequality. Inflation hits the poor the hardest. They are the ones least likely to receive compensatory pay raises, and are those unable to hedge their savings in indexed accounts or abroad. High inflation will wipe out any benefits of direct assistance programs, leaving individuals certainly no better off and most likely in a much worse situation. This means that as governments are designing programs for the poor, they need to include measures to keep inflation low – be that independent monetary policy, controlled deficits, and better financial regulation. Only with this combination will governments be able to truly help those at the bottom of the pyramid.

Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales are closely linked, and many fear they represent a new trend away from democracy, open markets, and the United States in Latin America. Overlooked are substantial differences between these two countries – and from their Latin American neighbors.

What Venezuela and Bolivia do share is the weakness of their political institutions – which results in large part from their history with democracy. Democracy emerged in Venezuela in the late 1950s and Bolivia in the early 1980s after elites joined together to form a “pact” that established the rules for the new governments.

These pacts brought stable democracy to both countries – no easy feat in Latin America. But, these agreements left many policy issues – particularly economic issues – permanently off the agenda. They also encouraged the development of cartel-like political parties, more interested in staying in power than truly representing their own populations.

These dynamics excluded large percentages of the population in both countries from politics. In the face of economic turmoil, these poorer populations searched for someone to represent their interests – and found outsider candidates Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales. Their elections ended the cozy arrangements between the traditional political parties – and challenged the rules of the political game.

But here is where the outcomes in each country diverge. Due to Venezuela’s oil wealth, Chavez has vast resources to satisfy his heterogeneous political base - creating new schools, health care clinics, affordable housing, and food subsidies. Morales, in contrast, does not have the public resources to provide so abundantly for his supporters. Instead, divisions within his own coalition are emerging, questioning his ability to balance campaign promises with the country’s economic realities.

Politically, Chavez has successfully consolidated power –retaining control now over the judiciary, the public bureaucracies, and the Congress. In Bolivia, we see a political standoff between the Morales’ political coalition and his opposition. The opposition – including the traditional political parties - retains control of several governorships, and for the last six months has stymied any substantive debate within the Constituent Assembly. These political divisions are now leading to social unrest and violence. In short, the battle between these two sides has yet to be won.

These separate outcomes in Venezuela and Bolivia are both worrisome for democracy. But since they result from domestic factors, their spread throughout Latin America is unlikely. It shows that to counter these trends, however, we need to pay more attention domestic institutions, and less to the grandstanding of particular political leaders.

On Monday January 8th, two days before his inauguration to a third term, Hugo Chavez announced that he would deepen his socialist or “Bolivarian” revolution by nationalizing companies that are deemed to be strategic to the national interest. Specifically, he singled out the telephone company CANTV and the Caracas utility company, EDC. Since both are at least partially owned by U.S. companies (Verizon and AES respectively), this shocked not only Venezuela’s domestic financial markets but also Wall Street.

Chavez’s ability to carry out these nationalizations rests on the confluence of political and economic power he holds. In recent years he consolidated political power in Venezuela by undermining the independence of the judiciary, the national electoral council, the bureaucracy, and he gained complete control of the Congress. On the economic side, high oil prices provide Chavez the resources to compensate the private owners of these or even other companies in Venezuela. Venezuela now holds over $50 billion dollars in international reserves, providing a war chest for not only his social programs but for expenditures like nationalizations.

What is important to understand is that it is unlikely his efforts will spread to other Latin American nations. Most of the recently elected leaders in Latin America (there have been twelve elections in as many months) are turning toward free markets, not away from them. Leftist leaders in countries such as Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and even Argentina are opening their markets while also instituting broader social protections, including social security, health care, and assistance programs. Even those leaders who may be more ideologically inclined toward state intervention in the economy, such as the presidents of Bolivia and Nicaragua, don’t have the luxury of strong oil revenues. So large-scale nationalizations are unlikely outside of Venezuela. In many ways this is an isolated, anachronistic turn to socialism, ironically buoyed by global capital markets and the increasing demand for oil due to globalization.

Finally, some commentators are pointing to the Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Venezuela (his second in five months) as a threat to U.S. interests. These meetings, and strategic agreements signed at them, are less important than many fear. While there are several reasons why the United States should worry about its relationship with Iran, the alliance with Chavez will not seriously influence these foreign relations. We should keep or foreign policy strategies and decisions toward each country separate, as their shared anti-Americanism shouldn’t negate their vast differences.

For more thoughts on Chavez’s announcements, please check out my interview with Mike McKee from Bloomberg earlier this week about this development:

Bloomberg interview