Workers harvest sugar cane in a farm in Maringa, Brazil (Courtesy Reuters).
I am in Brazil this week, and met today with people from the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA). In Brazil this means they are active energy players, as over half of the crop in Brazil is used for ethanol. In recent years they have become an effective lobbying force not just in Brazil, but also in Washington (and in Brussels).
They presented an ambitious future, with production and productivity increasing to meet both rising internal demand for biofuels and big jumps in projected exports. Brazil’s sugar-based ethanol is far more energy efficient than U.S. corn-based ethanol, and getting more so through biological innovations. Today Brazil is the world’s second largest supplier and consumer of ethanol (bested only by the United States). Now the majority of its cars run on ethanol, consuming almost a third of the world supply. Brazil also has huge tracts of agricultural land that could support the projected growth in biofuels demand.
But a couple of challenges remain. One is transportation. Getting ethanol from the interior to the main industrial and urban markets (or to ports for export) remains a major issue. For the moment most is transported by truck (some also by train), but the state of roads makes this increasingly expensive as producers move away from Sao Paulo state. A group of sugarcane growers and mill owners are planning to build an ethanol pipeline, which would provide an innovative solution in the medium term (if they can come up with the financing).
A second is cheap gas. Where Brazilian biofuels were once competitive or nearly competitive with conventional fuels, the discovery of huge amounts of shale gas around the world is beginning to question the role of biofuels in filling global energy gaps. From the United States to Argentina to Europe, energy calculations and expectations are shifting, shaking up renewable enery markets in the process. Some 35 countries have mandates to increase the percentage of renewable energy in fuel, which will provide some support for biofuels markets. But companies and countries are less likely to make the infrastructure and distribution investments needed for broader usage in a cheap gas world.
Brazil is a world leader today in biofuels through its dominance in sugar-based ethanol. It is working to expand that role internally and abroad. But it remains to be seen what role biofuels will play in the global energy matrix, and whether they will be surpassed by second generation cellulosic biofuels, or by other types of fuel more generally.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Pedestrians look at the front pages of newspapers on a street in Quito October 1, 2007. President Rafael Correa's party on Sunday battled for a majority of seats in the election of an assembly the leftist leader said will challenge discredited political elites by drafting a new constitution (Guillermo Granja/Courtesy Reuters).
Last Wednesday, Ecuador’s Supreme Court upheld sentences handed down in July 2011 for four members of the El Universo newspaper’s staff in the latest chapter of a lengthy and controversial trial. Three of the newspaper’s directors, Carlos, César, and Nícolas Perez, and an editorialist, Emilio Palacio, face three years in jail and $40 million in fines. All have fled the country or sought asylum abroad, and many expect that the fines (if collected) will bankrupt the 90-year-old periodical.
The February 2011 article that incited the controversy, entitled “NO a las Mentiras” by Emilio Palacio, alleged that during the September 2010 uprising Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa ordered troops to fire on a hospital filled with unarmed civilians. President Correa vigorously denied these claims and filed a libel suit in March 2011. He claims that the defendants are part of a powerful private media aiming to undermine his government and said a court victory “would represent a great step forward for the liberation of our Americas from one of the largest and most unpunished powers: the corrupt media.”
The case has been a messy back-and-forth, full of demands for written retractions, refusals of retraction offers, and accusations of judicial corruption—capturing the attention of international human rights organizations and free press advocates. Newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post have published highly critical op-eds on the case, saying that Correa is conducting “the most comprehensive and ruthless assault on free media under way in the Western Hemisphere.”
This is just one of several clashes between Correa and the press. This month Ecuadorian journalists Juan Carlos Calderón and Christian Zurita were both fined $1 million for their book, Gran Hermano, which detailed government contracts given to Correa’s brother Fabricio. The government recently passed a law that bans the media from “either directly or indirectly promoting any given candidate, proposal, options, electoral preferences or political thesis, through articles, specials or any other form of message.”
Ecuador isn’t the only Latin American country with tense government-media relations. Hugo Chavez’s battles with opposition-leaning television and radio stations are well-known, and the Kirchners of Argentina have had legendary fights with long-standing newspapers Clarín and La Nación. President Cristina Kirchner recently nationalized the only domestic supplier of newsprint (leading many to worry that this will increase the state’s influence over these news outlets).
Granted, in some places and cases the press hasn’t been guilt free. In many countries it is concentrated in a few hands, and those individuals have at times chosen to present biased views of politicians and events. These aggressive attacks on ideological opponents have not fostered a more open and inclusive society.
What is true is that a strong, independent, and responsible media is vital for Latin America’s democratic future. The challenge now is to both encourage and enable the press to play the role of watchdog. To become substantive (versus just electoral) democracies, Ecuador and other nations must think beyond the ballot box.
I look forward to your feedback via twitter, facebook or in the comments section.
I sat down last week with Bernie Gwertzman to talk about the top issues facing Mexico and U.S.-Mexican relations. In the interview we discussed Mexico’s economic prosperity (despite drug violence), immigration reform, and the importance of Mexico’s upcoming presidential election on both sides of the border. Here is an excerpt:
There have been reports about Mexico’s thriving economy amid continuing drug violence. Does this sort of ambivalence truly exist in Mexico right now?
It is true. Mexico is a place that’s seen a huge escalation in violence. Under President Felipe Calderon over the last five years, we’ve seen almost 50,000 people killed in drug-related murders. But at the same time, Mexico’s economy has actually been doing quite well since the end of the global recession. Mexico was the hardest hit in Latin America but it’s recovered quite quickly, and in part it’s been due to a huge boom in manufacturing along the border tied to U.S. companies and to U.S. consumers.
We’ve seen a boom in tourism. There have been record levels of tourists over the last year in Mexico–to its beaches, to its colonial cities, and to Mexico City. And we’ve also seen the benefit of high oil prices as Mexico still produces a good amount of oil and much of it for the United States.
The U.S. Congress can’t seem to get its hands on this issue. They tried in 2007 and failed to pass legislation. GOP candidate Mitt Romney has suggested “self-deportation.” Will it work?
What we saw in 2011 was many fewer people coming to the United States, and the number leaving was about the same. We didn’t see an increase in the people leaving the United States, the “self-deportation” that Romney talks about. But we saw many fewer people coming. And there are a few reasons for that.
One is the economic pull and push. In Mexico, the economy rebounded somewhat so there was less of a push from there, and the U.S. economy’s still quite weak, particularly in sectors that Mexicans would come to work in, so the pull of the U.S. economy is less. Another reason is U.S. border enforcement. There is some evidence that the increase in security and the hardening of the border has discouraged people from trying to come across. It’s much more expensive and it’s much more dangerous.
But third, one of the real reasons we’re seeing this decrease is a demographic shift. Given the falling birth rates in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, fewer Mexicans are turning eighteen and entering the labor force each year compared to, say, twenty years ago. There’s somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 fewer Mexicans turning eighteen today than there was back in 1990, when we saw the start of the emigration boom.
I look forward to your feedback via twitter, facebook or in the comments section.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
I wrote a piece for CNN Global Public Square entitled “Illegal Immigration and the 2012 Campaign,” which highlights the role illegal immigration plays in the 2012 U.S. presidential race. In it I discuss how the rhetoric does not always match up to current immigration realities, and how the Hispanic vote will affect the upcoming election. Here is a brief excerpt:
As the country begins to turn to the general election next November, immigration remains a difficult issue for both political parties. During the early Republican primary debates, candidates talked enthusiastically about mass deportations and expanding, doubling, and even electrifying the U.S. southern border fence to keep people out. As the field has narrowed, the leading contenders have continued with a hard-line. Romney in particular, though widely seen as a centrist candidate, has taken an unyielding stance on immigration, supporting Arizona’s and Alabama’s restrictive laws and aligning himself with their architect – well-known anti-immigrant official Kris Kobach.
The tone got so strident in the lead up to the Florida primary on January 31 that Florida Senator Marco Rubio (who many say is a potential candidate for Vice President) chastised the Republican candidates for “harsh and intolerable and inexcusable” anti-immigrant rhetoric.
The Democratic Party’s discourse has been more measured. Though all condemn illegal immigration, most speak of immigrants as “folks … just trying to earn a living and provide for their families,” no different from so many forebearers. But in concrete terms, President Obama has little to show immigrants – and more importantly Hispanic voters – from his three plus years in office.
I look forward to your feedback via twitter, facebook or in the comments section.
Guatemalan President Molina walks with his El Salvadoran counterpart Funes at the presidential house in Guatemala City (Jorge Lopez/Courtesy Reuters).
This is a guest post by Natalie Kitroeff, a research associate here at the Council on Foreign Relations who works with me in the Latin America program. She received her BA from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.
Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina has been acting strange lately. Just one month after his inauguration, he is already ruffling U.S. feathers, and making waves in the politics of the region in unexpected ways.
Pérez Molina’s military past and hard-line “mano dura” security policy made many worry that he would backtrack on justice reforms led by the UN Commission against Impunity (CICIG) and the new Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz. Instead, the new president has come out in support of these institutions. Last week he announced that when CICIG’s mandate runs out in 2013, he plans on extending it for another two years without seeking congressional approval. This preemptive decision was in response to a lawsuit filed last month against Álvaro Colom, alleging that CICIG has no right to be in the country because the executive branch bypassed congress to approve its current mandate. The interior minister followed up by asking CICIG to vet his staff to identify any links they may have with organized crime. Vowing to keep Paz y Paz on board for the foreseeable future, Pérez Molina has also stayed neutral as her office tries former de facto President Efraín Ríos Montt on crimes against humanity charges for his role in the civil war (in which the current president was deeply involved).
But after this string of pleasant surprises, Pérez Molina’s most recent about face has drawn annoyance and even anger from the United States. Last Saturday he raised the possibility of legalizing drugs in Central America, saying he’d put the debate on the table in future meetings with regional leaders. He followed through on this promise on Monday, when he discussed decriminalization with Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes (who first agreed to consider the option, and later retracted facing pressure from Washington). The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala responded with a swift condemnation of the proposal.
So what is Pérez Molina’s endgame? A popular theory is that he’s trying to pressure the United States into lifting its ban on weapons sales to Guatemala, instituted in 1978 due to the military’s role in human rights abuses during the civil conflict. This makes sense. The president has spoken openly and frequently about his desire to buy U.S. arms, pressing the issue with head of Southern Command Douglas Fraser during their meeting last November (Fraser said the embargo may well be lifted in the near future). Threatening to decriminalize drugs as a last resort solution the problem of organized crime could pressure the United States to offer an alternative: renewed military aid.
But Pérez Molina may also be making a more ambitious attempt to alter the long-standing foundations of U.S. relations with Guatemala and Central America more broadly. The six-country region has largely been an afterthought in U.S. security cooperation with Latin America, which has historically centered on the larger economies of Colombia and Mexico. In FY2013 Central America will receive $60 million in U.S. security aid– less than half of the funds destined for Colombia and a third of total aid to Mexico – and of that Guatemala gets a paltry $2 million. Meanwhile, Pérez Molina inherited a country with one of the highest murder rates in the world, and an impunity rate of 95 percent (meaning just 5 in every 100 crimes are solved).
The legalization debate is a way of putting Central America – and Guatemala in particular – on the United States’ radar screen. It is also a way of asserting the country’s autonomy from Washington. Pérez Molina joins a long list of leaders calling for decriminalization, including former presidents of Mexico, Brazil and Colombia. In an era of waning American influence in Latin America, he may to be trying to align Guatemala more closely with its regional partners, pulling a country long beholden to the United States out from under its powerful shadow.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Presidential candidate Henrique Capriles speaks to his supporters after knowing the results of the election in Caracas (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Courtesy Reuters).
Things are heating up in the two presidential races facing Latin America this year. On the heels of Josefina Vázquez Mota’s victory in the PAN party primary last week, on Sunday Venezuela hosted yet another historic vote. For the first time since Chávez won the presidency 1999, the opposition united, giving Venezuelans the chance to choose a single candidate to run in the general election this October against Chávez. And vote they did. Nearly 3 million ballots were cast in a massive turnout, which is particularly impressive given that many (particularly those with public sector jobs) fear even being seen in line to vote, as it would paint them as opposition sympathizers, perhaps costing them their jobs.
Longstanding front-runner Henrique Capriles Radonski won the contest by a convincing margin, taking 62 percent of the vote to Pablo Perez’s 29 percent. The 39-year-old Governor of Venezuela’s second largest state (Miranda) told a boisterous crowd of followers last night, “We came to build a distinct future, we came to build a future for all Venezuelans. Now is not the hour of left nor right; it is the hour of Venezuela, of all Venezuelans.”
Capriles Radonski – and the opposition more generally – seem to have learned a few important lessons after 12 plus years out in the cold. Most importantly, they have come around to the need to come together in order to take on a dominating incumbent. In the past, divisions and infighting stymied the opposition at least as much as Chávez’s electoral machinations. They have also learned the payoff of appealing to the center, and competing with rather than condemning the social programs and public works projects that appeal to the poor – an estimated 30 percent of this oil rich country. Capriles Radonski in particular does this well, donning the “Lula” mantle and advocating policies to spur inclusive economic growth, benefitting Venezuelans rich and poor.
The opposition looks to focus on issues of escalating crime, stagnant growth and rising inflation. But even with this momentum, Chávez will still be hard to beat. Polls show him with just over 50 percent popularity, and diehard support of a third of the population. He also dominates the radio and television airwaves, and has billions at his disposal to spend on campaigning – high world oil prices favor the government. Still, his health remains an issue, calling into question whether he can meet the rigors of the campaign trail, particularly vis-à-vis the energetic Capriles. But despite the uneven playing field, the opening start suggests a close (and closely watched) election season.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Vazquez Mota celebrates after winning the primary election to be the National Action Party’s candidate for president, in Mexico city. (Edgard Garrido/Courtesy Reuters).
I wrote a piece on Vázquez Mota and what it means for the Mexican election for Foreign Affairs entitled “Vázquez Mota and the 2012 Mexican Election”. In it I argue that she has the potential to upend the presidential race, but only if she can raise her profile and generate enthusiasm in the all important female vote (over half of the electorate). Here is an excerpt:
Last Sunday, Mexico’s incumbent National Action Party (PAN) chose its presidential candidate: Josefina Vázquez Mota, who won the party’s primary to become the first female presidential candidate from a major political party in Mexican history. But Vázquez Mota’s triumph was not a coup just because of her gender. She got the PAN nod (only party leaders, known as “militants,” actually vote in Mexican primaries), over President Felipe Calderón’s handpicked candidate, Ernesto Cordero. And Vázquez Mota’s victory was decisive — she took 55 percent of the vote to Cordero’s 38 percent. Despite their differences, President Calderón, her recent rivals, and the party quickly rallied behind her.
In the presidential election, which is set for July 1, Vázquez Mota will compete in a three-way race. The current front-runner is the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) Enrique Peña Nieto, the telegenic former governor of the state of Mexico; he maintains a twenty point lead in national polls. Voters like him because of his good looks, his fairytale family history (his wife died, then he married a soap opera star), and his public works largesse when in office. He also benefits from the partisan support of 19 of Mexico’s 32 governors. Not only will those governors endorse him, but they will boost Peña Nieto’s campaign with their abundant resources, ensuring widespread local media coverage, packed campaign rallies, and strong get-out-the vote drives. And then there is Televisa, Mexico’s largest media company, which has virtually adopted Peña Nieto; their camera crews are always close by and quick to flatter him.
It is Vázquez Mota’s place on the ticket, though, that has the potential to upend Mexican politics. Unlike her two challengers, who are linked to the old guard and old boys’ network, as a woman, Vázquez Mota can claim to be the mantle of change. And she can make that claim even against her own party, which has ruled the country for 12 years, a time of mediocre economic growth and increasing drug-related violence. Of course, as the first female candidate, her election would mark a definitive break with the past. But she also brings substantial political experience as a former minister of education and of social development and, most recently, as head of her party in the lower house. She also proved her knack for campaigning in the PAN primary debates where she outshone her competitors with her clarity and charm.
I look forward to your feedback via twitter, facebook or in the comments section.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
An aerial view of the final stage of the construction of the new P-56 semi-submersible production platform for the oil company Petrobas at the Brasfels shipyard in Angra dos Reis (Sergio Moraes/Courtesy Reuters).
There has been a lot of talk about the shifting geopolitical weight from the east to the west due to the growth of energy resources in Latin America. Ever growing oil discoveries off the coast of Brazil, hundreds of trillions of cubic feet of shale gas in Argentina, and booming energy markets in Colombia and Peru have led many to bet on Latin America as the next energy frontier. Tempering the enthusiasm is the stagnation or even decline in output in other places — Bolivia, Mexico and Venezuela — despite the buried potential riches.
University of California, San Diego political science professor David Mares was here at the Council last week talking about these issues and had a number of interesting takeaways. One was to move the discussion beyond simple resource nationalism. In nearly all Latin American countries the government is involved in the energy sector, but production, prices, and property rights vary dramatically. The question then is how the political systems work or don’t work to encourage the exploitation of this wealth. Here the on-the-ground realities get quite complicated.
What’s interesting as we try to estimate a geopolitical resource shift is that Latin American nations fall somewhere between the two best known energy-based political models. Though Latin American democracies have made great strides in the last two to three decades, they’re still a far cry from the Norways of the world, which have managed huge natural resources with considerable aplomb, using them to spur widespread and inclusive economic growth. Unlike Norway, government institutions are often weak, energy prices can be highly politicized (and subsidized), and nefarious characters such as guerilla groups or drug traffickers vie for control of energy rich areas.
But resource rich Latin American nations are still politically more open, and hence less potentially volatile than their Middle Eastern counterparts (think Iran, Iraq, or Libya). Every country in the region besides Cuba is at the very least an electoral democracy (and at best an inclusive and substantive one), and in general Congresses and Courts play a role in policy making.
As new resources come online, the real question is whether these countries can strengthen institutions and move closer toward the Norway model, rather than a more autocratic or conflict ridden situation. In that, some legislative gridlock might actually be a good sign, as it ensures more incremental and predictable policy changes in the energy sphere.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Below is a video interview I did for the Council on Foreign Relations’ Campaign 2012 series. In it I talk about the three big issues in U.S.-Latin America policy facing the next presidential term: security, immigration and economic relations. I look forward to your feedback in the comments section.
Published in conjunction with Latin America’s Moment at the Council on Foreign Relations.
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Latin America’s Economic Outlook Below is a video interview I did for the Council on Foreign Relations’ Campaign 2012 series. In it I talk about the three big issues in U.S.-Latin America policy facing the next presidential term: security, immigration and economic relations. I look forward to your feedback in the comments section.
(To watch the video on Youtube, click here.)
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Changes in Mexican Migration Below is a video interview I did for the Council on Foreign Relations’ Campaign 2012 series. In it I talk about the three big issues in U.S.-Latin America policy facing the next presidential term: security, immigration and economic relations. I look forward to your feedback in the comments section.
(To watch the video on Youtube, click here.)
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