Three weeks ago, Reynosa, Mexico–just across the Rio Grande from McAllen, Texas–exploded in violence. The Zetas and the Gulf cartels, once allies, began what may become a fight to the death. The turf war over a lucrative passageway to the United States reportedly claimed over one hundred lives, though no official headcount is available, as observers bemoan the lack of official presence–the local government as well as the army.
But what happened some eight hundred miles to the west on Saturday in Ciudad Juarez, when three U.S. consulate workers–two of them U.S. citizens–were killed in their cars in broad daylight wasn’t likely masterminded by drug cartel leaders. Such assassinations would be bad for cross-border business. Instead, this first case of serious violence against U.S. citizens in the “war on narcotraffickers” waged by President Felipe Calderon’s administration was probably committed by one of Ciudad Juarez’s gangs. Initial intelligence points to the Aztecas, a local gang of hitmen who have worked with “La Linea,” the enforcement arm of the Juarez cartel, which was also implicated in the January 31 massacre of sixteen youths at a birthday party.
In places like Ciudad Juarez, the prevalent depiction of a battle between highly organized and disciplined drug cartels is misleading. Instead, these “organizations” are sprawling networks full of freelancers who might work one day for a cartel, the next on their own or with a local gang. Some of the violence of recent years is between street toughs and gangs, often resolving local turf wars. This growing problem, while fueled by the money and guns associated with the drug trade, is distinct from the presence of multinational criminal drug-trafficking organizations.
Ciudad Juarez today presents a bleak picture. City infrastructure and manpower are overwhelmed; the dominant maquila factories offer only low-wage labor; and over 40 percent of the city’s youths are neither in school nor lawfully employed. Exclusion from the hope of joining Mexico’s developing middle class along with weak control mechanisms mean disaffected youth coalesce around an alternative source of social “status”–urban gangs.
In the aftermath of the shooting, President Obama vowed to continue to work with the Calderon government “to break the power of the drug trafficking organizations that operate in Mexico and far too often target and kill the innocent.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton vowed to “ensure that the perpetrators . . . are brought to justice,” reasserting that “this is a responsibility we must shoulder together, particularly in border communities where strong bonds of history, culture, and common interest bind the Mexican and the American people closely together.”
The United States should support Mexico during this moment–as the events of the past few weeks and this weekend show how closely tied Mexico’s stability and safety are to our own. Yes, weapons and equipment are needed for Mexico’s police forces–particularly at the local level where beat cops often patrol without bulletproof vests and in rundown squad cars. Many are even required to buy their own bullets.
But it is not just more gun power that Mexico needs. Instead, it is a functioning police and court system, a better and more open education system, and programs for early intervention, and professional development for at-risk youth. Partnerships between the United States and a wide range of agencies and stake holders at Mexico’s federal, state, and, most importantly, local levels will be vital for the coordination and pooling of resources and expertise.
This broader challenge of reknitting Mexico’s social fabric in places such as Ciudad Juarez is what Mexico struggles most with today. In light of the weekend violence, the United States should prioritize efforts that will assist Mexico in pushing through the changes that will actually matter, changing today’s violent dynamic for the long term.
Executive Summary
The United States has always seen Brazil as a significant regional powerhouse, but its perceived importance has risen in the last decade. Due to Brazil’s economic strength, its hemispheric leadership, and its growing geostrategic role through multilateral international forums, it has become a vital player in both regional and global politics across numerous dimensions. While US recognition of Brazil’s political and economic emergence brought the question of how Washington should manage relations with Brasilia to the fore, the ability to translate this new awareness into concrete bilateral policies and partnerships remains difficult. Whether the US and Brazil will be willing and able to form a ‘special relationship’ remains unclear.
Introduction
In the last century, the US has viewed Brazil as an important nation on the world stage – based on the sheer size of its territory, economy, and population, as well as its shared Western values. At times, the US has pushed for a ‘special relationship’ with Brazil, recognizing its importance for hemispheric and global stability. During World War II, the US promised support for Brazil’s development agenda and, in exchange, Brazil became the only Latin American nation to send troops to Europe’s battlefields. Although the pledged alliance faded after the war, throughout the 1950s Brazil largely supported US Cold War policies, if at somewhat of a distance. This support continued under Brazil’s military government in the 1960s. During the 1970s the US – especially Henry Kissinger – tried to reaffirm the ‘special relationship’ between the two nations, envisioning greater consultation and cooperation on an array of issues. These efforts were scuttled by a Carter administration more concerned with Brazil’s equivocal position on human rights and nuclear nonproliferation. These differences led not to conflict, but to detachment between the two governments.
By the 1980s, relations tilted further toward tensions and away from commonalities. The US disapproved of Brazilian trade policies and of its hardline stance when negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other creditors in the wake of the debt crisis. As the largest of all Third World debtors, Brazil repeatedly refused to pay interest on its arrears, threatening the deals US banks were negotiating with other nations. Newly democratic Brazil and the United States were also at odds over US military involvement in Central America.
By the 1990s, the debt crisis was resolved, and Brazil again became a welcome partner for the United States in the evolving post-Cold War world. Even if few concrete actions were taken, Presidents Cardoso and Clinton agreed on many matters. Some progress was made in the realm of democracy. Both the US and Brazil supported the consolidation of democracy in the region and leaned on Paraguay to reverse the attempted coup by an army commander against the elected government in 1996. Later, Brazil would prove important in pushing through the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which binds all 34 active member states to strengthen and uphold democratic institutions in the hemisphere.
Yet, as globalization became the driver behind much of US foreign policy, trade again became a sticking point between the two nations. In particular, Brazil’s reluctance to fully support the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) frustrated the Clinton administration and thwarted a closer relationship.
Generalizing five decades of foreign policy, the US rhetorically recognized Brazil’s importance, but concrete, practical initiatives or partnerships were few. This left little in the way of tangible policy outcomes between the US and Brazil. Instead, the two countries maintained a fairly warm, if distant, status quo, befitting Washington’s viewpoint that Brazil occupied an influential — but not central — role in the world pecking order.
A Turning Point in US-Brazil Relations
The urgency for bilateral relations began to change in the last decade. While blessed with natural resources, an almost 200 million-strong domestic market, and a well diversified economy (with robust agricultural, mining, manufacturing and service sectors), for decades Brazil suffered from high inflation, exchange rate instability, and low growth. This chronic economic instability meant that while viewed as geographically and geostrategically important, Brazil was seen by many in Washington, to quote General Charles de Gaulle, as ‘not a serious country’.
These reservations began to fade with the rise of Brazil’s economy. Anchored by the 1994 Plan Real, Brazil finally tamed its historically high inflation through solid macroeconomic and monetary policies and embarked on a process of privatization and other economic reforms. Put in place by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, these initiatives were adopted and deepened by his leftist successor and current president Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva.
By 2001, Brazil’s ascent was recognized by the financial markets. Banking giant Goldman Sachs named it one of the countries — alongside Russia, India and China (BRICs) – that could potentially eclipse the G8 in the coming decades. By the mid 2000s, Brazil’s macroeconomic instability seemed fully relegated to the past, and its economy boomed with higher commodity prices and the long awaited expansion of its own middle class.
At the same time, climbing worldwide energy prices and rising concerns over climate change brought Brazil’s biofuel successes and technology to Washington’s attention. Brazil’s biofuel industry dates back to the 1970s when the military government launched an ethanol program mandating a blend of sugar cane ethanol into transportation fuel with the hope of weaning the country off its dependence on imported fossil fuels. The program gained competitive traction by the late 1980s when more than a third of the country’s motor vehicle fleet was running on pure ethanol. In the 1990s the program experienced some growing pains as a 1993 federal law increased the mandate to a 25% ethanol blend, and demand outstripped local supply. The later technological breakthrough of flex-fuel vehicles restored widespread confidence (and investment) in ethanol, allowing motorists to switch to any blend of gasoline and ethanol at anytime.
By the turn of the 21st century, Brazil boasted the most efficient biofuel production in the world, with volumes rivaling those of the United States, and vast expanses of pasture land ready for planting more sugar cane. In February 2008, the market share of ethanol surpassed that of traditional gasoline at Brazilian pumps, proving the market viability of alternative fuels in one of the world’s largest economies. Add to this the recent discovery of significant oil fields off its coast and Brazil’s image as a global energy leader was secured.
Politically, the United States came to see Brazil’s well-grounded democracy and President Lula’s centrist even-handedness – particularly in comparison to some of its neighbors such as Venezuela – as important for US interests in the hemisphere. In addition, Presidents George W. Bush and Lula seemed to genuinely like each other, encouraging greater efforts to work together.
For Washington, Brazil’s rise came at a propitious time, one of changing policies and priorities. As the Bush administration took on two wars abroad, little bandwidth remained for policing its own hemisphere, despite what many saw as worrisome political shifts in the Andean region. The White House hoped that Brazil, as an important stakeholder and leader, would also take on the responsibility to push for stability and democracy in South America. During his visit in 2005, George W. Bush recognized Brazil as a ‘leader — …exercising its leadership across the globe’ and reassured Lula that as he ‘works for a better tomorrow, Brazil must know (it has) a strong partner in the United States’.
The US View Today
The events of the last few years and a change in the US administration make Brazil perhaps even more important than ever for US foreign policy. After the worldwide financial meltdown, the relative success of Brazil, China, and other developing economies has definitively shifted the multilateral center of global financial agreements from the G8 to the G20. This gives Brazil a permanent seat going forward in all major global macroeconomic discussions, where it has already become a vital voice in the North-South dialogue.
With climate change a priority for the Obama administration, Brazil’s perceived importance has grown, both on account of its leadership in alternative energy and its fight against deforestation. Brazil already boasts one of the most eco-friendly energy matrices in the world, with 46% of primary energy coming from renewable energies, far above the world average of 8%. In addition, as the majority owner of the planet’s largest rainforest, the Amazon, Brazil will play perhaps the central role in slowing worldwide deforestation, the leading cause of carbon emissions, ahead of the global transportation network.
While still not given as much airtime in Washington as many of its BRIC partners – China in particular – Brazil is seen as an emerging power that the United States can work with, be it on issues of global financial stability, climate change, reform of multilateral institutions (e.g.: the UN, G20, WTO, IMF) or regional security, stability and development.
Stumbling to Translate Interest into Policy
For all these reasons, many in Washington are calling yet again for a new special relationship with Brazil. While this is progress, significant limitations exist to translating growing US interest in Brazil as an emerging power into concrete policies.
On a practical level, the US-Latin America policy community has historically been biased toward Spanish-speaking Latin America. Few in Washington know Brazil well or speak Portuguese. The lack of a dedicated group of experts – both inside and outside of government – limits the constant pressure needed to keep Brazil firmly on the US foreign policy agenda. Adding to this, due to US domestic political battles it took nearly a year for President Obama to confirm his new Ambassador to Brazil. To date, this gap has severely hampered the administration’s ability to create a more dynamic engagement with Brazil.
Beyond these logistical challenges, it is still unclear how best to promote the two countries’ common interests. While they share many concerns in principle, priorities and policies are often not aligned, and at times even in conflict. In the realm of security, the United States prioritizes counterterrorism, which sits low on the list of Brazilian concerns. Regarding drug trafficking, US counter-narcotics assistance to the region often focuses on military responses, while Brazil has tended toward policing and law enforcement solutions. Add to this long-standing suspicion over US military involvement in the region, which recently resurfaced with the Colombian base agreement that granted the US military access to seven Colombian bases to combat drug trafficking and the guerrillas, or US concerns about Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s official visit to Brasilia in November 2009, and these differences may make it difficult to find a middle ground for deeper partnership around security issues in the hemisphere – while highlighting the need for Washington to more openly communicate with its regional partners.
The debate over free trade poses similar dilemmas. While both the US and Brazil rhetorically support the expansion of global free trade through the World Trade Organization’s Doha round and other mechanisms, their fundamental interests often diverge. Brazil wants the reduction and/or elimination of extensive US agricultural subsidies and protections, as well as tariffs on products such as ethanol. The vagaries of US domestic politics will make it difficult to deliver on these demands. The US, in turn, is suspicious of Brazilian protection of its industrial sector, and of what it sees as a weak intellectual property rights regime, and hopes Brazil is willing to change its position on services and market access.
Finally, assuming that Washington stays focused on developing and deepening its relationship with Brazil (a big assumption), it is unclear whether Brazil actually aspires to closer relations with the United States. It might benefit Brazil to keep the northern behemoth at arm’s length, particularly given the role the United States likely envisions for Brazil as an active regional ‘stakeholder’, shouldering greater responsibilities in the hemisphere and acting in US interests.
Conclusion
In recent years, the US view of Brazil has likely changed permanently, recognizing the nation’s importance for regional and world order. Brazil is finally seen by the United States as a genuine emerging power. The enhanced strategic dialogue and cooperative steps taken in recent years in light of this recognition has benefited both countries. Nevertheless, many areas of disengagement and even conflict remain. Whether the newly invoked ‘special relationship’ will be more multifaceted and long-lasting this time than on previous attempts remains to be seen.
Recommendations
• Brazil’s rise as an economic and global emerging power has finally been recognized by the US. To effectively leverage this interest, Washington needs to strengthen the policy community dedicated to Brazil – perhaps separately from Spanish-speaking Latin America, thus reflecting its emerging power status – in order to ensure more thorough and consistent attention to US-Brazil relations.
• Despite the potential, an ambitious ‘special relationship’ may be difficult to achieve. Too many differences in policies and priorities remain, particularly in the areas of security and trade. This is most evident in the context of regional leadership and a broader vision for the Americas.
• Bilateral relations should focus on a more permanent dialogue across multiple issue areas, thus converting growing areas of interest into concrete action and policy on a bilateral and multilateral level.
• The United States and Brazil should identify clear issues and strategies of mutual interest to start deepening the bilateral partnership and multilateral engagement. Energy and climate change, as well as global financial stability, are good starting points.
• The biofuel industry and associated technology development is an area of mutual interest that satisfies national and multilateral ambitions related to climate change. This is an obvious point of intersection between the US and Brazil where bilateral cooperation would have a global impact.
This piece was first published by the South African Institute of International Affairs and is available to download here
Philip Caputo paints a grim picture of Mexico’s current war on drugs in which appears in the December 2009 issue of The Atlantic. His pessimism reflects more than just skyrocketing murders in places such as Ciudad Juarez, or the seeming inability of the local police forces and courts to get to the bottom of these crimes. His chief concern revolves around Mexico’s military.
Caputo suggests that the military is in cahoots with the drug cartels today, much as they were in the past. Laying out what he can piece together from the few wary interviewees willing to speak to him, he depicts an independent military dismissive of human rights in the best case, and a military turned cartel in the worst. With both the Calderon and the U.S. government pinning their hopes in the war on drugs on this military, either scenario is bad news.
However corrupt the military is today, there is a fundamental difference from the earlier parallels he poses, and these differences matter for Mexico’s future. In the 1980s the secretary of defense was found to be working with no less than three drug cartels, and in the 1990s Mexico’s “drug czar” was discovered to be on the payroll of the Juarez cartel. But these incidences were part of a larger systematic relationship between drug traffickers and the long-standing ruling political party, the PRI. The military’s past drug ties can’t be seen in isolation from an organized system of control and enrichment constructed by the PRI that also encompassed the police, courts, and politicians.
Today, it isn’t that corruption has ended. But it is no longer as centralized and coordinated as in the past. Democratization opened up not just the political system to different political parties, but also the illicit economy – effectively ending the unwritten contracts that existed for years between the PRI and particular drug traffickers.
What this means is that corruption in the military today is more autonomous than in the past – not linked to a larger system, not controlled or checked by any political party, and perhaps not coming from the top of the chain of command. For some, this may be even worse news – well armed forces with no master. But, this shift may also mean that it is now much more possible to attack corruption – whether in the military or other parts of the government. With each pocket today no longer part of the larger functioning of an authoritarian system, a focused combination of vetting, training, prosecution, and long-term institution building could yield results. Mexico’s corruption remains a very difficult, but no longer insurmountable problem. And the current democratic political dynamic – forcing politicians to appeal to voters – may increase the chances that the Mexican government goes down a different road.
This better outcome is by no means guaranteed. It will take an incredible amount of work and resources over a long period of time. But the underlying dynamics today are quite different, and they provide Mexico – and the United States –an opportunity so that in ten years another journalist will not be writing a similar “Fall of Mexico” story.
Steep economic decline, rising public insecurity, and the resurgence of swine flu threaten North America today. As U.S. President Barack Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper head to Guadalajara, Mexico to meet with President Felipe Calderon, the agenda looks quite difficult. Add to this the equivocal support within the U.S. government for free trade, and the outlook for this summit looks grim. Yet now more than ever we need to appreciate the real lessons of NAFTA, and focus on our own neighborhood. All three countries will benefit from working together rather than moving apart.
Often maligned in all three countries, NAFTA has, on balance, benefited the region. By creating one of the largest trading blocks in the world, this trade agreement not only tripled regional trade and generated an estimated 40 million new jobs during its first fifteen years, but also helped spur similar agreements world wide. Even as economic recession frightens North American citizens, it is precisely the growth of free trade that will be the basis for economic recovery in all three countries. All efforts should be made to support its progress, resolve underlying disputes, and limit the barriers to economic integration.
Security too is a growing concern for all three North American leaders. While bloodshed so far has been concentrated in Mexico, Canadian and American citizens have also been caught up in the violence and the reach of organized crime and drug networks is apparent throughout the region. President Calderon has made a commitment to radically reduce the power of the drug cartels, but no unilateral solution is possible. The Guadalajara summit provides an opportunity to think creatively about cooperative action to address Mexico’s current challenge. Canada, as well as its NGOs , academic, and corporate communities , has a significant history of supporting democratization processes, fighting crime and corruption, and building institutions in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Lessons learned there could be helpful in dealing with similar issues on a much larger scale in its North American partnerships.
The most vivid recent example of the indelible ties between the North American nations – and the real benefits gained from close cooperation – occurred this last April with the discovery of the H1N1 virus. The spread of this flu respected no boundaries. Luckily, the response too crossed borders. With the initial cases found in Mexico, Canadian scientists first cracked the genetic makeup of the virus. As the virus spread, Canada and the United States sent epidemiologists to Mexico, who worked side by side investigating and controlling the outbreak. The three nations continue to share all data on the virus and its development in an unprecedented manner, and should use this moment to prepare together for the possible return of H1N1 this fall.
Joint programs and collaborative action to address climate change, environmental degradation, and renewable energy initiatives will make faster and deeper progress than individual activity in these areas. Mexico and the US announced in April a bilateral framework on clean energy and climate change. In July Canada announced that it will match US restrictions on greenhouse emissions. Just as NAFTA served as a catalyst for other extensive trade agreements, the US, Canada and Mexico should set the standard for regional cooperation on the global issues of climate change, cooperation in developing renewable energy technologies, and controlling carbon emissions.
Perhaps as important as the substance of trilateral relations going forward is the process. North American summits have suffered in recent years from the perception of exclusivity. As President Obama has done in other realms, it is time to open the process to a broad array of citizens, non-governmental organizations, labor unions, and private sector organizations. The recent Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago gave a strong voice and platform to these groups, as many leaders and their ministers attended a wide variety of events and discussions on regional initiatives with presentations from aboriginal groups, a youth forum, and a regional business forum in addition to the formal plenary summit sessions. A more inclusive process would provide both a broader set of ideas and solutions, as well as greater support for summit outcomes.
As the three leaders head to their summit, they face significant tasks. Yet this is a time to take on the many challenging issues ahead, addressing issues concerning the environment, labor, and energy, and expanding on issues of most pressing concern to all three countries – economic recovery and security most importantly. The intertwining of peoples, businesses, and communities has brought these populations together; it is time the governments caught up. This Trilateral Summit presents an ideal opportunity to start this process.
Co-Authored with Jennifer A. Jeffs, Acting President of the Canadian International Council, and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation
