Dr. Edgardo Buscaglia, a law professor at the Autonomous Technological Institute in Mexico City and a senior legal and economic adviser to the UN and the World Bank, concluded in a recent report that 17 of Mexico’s 31 states have become virtual narco-republics, where organized crime has infiltrated government, the courts, and the police so extensively that there is almost no way they can be cleaned up. The drug gangs have acquired a “military capacity” that enables them to confront the army on an almost equal footing.

If this is accurate, then it suggests that the cartels already control most of the country, at least in terms of the number of states. Whatever your view of the Mexican Army, that it is corrupt or that it is top heavy as the other commenter noted, or that it is inept, one thing seems clear: it has already lost a huge chunk of Mexico to the cartels.

Except that their agenda is criminal and not political, is the current state of Mexico any appreciably different than a successful insurgency? and if that is the case, can Calderon’s army, even if not inseperably linked to the institutional corruption of the PRI, ever succeed?

When you consider that there is one general for every 333 soldiers in the Mexican Army, compared to one general for every 1,720 soldiers in the US Army, we have a top-heavy scenario. These numbers coupled with the fact that generals earn US$13,000.00 a month, compared to recruits, who earn US$453 a month, spells out what we would consider a significant problem with pay for recruits.

Another consideration: the contract for a recruit is three years. But when a soldier is deployed, the Mexican Army can extend the recruit’s term of service by a total of six more years. This, in part, is why we’ve seen a consistent number of soldiers A.W.O.L. Keep in mind that when they leave, they know that no one will hunt them down for desertion. The only real penalty, apart from foregone pay, is that their command post retains federal identification documents. These are easily forged.

Our consistent worry, apart from human rights abuses and corruption, is that the military’s presence in the streets exposes soldiers to a criminal element that can pay them better, offer them better equipment, and in at least the case of the Zetas, can offer them benefits for their families and an esprit de corps that in many places has begun to falter across the Mexican Army deployments.

We don’t suggest that all who choose to go A.W.O.L. go rogue and join the ranks of organized crime. This is not the case. But there is an opportunity and a strong incentive. The longer the military remains in the streets, the longer soldiers will have to think about crossing to the “dark side.”

Along with a discussion over human rights and corruption, we should consider this exposure, as exposure is what likely most contributes to abuses and corruption.