Everyone in Bolivia is focusing on the shift toward “participatory democracy,” from the previous “representative democracy.” Some embrace this change enthusiastically, while others view it warily. What is clear is that the traditional political parties have disintegrated here, as they have in many other countries in the Andean region, including Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

It is also clear that new political parties are unlikely to arise anytime soon. Due to exclusion and corruption, the old system has been completely discredited. The MAS, which backs Evo Morales, is proud of its alternative organizational framework, based on linking various social movements and associations rather than forming a political party.

So where does this leave representation? Bolivia is institutionalizing a cycle which begins with protest marches, followed by negotiations with the government, and then ends in promises/governmental actions. These cycles are not necessarily new, as they played a key role in demand making in recent years. In fact, the inability of the governments of Sanchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa to fulfill promises made during the negotiation phase led in large part to their downfall.

But with the election of Evo Morales, these dynamics have changed in meaning. Rather than arising from the opposition, these protesters and their organizations are now part of the ruling MAS, institutionalizing this protest cycle as the main means of interest intermediation. And, the nature of demands has changed. And rather than focusing on big issues of political and social inclusion, or of national redistribution of resources, these protests tend to focus on specific group or individual needs. For instance, this week the marches in La Paz involved teachers and sellers of used clothes, each wanting an improvement in their own economic situation.

This transformation of interest intermediation - due to the decline in political parties - concentrates power in the Executive branch, and in Evo Morales. Other moves by the government - including the undermining of the judiciary - have added to this effect. What Evo does with this power remains to be seen. It may allow him to address historic injustices and issues by bypassing old elite and interest group issues. But, it may also lead to new patronage networks, inefficiency, corruption, and in the end renewed frustration by those wanting to see real change in Bolivia.

 

I am in Bolivia this week. In my meetings so far in La Paz, one common theme is the general support for Evo Morales. While there is significant frustration with the government, interviews with representatives from indigenous groups, from the middle class, from academic institutions and foundations, and with foreign diplomats (not to mention taxi drivers), show a general support for Morales and for his position as President. Almost all see him as genuine, as representative, and as capable of negotiating with the various interests within Bolivia.

Instead, people place blame elsewhere. Significant blame is placed on Morales cabinet and on his closest advisors. Many see them as being too radical in some cases, or not radical enough in others (especially on issues of particular interest to each group). They are also blamed for centralizing power. Instead of following through on Evo´s promise of broad participation, many view his closest advisors as making top-down and closed door decisions, much like governments in the past. Some even see the undue influence of foreign advisors, particularly Venezuelan, on government policies.

The continued support for Evo, despite the limits on actual policy changes in the first year and half of his government, questions the alarmist views often seen in the press. While frustrations continue, and marches are frequent through the downtown of the capital, there isn´t a sense here (at least in La Paz), of crisis or real unrest. That said, a few people see this as the lull before the storm, which will occur when the real negotiations happen (or more likely don´t happen in their view) within the Constituent Assembly, which is currently scheduled to conclude their process in August.

Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales are closely linked, and many fear they represent a new trend away from democracy, open markets, and the United States in Latin America. Overlooked are substantial differences between these two countries – and from their Latin American neighbors.

What Venezuela and Bolivia do share is the weakness of their political institutions – which results in large part from their history with democracy. Democracy emerged in Venezuela in the late 1950s and Bolivia in the early 1980s after elites joined together to form a “pact” that established the rules for the new governments.

These pacts brought stable democracy to both countries – no easy feat in Latin America. But, these agreements left many policy issues – particularly economic issues – permanently off the agenda. They also encouraged the development of cartel-like political parties, more interested in staying in power than truly representing their own populations.

These dynamics excluded large percentages of the population in both countries from politics. In the face of economic turmoil, these poorer populations searched for someone to represent their interests – and found outsider candidates Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales. Their elections ended the cozy arrangements between the traditional political parties – and challenged the rules of the political game.

But here is where the outcomes in each country diverge. Due to Venezuela’s oil wealth, Chavez has vast resources to satisfy his heterogeneous political base - creating new schools, health care clinics, affordable housing, and food subsidies. Morales, in contrast, does not have the public resources to provide so abundantly for his supporters. Instead, divisions within his own coalition are emerging, questioning his ability to balance campaign promises with the country’s economic realities.

Politically, Chavez has successfully consolidated power –retaining control now over the judiciary, the public bureaucracies, and the Congress. In Bolivia, we see a political standoff between the Morales’ political coalition and his opposition. The opposition – including the traditional political parties - retains control of several governorships, and for the last six months has stymied any substantive debate within the Constituent Assembly. These political divisions are now leading to social unrest and violence. In short, the battle between these two sides has yet to be won.

These separate outcomes in Venezuela and Bolivia are both worrisome for democracy. But since they result from domestic factors, their spread throughout Latin America is unlikely. It shows that to counter these trends, however, we need to pay more attention domestic institutions, and less to the grandstanding of particular political leaders.