Presidents Chavez of Venezuela, Fernandez of Argentina and Rousseff of Brazil chat while posing for a family photo during the CELAC summit in Caracas (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Courtesy Reuters).
As 2011 comes to an end, I want to reflect on just a few trends affecting the region over the course of the past year. While these developments certainly have long histories, they have all become more noticeable – and noteworthy – in 2011. To keep it interesting, I will be posting one trend a day for the rest of this week, so check back — and let me know what you’d add to the list in the comments or via my twitter account (@latintelligence).
This hasn’t been a good year health-wise for Latin American leaders. Cristina Kirchner’s recent diagnosis of thyroid cancer is just the latest. The most mysterious, and politically game-changing health challenge is that of Hugo Chávez. Officially, Cuban doctors removed a reportedly “aggressive” pelvic tumor in June, and since then he has undergone chemotherapy and steroid treatment. Though he claims to have conquered the disease, others (including his former doctor) say he may not live more than two years.
Last year, Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and spent four months in chemotherapy and in and out of hospitals. According to the most recent tests, his cancer is in remission. In Brazil, President Dilma Rousseff continues some treatment for lymphatic cancer (discovered during her 2010 presidential campaign) and former President and still political heavyweight Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has just begun his final round of chemo for throat cancer (diagnosed in October). Pictures of the famously bearded leader now show him hairless, though still beaming. There were also rumors circulating that Evo Morales had a cancerous tumor in his nose, though this was never proven.
This type of illness has idiosyncratic, but nevertheless real effects on politics. It can weaken a politician due to their physical absence from the public limelight as well as political backroom negotiations. Lula’s Worker’s Party (PT) will sorely miss his active leadership, especially in the run up to local elections in 2012. Kirchner is expected to make a quick recovery after surgery, though she will turn power over to her Vice President Amado Boudou (a close political confidant) for three weeks in January. It remains to be seen whether these absences will make a significant mark on either country’s internal politics.
Javier Corrales, a political scientist at Amherst, has written about a different role for illness, and its potential to strengthen rather than diminish the political patient. Calling it “participatory cancer” he chronicles Chávez’s attempts to turn his illness from a disadvantage to an electoral strength. By brandishing cancer and his fight as an electoral gimmick, the Venezuelan leader distracts voters from more serious problems (such as a floundering economy and rising crime).
While continuing to watch the political fallout, let’s hope the new year brings health to all.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
A view of the San Alberto gas plant (David Mercado/Courtesy Reuters).
Last December, Argentina’s major oil and gas company YPF discovered some 4.5 trillion cubic feet of unconventional gas in the southwest province of Neuquén. The find has the potential to totally transform the country’s (and the region’s) energy future. It pushes Argentina’s shale gas reserves to 774 trillion cubic feet — making it the third largest provider of natural gas in the world, after the United States and China. If exploited it would easily cover domestic demand for gas for the foreseeable future and end the recurring and unpopular gas crises that force factories to shut down at times during the winter months. Argentina would become energy self-sufficient for the first time in nearly a decade.
But there are challenges to get the gas out of the ground. First, Argentina’s shortage of water may stand in the way of accessing natural gas reserves. The process of drilling to extract shale gas uses up to 6 million gallons of water per day for every well drilled, and experts say it will take 38 billion gallons of water to capture natural gas trapped underneath the Vaca Muerta, or “Dead Cow” basin.
Another challenge is the government’s oil and gas pricing regime, which has been a major disincentive to investment in recent years. Heavy regulations hold prices down to $2.00-$2.50 per cubic foot of regulated gas — nowhere near the breakeven price needed to make development worthwhile. Argentina has set up a two-tier system under its “Gas Plus” program — allowing gas produced by new investment to be sold at much higher prices – in some cases more than double the rate in the domestic market. This has brought in more than a billion dollars from the likes of Exxon, AES and Apache. But these differential prices show how transitory Argentine rules can be. To attract the huge amounts of capital needed to truly develop these gas finds in the coming years, the Argentine government will have to convince investors that the rules won’t change with the political winds.
If this happens, it will transform regional gas markets. Bolivia will be the biggest loser. As the region’s current top energy provider, its economy today depends on fueling neighboring Argentina and Brazil. By developing its own gas reserves, Argentina takes away not just a vital customer but also potential foreign direct investment – leaving Bolivia’s economic development model in jeopardy.
Another — much more indirect — loser is Mexico. The fact that investors are more interested in Argentina — known for playing fast and loose with property rights and contracts — than in Mexico, which is ranked Latin America’s most business friendly economy, shows how hamstrung Mexico’s energy sector remains. Without further changes to the system to open up outside funding for exploration and production projects, Mexico risks becoming a spectator on the energy sidelines, with huge ramifications for its overall economy as a result.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Andean protesters shout slogans against the government in Lima (Enrique Castro-Mendivil/Courtesy Reuters).
Last month Peruvian President Ollanta Humala signed the popular consultation law, approved unanimously by Congress in August. This new law will require all public and private investors to consult local indigenous groups if and when their activities may affect their communities or ancestral lands. This is an important democratic step forward, reaching out to citizens who have for years been left out of the political process. In Latin America more broadly, incorporating indigenous communities into politics is a key challenge for consolidating democracy. But these types of laws also have their dangers, specifically potentially negative effects on investment and economic growth. Peru is only the latest of the Andean countries to take on the so-called “indigenous question” — trying to balance economic development with greater social inclusion.
Of its neighbors, Colombia has the longest history and the best track record. It incorporated indigenous consultation into the 1991 Constitution, and then created a Division of Indigenous Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior, as well as offices of indigenous affairs within each of its military commands. To be sure, things haven’t gone perfectly – for instance some indigenous groups accuse President Santos of ignoring their interests in the latest national development plan. But overall Colombia has been successful, enabling a greater voice for all of its citizens while also attracting billions in investment in oil production, coal mining, and other industries.
More cautionary tales come from Bolivia and Ecuador. Both nations have large indigenous populations which historically have been socially and politically marginalized, and excluded from the economic benefits of resource extraction — often by foreign companies — taking place on their land. As these groups have increasingly organized and mobilized, their distrust and animosity has led to conflicts, violence, and the fall of more than one democratically elected government.
Current Presidents Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Rafael Correa of Ecuador have both struggled to balance inclusion with economic development. Morales has perhaps gone the farthest in providing a voice for indigenous groups within the new Constitution, but in return has seen foreign investment plummet. Since Morales’s election in 2006 Bolivia’s natural gas output has stagnated, and proven reserves have shrunk by about a third. In Ecuador, Correa began with the backing of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), but is now at odds with the country’s largest indigenous organization, backing away from many of their demands regarding new mining projects.
While Peru’s indigenous communities have yet to organize politically, there is a growing discontent among these masses, which took a toll on the previous government’s popularity and led to several uprisings around natural resources extraction. The most violent of these – known as the “Baguazo” – occurred during the summer of 2009 in the Amazonian province of Bagua, where 22 indigenous protesters and 12 police officers died in clashes over mining projects in the area.
For Peru, it remains to be seen whether Humala can channel these pent up frustrations positively into the political process without scaring off investment. As the Ecuadorean and Bolivian examples show, more than just rhetoric — or leftist credentials — are needed. But if the new government can pull off this delicate balance, it will help support continued fast paced economic growth.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Plans for a $340 million overhaul of Rio de Janeiro's iconic Maracana stadium are among those behind schedule for the World Cup (Sergio Moraes / Courtesy Reuters).
The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) released its report on foreign direct investment (FDI), with generally good news for Latin America. While 2010 investment worldwide was fairly flat (and fell in developed economies), it soared forty percent in the region – reaching nearly $113 billion. Of the just over a trillion in worldwide flows, Latin America captured a tenth of the total (and over twenty percent of that invested in emerging economies).
These investments were divided between natural resources, domestic market players, and outsourcing venues. Within the region the biggest winners were Brazil (nearly doubling to $48.5 billion), followed by Mexico ($17.7 billion) and Chile ($15.1 billion). And, according to ECLAC, the trend is set to continue – it expects FDI to the region to rise a further fifteen to twenty-five percent in 2011.
A few interesting trends jump out of the data. One is the geographic pull of the Southern Cone. While investment in Mexico and Central America increased, the real upswing occurred in South America—almost four times as much. Brazil and Chile gained the most, but Peru, Bolivia and Argentina all saw large inflows. Only in the Caribbean did FDI actually fall.
You also see quite stark differences in the type of investment. In South America nearly a majority of FDI poured into natural resources—oil, gas, copper, iron, and soya. Further north, a greater share of the money went into manufacturing. There the biggest winners were Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic – all countries with free trade agreements with the United States (NAFTA and CAFTA). These trends, if they continue, suggest long-term structural economic differences may develop between the north and the south of the hemisphere.
The report also provides some context for the much-touted (and in some quarters much feared) rise in Chinese investment. It has indeed increased: last year China invested twice as much in Latin America as it did over the previous two decades combined. Directed almost solely at natural resources, it is also geographically concentrated, with most going to just three countries – Brazil, Argentina and Peru.
But the data reveals that China is still just the third largest investor — behind the U.S. and the Netherlands (the latter’s investment bumped up significantly last year due to Heineken’s acquisition of Mexico’s FEMSA brewery). Interestingly, China trails the combined Latin American investment in the region. Taken together, multilatina outlays hit a record $43 billion – almost triple China’s $15 billion contribution. These investments were more apt to go into financial services, retail, and utilities – value-added activities with more positive trickle down effects for the broader economy. This suggests Latin American nations should be more enthusiastic about trade missions from their neighbors than from China.
The report also hints at the hurdles the region continues to face. The proportion of investment in high tech fell far short of its global competitors—only eight percent compared to fifty-two percent among the Asian Tigers—and limited mostly to Brazil and Mexico. The region has a lot to do to upgrade educational systems and its workforce in general to change this balance.
And, with the exception of perhaps some smaller island economies, FDI isn’t going to be the ticket to the big time. It can’t make up for domestic savings and investment. In the end, growth will have to come from home. Nevertheless, these flows can provide a leg up if these nations can translate this investment into productive growth.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
A trader checks a newspaper at the Santiago Stock Exchange (Ivan Alvarado/Courtesy Reuters).
Much is made of ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, a pact backed by Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro to integrate the region based on “21st Century Socialism,” and incorporating neighbors such as Bolivia and Ecuador among others. Over the past five years, Venezuela has spent some $60 billion to back the project. In concrete terms the achievements so far are fairly limited: sponsoring some 75,000 health workers and subsidizing electricity within the participating countries. This has been undoubtedly helpful to hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of individuals, but it is not a comprehensive economic, political, or social model by any means. Instead, many of ALBA’s member countries continue to straddle the ideological fence, remaining open to trade with other regional groupings, as well as with the United States and China.
Substantive integration efforts are in fact taking shape elsewhere in Latin America – just without the fanfare. Several of the region’s fastest growing democracies — Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile — will sign a free trade accord on May 2. Connecting two hundred million people, 10,000 miles of Pacific coastline, and over $1.4 trillion of GDP—triple that of ALBA and rivaling the Brazilian economy—the group aims to ease the flow of goods, capital and people to create a common and more powerful front for exports to Asia. The pact brings together Chile and Peru’s strengths in commodities with Colombia’s energy and Mexico’s services and manufacturing. It should help Colombia, whose free trade agreement with the U.S. remains in limbo, and open up Mexico to finally profit from — instead of just compete with — China.
Additionally, Bogotá, Lima, and Santiago are combining their stock exchanges into the Mercado Integrado Latinoamericano (MILA). MILA will become the largest stock exchange in Latin America, surpassing Brazil’s Bovespa and Mexico’s BMV. The economies of scale should increase liquidity to the region’s expanding – and increasingly diverse — private sector.
With far less rhetoric, these recent efforts will likely transform the way many of the hemisphere’s nations interact with each other in day to day business. It may in fact lead to a new economic model, one based on “21st century markets,” finally enabling the integration Latin American leaders have long sought.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations
With the formation of ALBA, Unasur, IIRSA, and many others, Latin American nations are pushing towards a new era of economic, political, and social integration. But how innovative are these efforts really? Will they differ from the failed attempts of the past? I recently wrote the following article for World Politics Review on the promise and perils of the region’s integration.
The Promise and Perils of South American Integration
Shannon O’Neil
January 12, 2009
World Politics Review
In the 21st century so far, regional integration has been one of the most notable elements of South American foreign relations. Picking up speed in recent years, the continent’s heads of state have enthusiastically met in numerous summits, promising increased political, economic, social, and development cooperation. Across the spectrum, governments are expanding current integration frameworks and entering into new agreements. Expectations are no less grand. As Brazil’s President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva recently stated, “South America, united, will move the board game of power in the world, not for its own benefit, but for everyone’s.” Read the entire article here.
Everyone in Bolivia is focusing on the shift toward “participatory democracy,” from the previous “representative democracy.” Some embrace this change enthusiastically, while others view it warily. What is clear is that the traditional political parties have disintegrated here, as they have in many other countries in the Andean region, including Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
It is also clear that new political parties are unlikely to arise anytime soon. Due to exclusion and corruption, the old system has been completely discredited. The MAS, which backs Evo Morales, is proud of its alternative organizational framework, based on linking various social movements and associations rather than forming a political party.
So where does this leave representation? Bolivia is institutionalizing a cycle which begins with protest marches, followed by negotiations with the government, and then ends in promises/governmental actions. These cycles are not necessarily new, as they played a key role in demand making in recent years. In fact, the inability of the governments of Sanchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa to fulfill promises made during the negotiation phase led in large part to their downfall.
But with the election of Evo Morales, these dynamics have changed in meaning. Rather than arising from the opposition, these protesters and their organizations are now part of the ruling MAS, institutionalizing this protest cycle as the main means of interest intermediation. And, the nature of demands has changed. And rather than focusing on big issues of political and social inclusion, or of national redistribution of resources, these protests tend to focus on specific group or individual needs. For instance, this week the marches in La Paz involved teachers and sellers of used clothes, each wanting an improvement in their own economic situation.
This transformation of interest intermediation – due to the decline in political parties – concentrates power in the Executive branch, and in Evo Morales. Other moves by the government – including the undermining of the judiciary – have added to this effect. What Evo does with this power remains to be seen. It may allow him to address historic injustices and issues by bypassing old elite and interest group issues. But, it may also lead to new patronage networks, inefficiency, corruption, and in the end renewed frustration by those wanting to see real change in Bolivia.
I am in Bolivia this week. In my meetings so far in La Paz, one common theme is the general support for Evo Morales. While there is significant frustration with the government, interviews with representatives from indigenous groups, from the middle class, from academic institutions and foundations, and with foreign diplomats (not to mention taxi drivers), show a general support for Morales and for his position as President. Almost all see him as genuine, as representative, and as capable of negotiating with the various interests within Bolivia.
Instead, people place blame elsewhere. Significant blame is placed on Morales cabinet and on his closest advisors. Many see them as being too radical in some cases, or not radical enough in others (especially on issues of particular interest to each group). They are also blamed for centralizing power. Instead of following through on Evo´s promise of broad participation, many view his closest advisors as making top-down and closed door decisions, much like governments in the past. Some even see the undue influence of foreign advisors, particularly Venezuelan, on government policies.
The continued support for Evo, despite the limits on actual policy changes in the first year and half of his government, questions the alarmist views often seen in the press. While frustrations continue, and marches are frequent through the downtown of the capital, there isn´t a sense here (at least in La Paz), of crisis or real unrest. That said, a few people see this as the lull before the storm, which will occur when the real negotiations happen (or more likely don´t happen in their view) within the Constituent Assembly, which is currently scheduled to conclude their process in August.
Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales are closely linked, and many fear they represent a new trend away from democracy, open markets, and the United States in Latin America. Overlooked are substantial differences between these two countries and from their Latin American neighbors.
What Venezuela and Bolivia do share is the weakness of their political institutions which results in large part from their history with democracy. Democracy emerged in Venezuela in the late 1950s and Bolivia in the early 1980s after elites joined together to form a “pact” that established the rules for the new governments.
These pacts brought stable democracy to both countries no easy feat in Latin America. But, these agreements left many policy issues particularly economic issues permanently off the agenda. They also encouraged the development of cartel-like political parties, more interested in staying in power than truly representing their own populations.
These dynamics excluded large percentages of the population in both countries from politics. In the face of economic turmoil, these poorer populations searched for someone to represent their interests and found outsider candidates Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales. Their elections ended the cozy arrangements between the traditional political parties and challenged the rules of the political game.
But here is where the outcomes in each country diverge. Due to Venezuela’s oil wealth, Chavez has vast resources to satisfy his heterogeneous political base – creating new schools, health care clinics, affordable housing, and food subsidies. Morales, in contrast, does not have the public resources to provide so abundantly for his supporters. Instead, divisions within his own coalition are emerging, questioning his ability to balance campaign promises with the country’s economic realities.
Politically, Chavez has successfully consolidated power retaining control now over the judiciary, the public bureaucracies, and the Congress. In Bolivia, we see a political standoff between the Morales’ political coalition and his opposition. The opposition including the traditional political parties – retains control of several governorships, and for the last six months has stymied any substantive debate within the Constituent Assembly. These political divisions are now leading to social unrest and violence. In short, the battle between these two sides has yet to be won.
These separate outcomes in Venezuela and Bolivia are both worrisome for democracy. But since they result from domestic factors, their spread throughout Latin America is unlikely. It shows that to counter these trends, however, we need to pay more attention domestic institutions, and less to the grandstanding of particular political leaders.
