With the formation of ALBA, Unasur, IIRSA, and many others, Latin American nations are pushing towards a new era of economic, political, and social integration. But how innovative are these efforts really? Will they differ from the failed attempts of the past? I recently wrote the following article for World Politics Review on the promise and perils of the region’s integration.
The Promise and Perils of South American Integration
Shannon O’Neil
January 12, 2009
World Politics Review
In the 21st century so far, regional integration has been one of the most notable elements of South American foreign relations. Picking up speed in recent years, the continent’s heads of state have enthusiastically met in numerous summits, promising increased political, economic, social, and development cooperation. Across the spectrum, governments are expanding current integration frameworks and entering into new agreements. Expectations are no less grand. As Brazil’s President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva recently stated, “South America, united, will move the board game of power in the world, not for its own benefit, but for everyone’s.” Read the entire article here.
Since I published a short article on the drug war in Mexico on Tuesday (and re-published it in a posting below) I’ve received a number of responses and questions related to gun shops on the border and the weapons they sell that end up in the hands of drug cartels in Mexico. I’d like to thank everyone who sent feedback and clarify a few points.
I do incorrectly imply in the article that gun shops on the border sell hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The border gun shops do not legally sell these. However, these type of weapons used by Mexican drug cartels have been seized by customs officlas making their way south through the border. How they are purchased is somewhat unknown, but many of these are making their way to Mexico through the United States.
I received many skeptical emails regarding the number of gunshops along the border. In fact, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) estimates that there are about 6,650 Federal Firearms Licensees in this area, and the border is 2,000 mile long, meaning that there are 3.3 gun shops per mile (I said 3 per mile in the article). If we include all the shops in border states (not just near the border), the number rises to 9,161 locations.
I wrote the following piece on the U.S. role in Mexico’s security challenges for foreignpolicy.com.
President Calderón is fighting America’s third war, and America’s backing his enemies.
By Shannon O’Neil
When President-elect Barack Obama is sworn in next week, he’ll become the proud owner of several wars. There is the familiar mayhem in Afghanistan and reluctant optimism in Iraq. And then there is America’s forgotten war: the war on drugs. That battle’s newest front is its southern neighbor Mexico, whose president, Felipe Calderón, Obama met on Monday. If Calderón speaks his mind, he could put it simply to Obama: We are fighting your war, and you are supplying our enemies — with demand for their drugs, money for their cartels, and guns for their violence.
Mexico is fighting for its life, and Calderón has ratcheted up the battle since becoming president in 2006. Still, the picture remains grim.
Please click here to continue reading on foreignpolicy.com.
It’s hard to believe that Calderon is coming up for 2 years in office, one-third of his term. Much has been said of Calderon’s domestic agenda, but in the op-ed below, published in Mexico’s major English-language newspaper, The News, I analyze his foreign policy achievements. I argue that President Calderon has done much to restore Mexico’s bilateral relationships, but that so far his administration has failed to take on a global leadership role. With four more years in office, Calderon should shift Mexico’s foreign policy course to actively shape the international agenda.
It’s time for Mexico to lead
BY Shannon O’Neil
Special to The News
November 28, 2008
As he celebrates his two-year anniversary in office, President Felipe Calderón gets mixed reviews on his domestic and foreign policy. Many point to the numerous successful reforms – pension, tax, justice, and energy – that have passed as evidence he can deftly guide serious issues through a divided Congress. These achievements do stand in stark contrast to the gridlocked Vicente Fox administration. Yet others dismiss these reforms as too little, too late, and lament the wasted potential for real change.
This ambivalence is not limited to national politics. While much lower in profile, Calderón´s foreign policy elicits both praise and dismissals. It shines in comparison to Fox´s, which left Mexico’s relations with Venezuela and Cuba in tatters and U.S. relations weakened by recriminations on both sides. But as in the domestic arena, many worry Calderón is wasting the opportunity to fundamentally transform Mexico’s role on the world stage.
Upon entering Los Pinos, Calderón quickly moved to repair broken bilateral fences. In his first year, he returned Mexican ambassadors to both Venezuela and Cuba, taking the first necessary steps to re-engage with all of Latin America. He followed up with visits to Argentina and Chile, and received Presidents Tabaré Vázquez of Uruguay and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil at home. Through these renewed ties, his government pushed to increase trade and to further energy partnerships – all important for Mexico´s future. This new hemispheric camaraderie permitted Mexico´s successful U.N. Security Council seat bid, providing Calderón a new international platform in 2009.
While at times seeming almost desperate to ignore his northern neighbor – during his first trip there as head of state in April he even bypassed Washington – Calderón’s administration has actually made more concrete headway with the United States than many of his predecessors. The harsh realities of his “get tough” domestic agenda, and the increasing worries of U.S. policy-makers about drug-related violence in Mexico, have facilitated this newfound cooperation.
Negotiations with President George W. Bush culminated in the three-year package known as the Mérida Initiative, which provides $400 million in the first year for the fight against the drug cartels. Just as important, these discussions changed the terms of the drug war debate, getting the United States to at least grudgingly accept some responsibility in the violence and to promise to stem the flow of illegal guns and money into Mexico.
QUIET CONFIDENCE
On other bilateral issues, Calderón has been notably silent. Coming on Fox’s burned heels, he has virtually ignored U.S.-bound migration in his discussions with the U.S. president. Calls for better treatment of Mexico’s citizens abroad, and for economic development and job creation at home to stem the steady human flow outward, have been geared almost exclusively to his domestic audience. On NAFTA, too, the administration has been uncommonly reticent, particularly amid calls by U.S. democrats for its renegotiation.
Two years in, Calderón’s foreign policy has promoted better Latin American relations, and assuaged past rifts with the United States. Not bad – but not visionary. As the 13th-largest economy in the world, and according to The Economist, soon to break into the ranks of the top 10, Mexico has been decidedly quiet on the international front. It is time for Mexico to lead.
The current financial crisis provides an unprecedented opportunity. Given its own tortuous history with financial upheaval (and more than one near-death experience of its banking sector), Mexico has quite a lot of wisdom to share. And since the exclusive G-7 has given way to the G-20 in worldwide negotiations, Mexico now has a seat at the table.
Other countries understand this. Brazil is the most obvious example, and one to be emulated rather than envied. Its steady and confident leadership on the world stage (backed by good macroeconomic policies and solid domestic economic growth), seduces not just international businesses and investors, but also worldwide diplomats. Having the world’s ear, Brazil´s eminence has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In contrast, Mexico´s more timid foreign policy stance leaves it out of the game.
In the coming months, we will likely see a narrowing of the Mexican government’s domestic policy agenda. The unfortunate combination of escalating criminal violence, the almost certain National Action Party losses in next year´s midterm elections, and the deepening of the global financial crisis will prove too much for an ambitious reform program in the second half of the president´s term. But this unlucky trifecta for the home front opens the opportunity for a more aggressive foreign policy approach. Mexico should turn outward in earnest, building on the solid blocks of support developed so far by Mexico´s diplomats. With now two years of distance from Fox´s unfortunate travails, the arrival of a new administration in Washington provides an opening for the Calderón government to shift Mexico´s foreign policy course. Through the U.N. Security Council seat, its OECD and G-20 membership, and its intricate economic, security, social, and cultural ties with what is still the most powerful world economy and government, Mexico has a chance to shape the international agenda. It is an opportunity Calderón should not waste.
About the writer: Shannon O’Neil is Douglas Dillon Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
Since Calderon took office nearly 2 years ago, crime has increased at an alarming rate. Spilling beyond border drug violence, assaults, shootouts and kidnappings frighten citizens across the country. Perceived widespread corruption in the ranks of public security forces heightens the unease. In the wake of a particularly high profile and gruesome kidnapping/killing, Mexico’s civil society marched on mass in August 2008, demanding change. In response, local and national governments signed a pact-the “Acuerdo Nacional por la Seguridad, la Justicia y la Legalidad”-to improve Mexico’s public security.
Based on this agreement on October 22, 2008, President Calderon sent two reforms to Congress to overhaul Mexico’s federal police system, combining existing forces and redrawing responsibilities. Mexico’s federal police is currently composed of two separate federal forces: the Agencia Federal de Investigacion (AFI) and the Policia Federal Preventiva (PFP). Although on the operational side both forces report to the Ministry of Public Security (SSP), on administrative issues the AFI is linked to the Attorney General’s office, the PGR. Reforming two already-existing laws, the Federal Police Law and the Federal Attorney General Office’s (Procuraduria General de la Republica, PGR) Law, the new bills would merge these two police forces into one single branch under the SSP. This should, according to the Calderon administration, clarify the different roles of the SSP and the PGR and as a result strengthen their mandates. The executive argues that the new centralized police force will make the federal police more efficient, more effective, and less corrupt.
If congress approves the reforms, the first one would transform the PFP into an autonomous new Federal Police. The second reform would reorganize the PGR and change the process of selection and training of its officials in the effort to improve its performance. In this process, the AFI would disappear. Its officers could join the new Federal Police police force, but only after they prove- by undergoing an invigorated evaluation and certification process- that they are qualified (i.e. not corrupt among other skills).
It is good to see the Mexican government taking on these serious challenges, but it is not all that clear that the reforms will improve the situation. Given that today’s PFP suffers from corruption, it is unclear how the consolidation of authority and renaming of its force will clean up the system. Mexico’s past two Presidents also revamped the federal police with great fanfare, but with few material results. The infiltration by drug traffickers into the most elite forces combating organized crime, as was revealed last month, is just the most recent reminder that Mexico’s police forces do not have adequate measures in place to stem corruption. The proposed laws don’t look to change this situation.
Furthermore, while the new police force’s greater autonomy could increase efficiency, it will also reduce its interaction with the PGR. Whether the reforms then boost the new police’s ability to investigate and procure evidence on crime is a question.
Lastly, corruption is not exclusive to the federal police forces. State and local police forces, as well as the army and other government agencies (which are now all involved in the battle against organized crime) are all contaminated with corruption. The federal police accounts for less than 5 percent of Mexico’s total police presence. Therefore, although at this point almost any change is welcome, the Mexican government must address the dire situation of local police forces. It also needs to tackle the impunity (due to malfunctioning court systems) that allows corruption to flourish. Though seemingly insurmountable, cleaning up all these links in the “rule of law” chain are necessary to turn back the tide of organized crime, and better the lives of ordinary Mexican citizens.
While the world was glued to televisions waiting for the result of the U.S. elections last night, Mexico lost one of its most important leaders in its struggle against organized crime and drug trafficking. Juan Camilo Mouriño, Mexico’s Interior Minister, died along with seven others when a government plane that was carrying them to Mexico City crashed into the city’s busy Reforma Avenue in what appears to have been an accident. Among those killed was also José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos, an important presidential adviser on security and judicial reform matters, who had headed Mexico’s elite force to combat organized crime (SIEDO) and had been in charge of extraditing numerous narcotraffickers. The Interior Minister is the second most important position in Mexico’s government, comparable to the vicepresidential position in the United States, and is usually responsible for negotiating with the legislative branch. President Calderon had assigned Mouriño to spearhead the government’s efforts against organized crime and to reform Mexico’s security institutions. In an administration that has rested heavily on President Calderon’s closest confidants in its decision-making process Mouriño was probably the closest to Calderon. It is unclear who could fill Mouriño’s shoes. His death is indeed a blow to Calderon and to Mexico’s efforts against organized crime, drug trafficking, and corruption.
The Mexican Congress approved a long-overdue energy reform on Tuesday October 28 following 6 months of debates, referendums in 8 Mexican states and Mexico City, and numerous public demonstrations from both sides. While some newspapers tout the government got 80% of the reforms it asked for, Calderon started with an already limited proposal, rejecting any foreign investment in production, which would have required substantial changes to the 1938 constitutional amendment governing Mexican oil. The shared risk/shared reward bargain present around the world, and with other state-owned oil companies such as PETROBRAS in Brazil and PDVSA in Venezuela, was never on the table in Mexico. Even so, the “20 percent” that the President conceded to the PRI and PRD in Congress was an important part. The final bill , and soon law, prohibits private companies from operating refineries and transporting oil within Mexico. It allows Pemex, Mexico’s state-owned oil company, to contract with other companies for some (but not all) types of desperately needed investment in exploration and production, leaving out in particular difficult deep water explorations. The approved reform also sets up disincentives to contracting with Pemex at a time when capital and credit are limited. It mandates that contracted companies must be paid in cash and forbids paying them based on the amount of oil found, produced, or sold by Pemex, although it does offer bonuses for early completion of projects and transferring technology to the Mexican oil company. While the reform does give Pemex more financial autonomy and greater flexibility – allowing it to keep more of its profits so that it can use them for investment in technology and exploration – the company’s employees currently lack many of the necessary skills to realize these new opportunities. So, in the end, production will continue to decline.
Despite these limitations, the reform process was positive for Mexico’s solidifying democracy at work. Once a political third rail, politicians, interest groups, and society at large discussed and approved an oil reform, through successful negotiation and compromise between the Executive and Legislature, and within Congress. The PRI and the PRD played an important role in toning down the reform, which was then passed by an overwhelming majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives. The reforms exposed the deepening division within the PRD. While many of their colleagues voted for the reform, other PRD representatives attempted to block debate , forcing the Senate vote to take place at an alternate venue and the Chamber vote to take place at a makeshift podium, away from the flag-waving and horn-blowing occurring in the usual space. Yet these anti-democratic tactics were unable to sway the workings of Congress — a good sign. Democracy worked.
Given the importance of oil revenues for the government — it funds nearly 40% of all public spending — further debates and reforms will happen again — perhaps sooner than later. What this round of reform shows is The that the “sacred cow”? of oil is no longer that. This itself is good for Mexico.
Mexico’s attorney general said yesterday that employees of his elite force to combat organized crime, SIEDO, passed confidential information to the Beltran-Leyva cartel in what has been described as the “worst case of infiltration of law enforcement by drug cartels in 10 years.” This is what I had to say about this for PBS’s new show WorldFocus last night.
This opinion piece I wrote for the Washington Post lays out many of the findings and recommendations of the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S.-Latin America Relations, for which I served as Director.
The report has gotten some great feedback so far, and I hope will help jumpstart a new conversation within the next Administration and Congress with regard to the region.
The Task Force report co-chairs, Charlene Barshefsky and General James T. Hill, published an editorial yesterday in the Miami Herald. It lays out the main themes of the report, in particular the call to recognize that U.S.-Latin American relations is increasingly about U.S. domestic policy.
Brazil as an Emerging Power: The View from the United States The Task Force report co-chairs, Charlene Barshefsky and General James T. Hill, published an editorial yesterday in the Miami Herald. It lays out the main themes of the report, in particular the call to recognize that U.S.-Latin American relations is increasingly about U.S. domestic policy.
Obama and the World: Latin America The Task Force report co-chairs, Charlene Barshefsky and General James T. Hill, published an editorial yesterday in the Miami Herald. It lays out the main themes of the report, in particular the call to recognize that U.S.-Latin American relations is increasingly about U.S. domestic policy.
With the formation of ALBA, Unasur, IIRSA, and many others, Latin American nations are pushing towards a new era of economic, political, and social integration. But how innovative are these efforts really? Will they differ from the failed attempts of the past? I recently wrote the following article for World Politics Review on the promise and perils of the region’s integration.
Since I published a short article on the drug war in Mexico on Tuesday (and re-published it in a posting below) I’ve received a number of responses and questions related to gun shops on the border and the weapons they sell that end up in the hands of drug cartels in Mexico. I’d like to thank everyone who sent feedback and clarify a few points.
I wrote the following piece on the U.S. role in Mexico’s security challenges for foreignpolicy.com.
