Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011

In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, economists, investors, and even politicians have pinned their hopes on the major emerging markets as the new engines of global growth. International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde’s recent visit to Latin America (she has also made the rounds in China, Russia, and Japan) demonstrates this increasingly prominent macroeconomic role. Perhaps a first, the multilateral head came to ask for funds, not lay down rules. But for emerging economies to truly drive global growth, the real engine will be the private sector. While less measured than central bank reserves or monetary flows, anecdotal evidence suggests that this too is happening – with foreign direct investment now flowing from emerging to more mature economies.  And it isn’t just China searching for bargains.

A recent example of this worldwide trend includes Mexican-based Grupo Bimbo’s purchase of Sara Lee’s U.S. and European operations for close to $1 billion. The acquisition caps a two decade-long global expansion, buying up brands such as Entenmanns and Thomas’ and establishing plants in places as far flung as Beaverton, Oregon and Fort Worth, Texas. Begun by Spanish immigrants, Grupo Bimbo began with a family cake shop on the outskirts of Mexico City. In the post World War II economic boom the Servitje family expanded into breads, cookies, and candies, delivering their wares first in Mexico City, then throughout Mexico, and now throughout the world. Today Bimbo owns plants in 19 countries,  and is the largest baker in the United States.

Other recent acquisitions – such as Lenovo’s purchase of German electronics supplier Medion and Tata Group’s buyout of Jaguar and Land Rover – show a similar shift. To be sure, U.S. and European capital still pour into emerging economies – even in the midst of the global recession. FDI from developed to emerging economies nearly doubled from 2007 to 2010. It is not just diplomats but also Wall Street and the City of London that are adapting to a multipolar world. Developing countries are investing abroad more than ever, eating into advanced economies share of overall FDI outflows (down from 84 percent in 2007 to 71 percent in 2010). Most of the investment outflows (almost two thirds) go to their emerging market peers. This, perhaps more than other factors, will lead to the touted “rise of the rest.”

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

U.S Air Force worker, helps unload tons of relief aid at Armenia's airport, Colombia (Str Old/Courtesy Reuters).

Last week WOLA released the report “A Cautionary Tale: Plan Colombia’s Lessons for U.S. Policy Toward Mexico and Beyond.” The study is a useful reminder of the real differences between Colombia and Mexico. Unlike Colombia, where security forces fought to assert control over territory left to criminal groups, Mexico has had a strong state presence throughout the country for decades. Whereas violence in Colombia was concentrated in rural areas, in Mexico the highest rates of crime are in population centers and along drug trafficking routes.Their analysis also puts the Colombian experience into historical perspective. The real fight against drug cartels, as opposed to guerrillas and paramilitaries, happened in the 1990s – before Plan Colombia was even on the table. Successes here depended on police work by specialized vetted units, as well as a strong public prosecutor’s office – not sending the military into the streets or hills.

There are a number of good recommendations about how the United States and Mexico can apply these lessons to their joint policy on the drug war going forward.  A few stand out.

For Mexico (and other countries dealing with organized crime):

•             Don’t rely on the military, as it lacks the investigative capacity and the right training to provide public safety to civilians.

•             Measure what matters. Rather than process (e.g. how many arrests or drug kingpins captures) the government should focus on tangible results, such as how many cases are successfully prosecuted, or how much violence and other crimes decline.

For the United States:

•             Take on challenges at home – guns, money, and demand. Since the United States is asking other countries to implement politically difficult policies, policymakers at home should try it themselves – particularly because all these issues feed into the escalating violence Mexico (and other countries) face.

•             Make human rights a top priority, not an afterthought. Do more than just require police and military forces to take classes in human rights, and withhold bilateral security cooperation if standards are not met.

•             Let USAID take the lead in managing security  assistance, not the Department of Defense or even State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, as these are likely to overlook the crucial socioeconomic side of the security problem.

For all involved: protect local populations first. In addition to safeguarding, these governments need to invest in people – protecting them through law enforcement, courts, and social policies, and creating economic alternatives to a life of crime for those that today remain on the margins.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

– Latin Americans are second only to North Americans in terms of social networking — for those that access the Internet, 8 in 10 use social media.

– While broadband access is limited but increasing (expected to surpass 30% by 2014) some 36% of Latin Americans Internet access of some form. And, 90 percent of Latin Americans have cell phones – so the potential to expand is large.

– Facebook claims 100 million Latin American users, led by Brazil, and then  Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and Venezuela.

– Some governments – most notably Colombia – are investing millions to expand Internet use, seeing it as an important driver of economic growth.

Overall it is an interesting and fairly positive technological look at the region. While Latin America falls behind Asia in terms of access to the Internet, the region’s citizens are more socially connected – at least as measured by Facebook, Twitter, and the like. These connections have had and can have broader political and economic impacts than just catching up with family and friends. Social networking has already played big roles in Colombia, with a Facebook-led series of marches against the FARC in 2008 that spread throughout the country (and as far as New York and Chicago), and in Mexico, where twitter updates on drug violence give people vital information the local press and governments are no longer able or willing to provide. Some even see the arrival of social media to Latin America as a great democratizer – helping open up governments (like in the Arab Spring) and media monopolies.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Passengers on a bus pass a vehicle painted with a slogan during an anti-drugs campaign to mark International Anti-Drug Day in Jakarta (Dadang Tri/Courtesy Reuters).

The “drug war” strategy of the last four decades revolves primarily around  supply side measures. Whether  eradication, interdiction, or arrests, it fixates on stopping the seemingly endless flow of drugs and cash across U.S. borders. But there is obviously another side to the equation – U.S. demand. The United States is the largest consumer of drugs across the globe (though there are signs that the cocaine and marijuana markets in Europe and the developing world are catching up) with 1 in every 7 Americans having tried an illegal substance. Marijuana accounts for the vast majority of that consumption, followed by prescription drugs and cocaine.

Three basic strategies underlie the traditional approach to dealing with drug abuse at home: prevention, treatment and enforcement. Prevention programs seek to stop substance abuse by educating primarily schoolchildren on the dangers of narcotics. Even with their memorable slogans (such as Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaign or Drug Abuse Resistance Education’s “D.A.R.E. to resist drugs and violence”) the results have been  disappointing. A number of studies show these efforts – costing millions of dollars – may slightly slow marijuana experimentation among teens.

Treatment programs, particularly when focused on rehab for heavy drug users, are by far the most cost effective U.S. policy. For every million dollars spent, these programs reduce lifetime cocaine consumption by 100 grams.This may not seem like a lot, but it is more than three times as effective as preventive programs and punitive measures. Investing in treatment also yields impressive returns in terms of public safety, as every dollar spent on substance abuse rehabilitation reduces  the costs of associated crime by an estimated seven dollars. Still, soaring dropout rates – even within mandatory programs — question the long-term benefits of formal treatment for the relatively few drug addicts who choose to participate.

A final major element of demand side in the United States has been enforcement, namely incarceration of those selling and using drugs. From 1972-2002, the number of drug offenders behind bars increased twelve-fold (accounting for about half of the total growth of the federal prison population). This has hit African American communities the hardest, as 1 in every 3 black males goes to prison at some point in his life (1 in 15 black adults are currently behind bars). This is at least in part because the punishments for crack are harsher than those for powder cocaine, leading to longer sentences for black vs. white offenders. This style of stepped up enforcement doesn’t seem to have changed the fundamental drug markets, at least not for the better. Cocaine and heroin prices have hit all-time lows, indicating  greater availability, while purity has increased by more than half in recent years. Methamphetamine rose from near obscurity in the early nineties to become the drug of choice for roughly 1.5 million Americans today.

Latin American officials such as presidents Felipe Calderon of Mexico and Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia are increasingly calling on the United States to do more to reduce consumption, and a recent report co-authored by former President of Brazil Fernando Henrique Cardoso urged a “paradigm shift” in global drug policy to treat “drug addiction as a health issue, reducing drug demand through educational initiatives and legally regulating rather than criminalizing cannabis.” So what should the U.S. government do?

Some experts favor legalizing narcotics, putting an end to drug war once and for all. These advocates maintain that making drugs commercially available will replace illicit markets with formal ones, and thus eliminate the violence of the illegal drug trade. Researchers have found that legalizing marijuana would not necessarily lead to a rise in substance abuse (since those that want to get high today can, at least in many states, do it quite easily), and could slash one fifth of Mexican cartels’ profits. Ending the prohibition on harder drugs may not have the same effect, as legalization could prompt more consumption of cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine (because current enforcement against these drugs is more effective than for marijuana). To appreciate the potential costs of a surge in use, one need only to look at the double-edged consequences of ending the prohibition against alcohol. While the likes of Al Capone are history, Americans today are four times more likely to abuse alcohol than all illicit drugs combined. Alcohol-abusers are also more prone to break the law, as more than half of the current prison population committed their crimes drunk.

Other experts (especially those at RAND corp.) suggest we focus our anti-drug resources on enforcement that prioritizes harm reduction. The idea here is not to lock people up indiscriminately, but to go after the most violent drug traffickers and retail dealers. While this may not alter the availability and price of drugs (current policies haven’t done this either), it would they suggest reduce the effects on the larger community and population – whether here in the United States or in places such as Mexico.

For the past three decades Washington has spent the bulk (an average of two thirds) of anti-drug resources on supply side solutions. Even as the U.S. drug control budget expanded by more than 50 percent in recent years, expenditures for demand side policies remained stagnant, growing less than one percent per year over the past decade. Realizing that there is no easy solution on either side of the border, it is time to rethink these strategies, keeping in mind the brief successes and unfortunate failures of the last four decades.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

U.S. Republican presidential candidate Michele Bachmann gestures beside Mitt Romney during the Republican presidential debate in Ames (Courtesy Reuters).

As primary election season gets underway, the Republican hopefuls have had little to say about Latin America. But there have been a few hints though from the leading candidates as to what they see when they look south – particularly with regard to Mexico.

Michele Bachmann is the most cut and dry so far. She opposes immigration and the legalization of undocumented migrants, and calls for the deployment of troops in south Texas. The Minnesota congresswoman wants to wall the border off completely, saying “As president of the United States, every mile, every yard, every foot, every inch will be covered on that southern border.” When Bachmann felt the need to strengthen her foreign policy chops last spring, she flew to Colombia and Mexico with the House Intelligence Committee – her first trip abroad to a country other than Israel (which she has visited multiple times courtesy of pro-Israel interest groups). Upon returning, she expressed strong support for the drug war.

Mitt Romney and Rick Perry have more nuanced takes – in part because they have more extensive experience in and with the region. Romney has a long history working in Latin America, as his firm Bain Capital invested extensively in Central and South America. On the campaign trail, he lauds those governments with business friendly policies, pointedly contrasting them to those with less open markets (e.g. Venezuela and Cuba).

During the 2008 electoral race Romney became increasingly tough on immigration , and even tougher on border enforcement, running ads attacking John McCain for his “soft” stances. His hardened views have caused somewhat of a family drama as many of his relatives (no, not from the Huntsman branch) live in northern Mexico and have openly criticized him, saying that “I don’t think Mitt understands the causes of illegal immigration.”

Rick Perry, the newest addition to the field and the now front-runner has little interest in Latin America, but does have a long history with Mexico. On immigration, the Texas governor is considerably more progressive than many of his peers.  Perry’s record suggests that he supports the DREAM act and similar reforms, given that he approved a law allowing undocumented high school graduates in Texas to pay state tuition. He has even thrown his weight behind a guest worker program for Texas.

But Perry is increasingly vocal and tough on border security. Among the most outspoken critics of Obama’s border policy, he has repeatedly raised alarm bells about violence spilling over from Mexico into the lone star state, and asked for the deployment of military troops and predator drone in response. Unlike Bachmann, Perry has remained firmly opposed to the border fence, calling the idea “ridiculous on its face.”

This early in the season, most candidates and campaigns are focused on domestic issues. Those foreign policy issues at the forefront – Afghanistan, Libya, or Syria – aren’t necessarily a club Latin American nations would want to join. But many do bemoan the lack of interest and understanding of the rest of the Western Hemisphere by these presidential hopefuls.

Latin America should  in fact matter more. The region is among the U.S. fastest growing trading partners, creating American jobs with each purchase. With over half a trillion dollars worth of goods going back and forth, Latin America is second only to Asia – and growing much faster – in terms of total trade with the United States. Its largest nations play important roles in multilateral organizations from the G20 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), helping the United States and others resolve difficult global challenges. And finally, according to the latest census 50 million Americans – 1/6 of the population – are descendants of these nations, many still with close ties to their original homes. Ignoring Latin America or alienating Latin Americans only adds up to a missed opportunity, both for the Republican Party and for the country.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents usher Fabio Ochoa, Colombian drug kingpin, to an awaiting vehicle following his extradition from Colombia to Florida, September 8, 2001(Courtesy Reuters).

One of the heralded lessons of Colombia’s fight against drug cartels is that fragmentation reduces violence. The vertical command structures of the famed Medellín and Cali cartels were legendary. Their pseudo-celebrity leaders lived extravagantly, socialized widely, and often died violently. They spent billions to buy off politicians, judges, and business leaders, and they spent more to assassinate adversaries they couldn’t buy, chasing their targets not just all over Colombia but the world. The country became, for a time, the most violent place on earth, the nationwide homicide rate topping 80 per 100,000 in 1991.

But a couple of decades later, the drastic levels of violence have fallen, the motorcycle assassins disappeared, the car bombs ended. The conventional story goes something like this: the killing first of Pablo Escobar and then the arrest and conviction of the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers fragmented the cartels and their command structures. From the ruins of the once centralized cartels sprang smaller – and less vicious – criminal organizations. While cocaine production and distribution (which hasn’t changed much) continued, violence fell.

A U.S. law enforcement official once told me that their antidrug strategy in Mexico was first to go after the wolves (the highest level cartel leaders), then go after the snakes (the next level down), and then clean up the remaining rats. The odd animal analogy aside, this strategy seems straight out of Colombia’s playbook.

Mexico has, in fact, done this fairly successfully. Of the 37 thugs on its Most Wanted list, 21 are either behind bars or six feet underground. Where once U.S. and Mexican officials cited four main criminal organizations, today the number has at least doubled, complemented by the rise of many smaller operations and local gangs. But as the Mexican cartels multiplied, violence escalated to all time highs.

Why the difference? Obviously Mexico and Colombia have different histories, and different security problems, so the reasons for divergent outcomes are multiple and complex. Perhaps one issue — seemingly forgotten in the transfer of “lessons learned” —is the direct targeting of the Colombian government by its cartels.  In the early 1990s, at the peak of the violence, one of the biggest points of contention was Colombia’s extradition law. The drug cartels wrote open letters offering to stop the car bombs and assassinations, to retire from the drug business, to even pay off the national debt if extradition to the United States was taken off the table. Denied, the cartels tried to lay down their own version of the law on the nation. Fighting back, Colombian law enforcement slowly gained the advantage, and as these groups fragmented, violence declined.

In Mexico, by contrast, the cartels are not openly and directly confronting the state. Sure, they threaten, co-opt and even increasingly kill local and state police and elected representatives. But their open letters –narcomantas hung over important intersections– are primarily directed to their drug trafficking rivals, or to local political alignments. They don’t often explicitly challenge the national government, much less launch violent “campaigns” against it. Even the most high-profile recent killings – for instance DEA officer Jaime Zapata in San Luis Potosi, the brother of former Chihuahua Attorney General Mario Gonzalez or PRI gubernatorial candidate in Tamaulipas Rodolfo Torre Cantú— the assassinations don’t seem to have come from the top. If the violence isn’t ordered from on high (as it was in Colombia), then taking out the top echelons of the cartels won’t end it. Furthermore, if most of the bloodshed is between the criminals themselves, going after the heads will just escalate the cycle, as more and more mid-level criminals fight it out for control of the remaining business (catching innocent civilians and law enforcement officials in their wake). 

This suggests Mexico should rethink its kingpin strategy — or at least complement it with other approaches. There are many other models out there to consider – the “broken windows” approach (perhaps the other extreme, as it focuses instead on smaller quality of life crimes before building up to the big organized crime rings); community policing models, used to good effect in U.S. cities such as Boston, Los Angeles, New Haven, and elsewhere; or a territorial approach, which integrates neighborhood level policing with other public services, and is already being used in the historic center of Mexico City. These methods may work to raise the social, in addition to the material costs of violence for the criminals.

As Mexico debates the right policy mix in the coming year under Calderón and beyond next July’s presidential elections, the big missing question is how to get Mexican society– the one weapon the cartels can’t match – involved. So far, citizens have been relegated to the status of “clients” or victims. Opening up the security policy to analysis and debate is an important first step.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Suspects wait at the Supreme Court in Guatemala City (Jorge Lopez/Courtesy Reuters).

The conventional Guatemalan security story is one of a country riddled with violence, where law enforcement institutions are in shambles and corruption reaches the highest levels of government. Its homicide rate triples that of Mexico, and its notoriously weak rule of law system lets more than 99 percent of criminals walk free. The growing presence of Mexican and Colombian cartels, pushed out of their home countries due to intensive antidrug campaigns, has only made matters worse. As the Zetas in particular move into the northern provinces, observers sound alarm bells about Guatemala’s possible descent into a “narco-state”.

Still, it may be too early to give up on Guatemala. Since the capture of top drug-smuggler Juan Alberto Ortiz-López, alias ‘el Chamalé’, in late March of this year, Guatemalan officials have arrested a number of local gang leaders, some with close ties to the Zetas. Within days of folk singer Facundo Cabral’s murder this month, the authorities announced the arrest of three suspects, presenting a slideshow with a play-by-play rundown of the events.  The swift response became a point of pride for Guatemalans accustomed to sluggish, if any, justice.

The UN International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) can take much of the credit for these improvements. Set up in 2007, the commission has been an enormous boost to law enforcement’s (still limited) capacity; assisting in high-profile investigations and promoting important reforms, notably witness protection and plea bargaining laws. It works in conjunction with domestic security agencies, employing a “learning by doing” model that teaches investigative methods to Guatemalan prosecutors on the job. Not least of all, CICIG played an instrumental role in the appointment of current Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz, who has had a markedly positive impact on the public prosecutor’s office.

But Paz y Paz and her fellow reformers face an uphill battle. Guatemalans are among the most mistrustful of judicial institutions across Latin America, and the most skeptical of democracy overall. Winning the public’s trust in the justice system requires sustained improvements, not just sporadic high-profile successes. The lack of funding for security poses another major challenge – last year the government cut the public prosecutor’s budget by a quarter. More generally, Guatemala’s tax revenue is the lowest in the region at around 10 percent of GDP (its Central American neighbors are not much better, with this part of the region ranking below the rest of the continent and even Sub-Saharan Africa in tax collection).

The upcoming elections may also stall progress. The presidential frontrunner, Otto Pérez-Molina, is a retired army general with a questionable human rights record and a preference for iron fist, hard-line security policies. While he has promised to respect political appointees’ mandates, many fear that if elected he would replace Paz y Paz and even block the continuation of CICIG’s work beyond its current 2013 deadline. While outsourcing justice is not a long-term solution, banishing the UN commission before it has completed its investigations and trials will handicap efforts to strengthen the rule of law.

For a place that many have already labeled a failed state, the recent advances in security are a ray of hope. A committed Attorney General and external commission have shown that it is possible to make inroads combating organized crime and Guatemala’s pervasive culture of impunity. But to sustain and further these small islands of progress, other branches of government and citizens more generally will have to do their part. The very wealthy will have to pay higher taxes to underpin public security (a point stressed by Hillary Clinton during last month’s Central American security conference). The next president may have to forgo partisan calculations and bolster the justice system, starting with keeping the effective Paz y Paz as chief prosecutor. These are by no means easy steps to take. They require personal sacrifices and the setting aside of self interest for the public good of a stronger state. But if Guatemalans truly want a more stable and secure future, they will have to start making these tough choices. Instead of writing Guatemala off as a lost cause, we should applaud the work of a few courageous reformers and encourage the rest of the country to follow their lead.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Peru's new President Ollanta Humala is sworn in to office in Congress in Lima (Mariana Bazo/Courtesy Reuters).

As President Ollanta Humala assumes office today, it looks as if he has chosen to emulate Lula rather than Chávez. His cabinet is full of moderates, and some even see it as leaning center-right. While growth is expected to continue at about 6 percent, the new administration will face many challenges, in particular security and the increasing presence of transnational crime, as well as high levels of inequality.

This week the Obama administration released a new directive on combating transnational organized crime (TOC). Among its 56 “priority actions” are new and deepened efforts to stop the money laundering and flows supporting these crime networks. New tools include barring TOC members entry into the U.S., freezing assets and other financial sanctions. The document also expands the role of the Justice Department and FBI in investigating transnational crime more generally. Still, many of the nearly five dozen items seem little more than aspirations– such as the commitment to “stop the illicit flow from the United States of weapons.” But generally, this revamped strategy and more focused game plan is welcome.

Finally William Rempel’s new book, At the Devil’s Table, showcases the role one individual can play in the fight against drug cartels. This gripping read chronicles the life of Jorge Salcedo, a Colombian engineer that rose to be head of security for Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, a godfather of the Cali cartel during its heyday. The tale tells the true story of Salcedo’s introduction to crime, his rise within one of the most powerful drug cartels in the world, and the actions he ultimately took to help bring it down. It shows the power of one courageous individual, but also the challenges of going it alone in the belly of the criminal underworld. While the Cali cartel is now gone, others have willingly taken its place, and Colombian coca and cocaine continue unimpeded.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

A girl stands in front of a mural as she waits for Spain's King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia for the inauguration of a public library in a suburb of Medellin (Jose Gomez/Courtesy Reuters).

I wrote this op-ed for Bloomberg Views on the lessons for Mexico from Colombia’s wealth tax.

In 2002, strife-torn Colombia took a bold step that paved the way for vastly improved public safety. Now Mexico is struggling to subdue drug wars that have killed almost 40,000 people during President Felipe Calderon’s tenure. It’s time to try the Colombian remedy.

Part of Colombia’s success can be traced to Plan Colombia, the multibillion-dollar U.S. assistance package. That plan concentrated on beefing up military capacity, professionalizing the police and reforming Colombia’s judicial system. The desperately needed money and strategy helped pull Colombia back from the brink of chaos.

Just as important — and much less heralded — is a transformation within Colombia. The country’s privileged rallied together, not just to demand better security but also to shoulder responsibility. In 2002, newly inaugurated President Alvaro Uribe and Colombia’s elites negotiated a wealth tax. In the decade since, the tax has raised nearly a billion dollars annually for security. It also changed the nature of the fight, throwing the establishment’s weight behind the government in the battle for public safety. More than foreign security aid, this is what Mexico needs today: an investment by Mexico’s elites in the safety and well-being of all its citizens.

Click here for the full story.

Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.